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L INTRODUCTION

Countless rimes a day, wilnesses in court are sworn to tell "me wholie
truth." 1 But do we mean it? The simple fact is that our adversarial legal
culture condones a large measure of selective reporting by witnesses as weB
as selective presentation of doclilllentar<; or real evidence. This tolerance
for partial truths is premised on the theory that the partiality of one side
will be offSet by the partiality of the other. Amid this adversarial dash, one
wonders whether the mandate to tell "the whole truth," as distinct from
the mandate not to lie, has any practical significance. 2
Of course, the adversarial contest is governed by a variety of
procedural rules that regulate the partiality of the evidence introduced.
The most significant are rules of discovery, which allow parties access to
the information needed to supply that which their adversaries omit, and
rules requiring wilnesses to submit to cross-examination. Collectively, these
mles enhance and protect the capacit'f of the system to provide adversa..vial
cures for adversarial partiality. Also of considerable importance, though
less so since the expansion of discovery rights, are the rules of admissibility.
Many of these rules control partiality more directly by exerting pressure on
parties to present preferred forms of evidence, such as assertions subject to
3
cross-examination and documents subject to direct inspection.
The so-called "rule of completeness" is different It constitutes the
most direct way that the law of evidence rro~nifests a commitment to
override adversarial partiality in the presentation of evidence. Whereas
most acLrnissibility rules are exclusionary, operating against a badcground
preference for the admissibility of relevant evidence! the completeness
rule is explicitly inclusionary. It affirmatively provides for the admission of
5
evidence needed to understand other evidence already admitted. The

1. The language appea.rs in Lhe familiar requirement of a.'l oath "to tell the truth, the
whole truth, a.11d nothing but the truth." See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat.§ 13-90-117 (1987); Fla. Stat.
Ann.§ 90.605 (West 1979); Ind. Code§ 34-1-14-2 (1986).
2. The problem of selective questioning of witnesses is exacerbated in this country by
the fairly peiV<ISive practice of coaching witnesses. See generally John S. Applegate, Witness
Preparation, 58 Tex. L. Rev. 227 (1989).
3. See generally Dale A. Na.1ce, The Best Evidence Principle, '73 Iowa L. Rev. 227 (1988)
[hereinafter Best Evidence]. To be sure, the exclusionary rules sometimes generate their own
distorting side effects. See, e.g., Stephen A. Saltzburg, A Special Aspect of Relevance:
Countering Negative Inferences Associated with the Absence of Evidence, 66 Cal. L. Rev. 1011
(197ll) (discussing problem of jury discounting f01 fuilure to produce evidence 1·1hen,
unbeknownst to jury, party who would be expected to present such evidence has tried
unsuccessfully to introduce it).
4. See, e.g., Fed. R Evid. 402 (providing that all relevant evidence is admissible except as
limited by explicit rule). See generally James B. Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at
the Common Law 253-'70 (1898).
5. See generally Charles T. McCormick, McCormick on Evidence § 56 (3d ed. 1984).
Besides the completeness rule, the only general inclusionary rules, other than constitutional
limitations on the e.xdusion of reliabie evidence, are the doctrine of curative admissibility, id.
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former "completes" the latter.
This root idea-favoring the "whole" evidence, if not the whole
truth-provides a potentially wide open door to the admission of evidence,
since relevant evidence will almost always aid in understanding other
information presented on the same material issue. It thus carries the
potential to undermine the entire system of evidence rules. If one side
introduces evidence E1 on some material issue, an adversary may want to
introduce evidence E2 that affects what the trier of fact infers from E1 about
that issue or about other issues in the case. If the presentation of E2 is
blocked by some exclusionary or regulatory evidence rule, the adversary
may appeal to the principle of completeness in an effort to override the
obstruction. And if this is to be allowed, what evidence rule could remain
intact?
Not surprisingly, the completeness principle has been constrained so
as to apply only in certain special contexts. For example, the most
commonly encountered codification of the doctrine is Federal Rule of
Evidence I 06:
When a writing or -recorded statement or part thereof is
introduced by a party, an adverse party may require the
introduction at that time of any other part or any other writing or
recorded statement that ought in fairness to be considered
contemporaneously with it.
On its face, this provision limits the completeness idea to assuring the
presentation of the entire relevant portion of a writing or recorded
statement. Still, the rule applies quite broadly in certain respects. Unlike
most other rules that affirmatively provide for the admission of evidence,
the rule of completeness is not tied to a particular exclusionary rule: 6
Therein lies both its potential power and its realized ambiguity.
On the one hand, the completeness rule might operate across
admissibility rules, trumping any that would otherwise require the
exclusion of potentially "completing" evidence. Alternatively, it might be
subordinate to such exclusionary: rules, having only some narrower

§ 57, and the doctrine of waiver of objections, id. § 55. The relationship of curative
admissibility to completeness is discussed infra Part ill.B.
6. Given the presumptive admissibility of relevant evidence, most other inclusionary
rules are simply exceptions to exclusionary rules that would otherwise apply. Usually, the
status of a rule as an exception is obvious, especially under modern codifications. However,
some rules require closer inspection. For example, Fed. R Evid. 609 mandates the
admissibility of certain evidence that a witness has been convicted of crime, but it is clear
from the context that the ruJe operates as an exception to the otherwise applicable exclusion
of character evidence. See Fed. R Evid. 404, 608(b). Yet Rule 609 also operates as an
exception to the hearsay prohibition as it would apply to a report of the conclusion of a
separate trier of fuct. Cf. Fed. R Evid. 803(22).
It should also be noted that there is a much narrower completeness provision in the
Federal Rules that is tied to a particular exclusionary rule. See Fed. R Evid. 410(i) (providing
for admissibility against defendant of statement made in plea negotiations when necessary to
understand another admitted statement from same discussions).
c
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procedw.-al effect indicated by the "at til.at time" language. Modem case
bw and commentary are split on fuis question, .reflecting substanti.all
confusion about the .rationale of the rule.'' In thls Article I wiH endorse the
view that the most important modern function of the completeness rule is
to trump oLhenvi_se applicable exdusionar1 rules, though not ever/ rule in
every instance. I will also offer the general proposition that it should
almost always trump one la:rge and important class of exclusionary rules,
those based upon the "best evidence" principle, that is, the principle that
parties should present to the tribunal the epistemically best evidence
8
available to them on a given litigated issue. The trumping effect arises
naturally from the fact that the completeness rule is itself an instantiation
of that principle.
Beyond these specific conclusions, this study of the completeness :n:ule
is valuable for the light that it sheds on the complex ways in which the
Anglo-American system of adjudication ~·esponds to partiality of
presentations. It demonstcrates that we accept evidentiary partiality in orde:r
to gain the benefits of an adversarial procedure. \1\T'nen those benefits a:re
compromised, the commitment to adversarial procedure is weakened. lln
particular, when accuracy of adjudication is at risk, the adversary system :is
often modified to a.udio:rate the problem, even at the cost of some loss in
9
party autonomy in the conduct of tria1s.
The analysis proceeds i.1 two stages. Part H of the .Article examines
completeness under the common law of evidence, by which I shall mean
evidence law apart from me Federal Rules of Evidence and sirnilar state
codifications. This examination yields a mo.re precise picture of the
common-!Lrw doctrine than heretofore available and identifies three
distinguishable functions that it pe.rfo:rms. The discussion also establishes
the importance of completeness in contexts noi limited to "writings or
recorded statements," the language of Federal Rule 106. With this
badcg:round, the more theoretical Part HI .relates the completeness
doctrine to the best evidence prirrcip1e, ru;;ng the resulti.Dg Lnsights to
distinguish completeness from the .related doctrine of curative admissibility,
sometimes suggested as the source of the power to tiump otherwise
applicable exclusionary :rules. Most importantly, this exawjnation allows us
to identity a test for when the trumping of such exclusionary rules should
occur. Part rv concludes with an indication of future work on the
:implications of this study for the interpretation and evaluation of the
treatment of completeness under the Federal Rules.

7. This issue has been called "by fur the most intriguing" problem to arise in connection
with Rule 106. Emerging Problems Under the Federal Rules of Evidence (2d ed.) ABA Sec.
on Litig. 21 (West 199]).
8. See Nance, Best Evidence, supra note 3, at 230-47.
9. See id. at 234-39, 242-43, 263-70.
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II. THE COMMON-LAW HERITAGE: IDENTIFYING FuNCTIONS OF THE
COMPLETENESS DOCTRINE

In order to understand" the modem completeness doctrine, a reexamination of its common-law origins is indispensable. Indeed, this is a
classic example of the importance of doctrinal history in the interpretation
of codified rules. Unfortunately, though not surprisingly, that history
reveals both complexity and confusion. Much of the difficulty arises from
the brevity of judicial opinions on evidentiary questions generally, and
completeness questions in particular. Cryptic opinions pose a serious
challenge to interpretive efforts. And of course, even under the most
careful scrutiny, the large number of opinions from courts at every level
dating back over two hundred years cannot all be perfectly harmonized.
What follows, therefore, is a necessarily brief summary of the mature
common-law completeness rule, articulated with an unavoidable, yet
historically sound, interpretive gloss. It is, however, much more than a
mere restatement of the received wisdom. By exploring the rationale of the
doctrine at greater depth than· previously attempted, the discussion dispels
several confusions that have beset the doctrine, confusions that have
appeared in both judicial opinions and academic commentary.

A. Defining "Wholeness"
Wigmore's synthesis of the common-law rule provides an excellent
starting point, although it is not without flaws. What Wigmore called the
doctrine of ''Verbal Completeness" 10 is triggered when a party (hereafter
the "proponent") presents evidence of only part of a verbal utterance,
written or oral, rather than the entire utterance. 11 The basic idea can be
traced at least as fu back as a famous seventeenth century English trial in
which the defendant argued against piecemeal use of passages from his
allegedly seditious manuscript. 12 Rather than simply leaving the adversely
affected party (hereafter the "opponent") to complain of unfairness, the
modern doctrine offers a more significant remedy, the exact contours of
which will be addressed momentarily. In other words, the doctrine is a
response to the advertent or inadvertent creation of false impressions made
by taking language out of context, and it may be summarized in the
principle that "the whole of a verbal utterance must be taken together." 13

10. See7 John H. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law ch. 73 (Chadbourn rev.
1978).
11. Id. § 2094, at 595-97. Wigmore's use of the term "verbal" is intended to embrace both
oral and written communication. Id. at 595 n.l. The same convention is followed here.
12. Id. at 601 (summarizing Algernon Sidney's Trial, 9 How. St Tr. 8.18, 868 (KB.
1683)).
13. 7 Wigmore, supra note 10, § 2094, at 601-07 (quoted language appearing at 604;
emphasis in original). Wigmore distinguished two types of incompleteness, that arisin_g from
imprecision of an evidentiary recounting and that arising from a lack of the entirety of the parts of
the original event ld. at 597-601. We are here concerned only with the latter type. The
former, concerning whether a witness may testify to the gist or net purport of an out-of-court
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The expansive force of the completeness principle is t.h.us consttained
by the idea of a verbal utterance, since ilie aff.t.rw..al:ive license or demand
for the admission of evidence can extend no further !.han to the entirety of
such an event This supposes, of course, the individuation of communications i..1to identifiable events that may qualify as "wholes," though it does
not necessarily assume that such individuation is unique, that it can be
performed ii"1 only one way. The common-law doctrine is thoroughly
modern in that its point is to achieve an understanding of evidence based
on wholeness of meaning, even if there is no "value-free" criterion of
wholeness. Wigmore succinctly identified the resulting tension:
But what is the whole of the utterance? No doubt this principle of
entirety is flexible in its application. A simple thought requires
but a simple utterance; a complex thought, a complicated
utterance. When, therefore, we obey the canon that the whole of
the utterance must be considered, the scope of our survey may be
very variable, so fur as concerns the mere number of words,
sentences, or paragraphs. The whole that is to be considered is
obviously not the whole of a phrase or a paragraph, any more
than it is the whole of the printer's line or page, but the whole of
thought - that is, such a quantity of utterance as the utterer has
indicated to be distinct and entire in itself, for the purpose of
jcepresenting a distinct thought. . . . Thus t.i-}e possibilities are
infinite and the boundaries indefmite in this search for entirety of
utterance. It will be difficult for the law, in applying the principle,
to employ any fJ.Xed test. Yet the law cannot be expected to be
satisfied practically with the indefiniteness which in theory the
conception of entirety involves; and therefore the application of it
is full of difficulties. 14
Although the identification of verbal events may present difficult problems,
that :is not to say that it cannot practically be performed. As is often the
case in handling such dilemmas, the key to an identification of whole
verbal events will be context The practicol "bounda_ries" of t.he who!e -..vi!!
be a function of both the purposes for which the original portion may
legitimately lbe used aa>d the purposes seiVed lby invoicing the completeness
doctrine.

verbal event rather than its exact words, presents a problem the treatment of which has now
largely merged with the lay opinion rules. See generally id. §§ 2097, 2098. A similar confluence
can be seen with respect to the issue of precision of secondary evidence of the contents of a
document or other recording and the rule preferring originals when trying to prove the
contents thereof. Su; genemlly id. §§ 2105-11. Of course, the risks of each type of incompleteness partly account for the necessity of all those rules that constrain the means by which one
can prove out-of-court verbal events, including the lay opinion rule, the original recording
rule, and the hearsay rule, a fuct that will prove to be of considerable importance.
14. Id. § 2094, at 604 (emphasis in original).
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1. The Relevance Test
With resp~ct to the fanner, a substantial amount of case law addresses
the standard by which one is to measure wholeness. Wigmore offered the
following synthesis of the nann animating these decisions: "No more of the
remainder of the utterance than concerns the same subject, and is explanatory of the
first part, is receivable" under the principle of completeness. 15 While this
way of expressing the matter seems to depend upon a prior determination
of what constitutes the "remainder" of a verbal utterance, one may take it
to be the refinement of a pre-analytic notion. Such a broader notion of the
whole--extending to all that the person said or wrote at that time on the
subject-matter of the suit-is sometimes encountered, especially in
questions about the entirety of a criminal defendant's admission or
confession. 16 Wigmore thought the narrower restriction necessary "so that
the opponent shall not, under cloak of this conceded right, put in
utterances which do not come within its principle and would be

15. 7 Wigmore, supra'note 10, § 2113, at 656 (emphasis in original). Actually, Wigmore
offers this as one of three restrictions on the use of the remainder, the other two being: "No
utterance i=levant to the issue is receivab~" and "The remainder thus received merely aids in the
construction of the utterance as a wlwle, and is not in itself testimony." ld (emphasis in original).
The former might seem to be entailed by the restriction quoted in the text, but by reasserting
t..~e overarc...~ing requirement of rele-vC.l'lCe, it affirms thai qualifications of admitted portions
do not become admissible when they concern irrelevancies. See id at 656-57. The latter
additional restriction does not address the boundaries of the verbal event at all, but rather the
nature of the use of remainder evidence. See United States v. McCorkle, 511 F.2d 482, 487 n.4
(7th Cir. 1974) (en bane) (endorsing the first two restrictions and distinguishing the third},
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 826 (1975). I argue later that Wigmore was wrong about this last
restriction. See infra note 56 and accompanying text.
16. Compare I Simon Greenleaf, Greenleaf on Eviden~:e § 218 (re~. ed. 1899) (noting
early cases admitting remainder of confessions, the defendant "not being confined to so much
only as is explanatory of the part already proved against him, but being permitted to give
evidence of all that was said upon that occasion, relative to the subject-matter in issue"}, with J
Commonwealth v. Watson, 388 N.E.2d 680, 686-91 (Mass. 1979) (holding that after
prosecution used part of defendant's out-of-court statement to show defendant's consciousness of guilt, the remainder was properly excluded as not relevant to the admitted portion),
and People v. Ramos, 512 N.E.2d 304 (N.Y. 1987) (holding that after partial introduction of
defendant's prior statements to impeach defendant's testimony, defendant's completeness
motion was properly rejected in absence of showing of relevance to rehabilitation by affecting
understanding of prior inconsistent statement). The broader view of wholeness seems not
even to have gained much of a foothold in this country with respect to utterances other than
those of a criminal defendant. Compare Clark v. Smith, I 0 Conn. 1, 5 (1833) (applying broader
standard to admissions of a civil defendant), with Commonwealth v. Keyes, 77 Mass. (11 Gray)
323 (1858} (applying narrower standard in rejecting completeness argument with respect to
utterances of non-defendant in criminal case), and Rouse v. Whited, 25 N.Y. 170 (1862)
(applying narrower standard in rejecting completeness argument with respect to utterances
proved in civil cases). ·The same point is true under codifications of the completeness rule. A
modern example is People v. Perry, 499 P.2d 129, 148 (Cal. 1972) (interpreting codification
allowing admission of "the whole on the same subject" as "necessarily subject to the
qualification that the court may exclude those portions of the conversation not relevant to the
items thereof which have been introduced").
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otherwise ... inadmissible." • Conversely, a statement Lhat is not part of
what was said or written at the same time is not ordinarily embraced within
the rule, even if it qualifies the admitted statement, so Lhe pre-analytic
18
notion continues to have bite. This collection of restrictions on the use
of completing evidence will be called the "relevance test" for wholeness,
even though it is obviously important to lceep in mi...1d that these
.restrictions are tighter than one simply requiring the :remainder to be
relevant to the material issues in the case.
The application of the relevance test can be controversial even in
those courts, the vast majority, that unequivocally endorse the narrower
:restrictions advocated by Wigmore. The explanation for this lies in the
variety of ways that the .remainder can serve to explain or qualify fue
original part .i1Jthough :neit.~er piliuillt-f nor secondaJ-y authoJiities r.nalc.e
any conscious effort to distinguish among these modes of completion, one
ca..n readily illustrate the variety. In each of the following hypotheticals the
whole of the statement is given, with the portion omitted by the proponent
in italics:
Evidence that a defendant, charged wiu'l a chainsaw slaying,
said, ''Yes, I sawed him then, but I ain't seen him later thai
day."

Case 2:

Evidence that a defendant, rharged 1vith murder, said, "I
may have killed him."
Case 3: Evidence that a defendant, charged -.vith murder, said, "I
killed him, as I would kill any invader from Mars."
Case 4: Evidence that a defendant, charged with murder, said, "I
shot Iight at him, but I missed."
Case 5: Evidence that a defendant, charged with murder, said,
''You're damn right, I killed him; in self-difense."
In Case 1, ihe omitted part qualifies the (grammatical) meaning of the
utterance, in ibis particular case by indicating which of two possible words
with the same or sin1ilar speHing or pronunciation, even if ungrammatical,
the defendant intended in making the statement In Case 2, the omission
reduces the probability of the partial utterance being true i.nsofur as t.he

17. 7 Wigmore, supra note 10, § 2113, at 656. One should note, however, that Wigmore
acknowledged the use of a broader idea in some C2Ses, and even conceded that no great
harm comes therefrom. Id. § 2113, at 657-59.
18. See 7 Wigmore, supra note 10, § 2119 (noting general pattern as well as inconsistency
in rulings). The most conspicuous exception routinely recognized at common law was when
the part of the utterance introduced contained an explicit or implicit reference to another
utterance. Id. §§ 2104, 2120. An occasional case can be found that for good reason extends
the reach of wholeness to temporally separate utterances that, because of their circumstances,
were understood by Lhe conversants as part of the context of the statement first introduced.
See, e.g., West v. State, 37 S.E.2d 799, 800-01 (Ga. 1946) (holding that inculpatory statements
made to sheriff on second interview presupposed the exculpatory statements made during first
interview). And codifications of the completeness rule sometimes confirm a broader extension
to at least some separate but gualifying utterances. See, e.g., Cal. Evid. Code § 356 (West 1967),
Iowa Code § 622.20 (1950), Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Arm. art. 38.24 (West 1964).
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warrant for its truth is the credit given the utterance, though of course the
19
partial utterance could still be true. All common-law courts would
concede the application of the completeness doctrine in Cases 1 and 2. 20
And only the fluky case can be found rejecting completeness in cases like
Case 3, in which the probability of the truth of the partial utterance is
affected, but not necessarily according to any assertive intentions of the
speaker. 21
However, the omitted parts in Cases 4 and 5 qualify neither the
meaning nor the probability of the truth of the partial utterance; rather,
they qualify its significance in the case. More precisely, the remainder in
Case 4 qualifies the factual inference to Jwmicide that the trier of :fuct has
been invited to draw, while the remainder in Case 5 invites an inference as
to a distinct ultimate fuct in the case, such as a justifying circumstance or
the existence of malice. 22 Here there is serious ambiguity due to the
malleability of the "same subject" restriction articulated by Wigmore. For
example, in Case 4 one can argue that the prosecution's evidence
addresses only the mens rea of murder, not the "distinct subject" of an actus
reus of homicide; and in Case 5 one can argue that the prosecution's
evidence concerns only the homicide and not the "subject" of mens rea. 2s

19. In an extreme case, like, "I did wt kill him," the omission (of the word "not"} makes
the whole logically inconsistent with the partial utterance, though once again the partial
utterance could still be true. Incredibly, such deceitful redaction has actually occurred and
not only in the distant past. See, e.g., Reece v. State, 772 S.W.2d 198, 202..04 (Tex. Ct. App.
1989} (arising under state's version of the Federal Rules}.
20. To be sure, the effect of the remainder on the probability of the truth of the partial
utterance is not always recognized, but even then the principle of allowing the remainder if it
does have such an effect is not questioned. See, e.g., Black v. Nelson, 424 P.2d 251, 252-54 (Or.
1967} (reversing judgment for defendant in personal injury case because, inter alia, trial court
wrongly admitted remainder of written statement by defendant which included opinion on
the ability of plaintiff. to avoid the accident; the appellate court was of the erroneous view that
the opinion "in no way tends to explain or qualify the discrepancy between the defendant's
testimony and the pretrial statement" as to the positions of the cars}.
21. Compare Commonwealth v. Keyes, 77 Mass. (11 Gray} 323 (1858) (affirming trial
court's rejection of completeness argument with respect to remainder of utterance that might
have called into question the credibility of an unavailable hearsay declarant; the court
strangely opined that since the hearsay declarant was not a witness, his credibility was not in
issue}, with Tracy v. People, 97 Ill. 101, 105-07 (1880) (holding that trial court erred in
excluding defendant's cross-exanJination of witness about whether dying declarant used
profunity, a fact that would be relevant to the credibility of someone about to meet his
maker).
22. Certain assumptions are implicit in this analysis. For example, the remainder in Case
3 may similarly affect the significance of the original proffer, as distinct from affecting the
probability of the original part's being true, if the defendant's plea is not guilty by reason of
insanity. And the remainder in Case 4 may affect the significance of the original part if the
defendant is also charged with attempted murder; if the charge were only attempted murder,
then the remainder would be irrelevant, despite its casting doubt on the accuracy of
defendant's aim. (The remainder in Case 4 might also affect the probability of the truth of
the proposition that defendant "aimed right at" the victim, assuming it is disputed that he
killed the victim, for if he had so aimed, it is less likely that he would have missed.}
23. The question of whether the identity of the subject matter is determined by the use
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The court can undoubtedly use this flexibility to reach the result it
considers just or otherwise desirable. 24 Nonetheless, the majority of
decisions employ a relevance test broad enough to cover Case 425 and, at
least as to the utterances of criminal defendants, Case 5 as well. 26
For the pragmatist, however, all this will seem rather amorphous
without an understanding of the other aspect of context which seiVes to
mark off meaningful wholes, namely the purpose or purposes of employing
the notion of completeness. How, in other words, does the holistic demand
arise in practice? In order to answer this question, careful attention must
be directed to the procedural contexts in which the common-law response
is invoked.

which the proponent claims to w..ake of the original part is addressed infra at notes 59-63 and
accompanying text.
24. Often the result is simply to affirm the trial court's judgment. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Watson, 388 N.E.2d 680, 686-91 (Mass. 1979) (holding that, after demonstrably false
part of defendant's out-of-court statement was used to show defendant's consciousness of
guilt, the remainder, which conceivably affected the various inferences to be drawn from the
lie, was properly excluded as not relevant to whether defendant lied and therefore to whether
he was conscious of his own guilt). One must be careful not to read from such cases the
proposition that, so long as the remainder evidence affects neither the grammatical meaning
of the proffered part nor the probability of its being true, there is necessarily a distinct subject
matter, L."tus defeating a completetJess motion even if the suggested inferences from the
proffered part are ·affected by die remainder. Watson seems rather to be based on the
judgment that the inferences to be drawn from the defendant's lie were not significantly
affected by the exculpatory assertions coupled with it.
25. See, e.g., Rosenberg v. Wittenborn, 3 Cal. Rptr. 459 {Cal. Ct. App. 1960) (affirming
admission of remainder in personal injury case after police officer testified for plaintiff that
defendant had admitted running a red light; cross-examination was allowed as to defendant's
further statements to the officer about failure of his brakes); Rokus v. City of Bridgeport, 463
A2d 252, 255-56 (Conn. 1983) (holding it error to reject remainder in a personal injury case
after police officer testified for plaintiff that defendant's employee admitted not seeing
plaintiff in time to avoid collision; trial court had precluded cross-examination as to
employee's further explanations of collision); Brown v. State, 450 S.E.2d 821 (Ga. 1994)
(holding trial court's error in not admitting further portions of defendant's suppression
hearing testimony was not harmless, when the state had introduced portions suggesting that
earlier ext:£<9udicial statements by defendant were voluntarily made, and the offered further
portions would suggest that they were coerced); Commonwealth v. Britland, 15 N.E.2d 657,
658-59 (Mass. 1938) (holding it error to exclude remainder of defendant's statement
qualifying admissions of involvement in crime by denials of knowledge or intent).
26. See, e.g, State v. Menilla, 158 N.W. 645, 653 (Iowa 1916) (holding that codified
rebuttal rule renders admissible the exculpatory portions of defendant's out-of-court
statement that admitted the killing but justified it as in defense of her son); King v. State, 287
S.W.2d 642 (Tex. Grim. App. 1956) (holding that codified rebuttal rule renders admissible the
exculpatory portions of defendant's testimony at prior trial admitting killing in self-defense).
This expands the test almost to the pre-analytic notion already mentioned, unless one limits
the use of remainders to those which relate to the same causes of action, offenses, or defenses
as the original part. Cf. Rouse v. Whited, 25 N.Y. 170 (1862) {allowing remainder of
defendant's statement attributing principal debt to plaintiff, after plaintiff had introduced
part of same statement attributing ownership of levied property to plaintiff).
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2. Aggressive and Responsive Completeness
One must first set aside what may be called an aggressive use of the
notion of completeness, in which the proponent of the original partial
utterance attempts to invoke the completeness principle in order to
introduce a remainder that is otherwise inadmissible on his behalf. If this
were allowed, it would invite abuse, as proponents would offer relatively
unimportant parts of a verbal utterance for the purpose of bootstrapping
the admission of the remainder. Not surprisingly, the courts have been
careful to avoid such stratagems. 27 The doctrine is thus limited for the
28
most part to a responsive role. So limited, there are two distinct
common-law completeness rules, at least as delineated by Wigmore. 29
Distinguishing these rules and identifying their underlying functions are
essential to understanding the common law and, ultimately, modem
codifications. The next two sections undertake these tasks.

B. The Rebuttal Rule
The first rule, "universally conceded" in the common law, allows the
opponent to place in evidence, during either cross-examination or the next
major phase of the trial, those parts of the verbal event needed to
understand and evaluate the part already introduced. 30 I will refer to this

27. See, e.g., State v. Savage, 290 A2d 221, 223 (Conn. 1971) (holding that trial court
properly precluded defendant's effort to introduce remainder of statement part of which was
first elicited by defendant in cross-examining police officer); Kuhn v. Kjose, 248 N.W. 230,
231-32 .(Iowa 1933) (holding that trial court properly refused admission of that part of
defendant's out-of-court admission that indicated his insurance coverage); Commonwealth v.
Henry, 640 N.E.2d 503, 505-07 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994) (holding no error in trial court's
exclusion of that part of defendant's out-of-court statement which denied wrongdoing). To be
sure, many of the cases have concerned the prosecution's attempt to introduce portions of a
defendant's admission or confession which relate to other crimes the defendant may have
committed, and those decisions are somewhat in conflict. Compare People v. Loomis, 70 N.E.
919, 919-21 (N.Y. 1904) (holding that parts of confession relating to other crimes was
impropedy admitted), with McRae v. People, 281 P.2d 153, 153-56 (Colo. 1955) (holding that
parts of confession relating to prior incarceration was properly admitted). If the two parts of
the statement are not conveniently separable, one must apply the usual balancing of probative
value and prejudicial potential, and even when the result is that the remainder is admitted in
order to help the trier of fact understand the admissible parts, limiting instructions are
properly employed to minimize the risk of improper use of the former. See, e.g., People v.
Hurry, 52 N.E.2d 173, 176 (lll. 1944); Bell v. State, 198 A2d 895, 897 (Md. 1964). Responsive
or defensive uses of completeness are not properly subject to such limitations, occasional
contrary statements notwithstanding. See infra Part ill.B.
· 28. Of course, the opponent of an incomplete proffer can become the proponent of an
incomplete remainder, thus generating a completeness right in the original proponent. See,
e.g., Patterson v. State, 509 S.W.2d 857 (Tex. Grim. App. 1974) (holding that defendant's
introduction of part of remainder of confession allows prosecution to introduce residue of
remainder).
29. See 7 Wigmore, supra note 10, § 2095.
30. ld. §§ 2113-25 (quoted language appearing at 654). Some states have codified this
rule. See, e.g., Cal. Evid. Code§ 356 (West 1967):
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as fue rebuttal :rule. H is at once puzzling because it seems w1necessary: If
the completing portion aids in assessing Lhe probative value of admittedly
relevant evidence, it is itself necessarily relevant and tlms presumptively
31
admissible. Thus, the limitation of the rule to qualifYing portions of the
same verbal event as that proffered by Lhe proponent seems too st;ici:. Why
cannot the opponent present any evidence relevant to the material fucts?
To be sure, fue doctrine could have meant no more than to
emphasize the relevance of the completing evidence. Indeed, in many
cases this seems to be the only identifiable purpose of :involdng the
32
completeness principle. Thus, one might say that a distinct completeness
function is that of demonstrating relevance. But of course such a function,
though persuasively real, is not doctrinally distinct. The completeness
principle is used here merely as part of an argument to est:~_bli~h
admissibility under the rule of presumptive admissibility of relevant
evidence. In a doctrinal sense, the latter rule does the work. Likewise, since
the probative value of the completing evidence can be de minimis i.f not
considered in connection '.vi.th the part it modifies, the completeness
argument can serve to emphasize that the remainder is not subject to
33
exclusion as a waste of time. Again, the latter rule does the work. In
other words, the common-law rule would have been unnecessary, as a
distinct docu-ine, were its only practical point that of emphasizing !he
relevance or probative value of the remainder.

Where part of an act, declaration, conversation, or writing is given in evidence by
one party, the whole on the same subject may be inquired into by an adverse party;
when a letter is read, the answ~r may be given; and when a detached act,
declaration, conversation, or writing is given in evidence, any other act, decla.-ation,
conversation, or writing which is necessary to make it understood may also be given
in evidence.
Id. See also Ga. Code Ann. § 24-2-4 (1981) (codifying rebuttal rule for completeness of
documents or records), § 24-3-38 (codifying rebuttal rule for completeness of adrn!ss!ons).
Several other states have codi.fied rebuttal rules that are now either superseded Oil augmented
by versions of the federal rules. See, e.g., Iowa Code §§ 622.19-.20 (1950); La. Rev. Stat..Ann.
§ 15-450 (West 1950); Mont. Code Ann.§ 93-401-11 (1964); Neb. Rev. Stat § 25-1215 (1943);
Or. Rev. Stat.§ 41.880 (1975); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art 38.24 (West 1964).
31. See McCormick, supra note 5, § 185, at 541-44 (articulating relevance as the existence
of probative value with respect to a material proposition in the case).
32. See, e.g.,]. Truett Payne Co. v. Jackson, 203 So. 2d 443, 445 (Ala. 1967) (discussing
use of cross,-examination to elicit remainder of conversation surrounding transaction between
agent of defendant and third party); State v. Hillesheim, 305 N.W.2d 710, 716-17 (Iowa 1981)
(discussing rebuttal presentation of other portions of basis of expert opinion); Floyd v.
Tewksburj, 129 Mass. 362, 353 (1080) (discussing rebuttal presentation of furtl1er terms of,
and basis for, prior judgment of partition); Aaberg v. Minnesota Commercial Men's Ass'n, 173
N.W. 708, 711 (Minn. 1919) (discussing rebuttal presentation of further terms of insurance
contract).
33. See McCormidc, supra note 5, § 185, at 544-46 (discussing counterweights to
relevance, including judicial economy). See generally Richard D. Friedman, Conditional
Probative Value: Neoclassicism vVlthout Myth, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 439 (1994) (explaining how
conditional admissibility can result from the probative interdependence of different items of
evidence).
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1. The Timing Functian

However, the common-Jaw doctrine has meant much more than this
allows, and the problem remains to identify its doctrinally distinct function.
One suggestion is that the rebuttal rule overcomes any otherwise
applicable preference for limiting the scope of cross-examination to the
54
subject matter of the direct examination. In this way, the doctrine serves
what is essentially a "timing'' function, changing the point in the trial at
which evidence is received, for if the scope limitation is the only difficulty
in admitting the evidence, then by hypothesis it would be admissible
without the aid of the completeness principle if offered at a later stage of
55
the proceedings. Some modern commentators have treated this
overriding of scope limitations as the principaL if not only, independent
56
significance of the doctrine.
But Wigmore disagreed, explicitly
distinguishing the completeness doctrine from rules governing the timing
. 57
of eVI'dence presentallon.
What should be made of this disagreement? While overriding
otherwise applicable rules is the right general idea, overriding evidence
sequencing rules certainly does not fully explain the completeness
doctrine. In the first place, once again completeness would serve virtually
no distinct doctrinal function. In jurisdictions that do so limit the scope of
cross, the completing portions of a verbal event are almost inevitably within
the subject matter of direct in that they qualify the evidence already
offered with regard to the relevant subject matter thereof. Thus, the only
relationship of rebuttal completeness to scope is that satisfying the

34. See, e.g., 1 B.E. Witkin, California Evidence § 319 (3d ed. 1986); Note, The Scope of
Cross-Examination, 24 Iowa L. Rev. 564, 572-73 (1939). Of course, not all jurisdictions so limit
cross-examination, but the "subject matter of direct" test is the narrowest of restrictions
commonly applied. See McCormick, supra note 5, § 21.
35. The prosecution cannot call the criminal defendant to the stand, so it is ordinarily
limited to whatever testimony it can elicit during cross-examination of a defendant who
chooses to testify. See McCormick, supra note 5, § 130. Thus, if a defendant testifies to a part
of an utterance made by someone else or by himself at another time, the timing function of
completeness may have the effect of allowing the prosecution to admit evidence that it could
not otherwise elicit from the defendant at a later time. However, this phenomenon applies
more broadly than to verbal utterances and is a consequence of judgments about waiver of
the defendant's privilege not to testifY and the extent thereof. Id. § 132. In principle, the
prosecution could constitutionally call the defendant to the stand at a later time, provided the
further examination were limited to the scope of the waiver. See Graham C. Lilly, An
Introduction to the Law of Evidence § 4.11 (2d ed. 1987).
36. See, e.g., Ronald L. Carlson eta!., Evidence in the Nmeties 104 (3d ed. 1991). While
these authors at least raise the question of the existence of non timing functions, see id. at 105
(problem 6-12), they dearly indicate their belief that the rule of completeness is primarily a
rule altering the usual scope rules governing successive stages of the examination of a witness.
See also Edward J. Imwinkelried, Evidentiary Distinctions 14 (1993).
37. 7 Wigmore, supra note 10, § 2114 ("Other principles discriminated"); (5) at 661-62
("That the stage of reexamination or cross-examination is the proper time for putting in
explanatory utterances is one of the rules for the order of evidence, and does not involve the
tenor or limits of the utterance." [cross-references omitted; emphasis in original]).
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.requirements for completeness entails saris:rying even the most restrictive
limitations on the scope of subsequent ex3.lminations. Completeness serves
as part of an argument that presentation of the .remainder satisfies such
limitations, .rather than that the .remainder is admissible notwithstanding
such limitations. No significant "override" is involved. 38
More importantly, other modalities of the rebuttal rule cannot be
captured by reference to a timing function. This point can be shown
indirectly in several ways. First, some jurisdictions do not limit crossexamination to the subject matter of direct yet still fmd need of a rebuttal
39
rule. Furthermore, many common-law decisions invoke the completeness
principle for the opponent's presentation of the remainder at a stage of
the proceedings following cross-examination of the witness sponsoring the
original incomplete version, or in some other context where the scope
limitation on cross does not apply. 4° Finally, even when the remainder is
presented on cross in a jurisdiction where cross-examination is subject to
the usual scope limitation, the completeness doctrine does more ilian
11
s1mp1y ovemae 1LTlaruy restrictive appllcallons ot the scope 1un1tatwn.
•

11

•

11

...

,.

•

•

....

•

~

~
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38. See McCormick, supra note 5, § 21, at 53 (opining that completeness idea often
invoked in applying scope limitation is "mere statement of the converse of the limiting rule"
and is thus distinct fro:rn the generai compieteness doctrine). Once again, tl-1is is not to deny
the rhetorical value of the completeness principle in this context: "The fuct that this is
substantially a mere statement of the converse of the limiting rule itself does not detract from
its usefulness as an added tooi for argument." Id.
39. E.g., compare Blackington v. Johnson, 126 Mass. 21, 21 (1878) (holding crossexamination allowed as to all issues in the case), with Commonwealth v. Britland, 15 N.E.2d
657, 658-59 (Mass. 1938) (applying completeness principle by way of rebuttal). See also Paul].
Liacos, Handbook of Massachusetts Evidence 66, 443 (5th ed. 1981). The codification of
evidence law in Texas continues a similar, long-standing pattern. Compare Tex. R Crim. Evid.
610(b) (allowing wide-open scope of cross), with Tex. R Grim. Evid. 107 (codifying rebuttal
rule). See ge71erally Steven Goode et al., 33 Texas Practice: Guide to the Texas Rules of
Evidence: Civil and Criminal 27-31, 451-52 (1988).
40. While some such cases may entail no more than emphasizing the relevance of the
remainder, see supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text, others cannot be so explained. Sec,
e.g., Evans v. Multicon Constr. Corp., 574 N.E.2d 395, 402 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991) (applying
rebuttal rule to responses to requests for admission); Albuquerque Nat'! Bank v. Clifford
Indus., Inc., 571 P.2d 1181 (N.M. 1977) (applying rebuttal rule to answers to interrogatories);
Clinch River Mine•al Co. v. Harrison, 21 S.E. 660, 663 (Va 1895) (holding that if part of
defendant's answer to t.he complaint is used as evidence against it, exculpatory portions of the
answer must be considered as well).
41. See, e.g., Rosenberg v. Wittenborn, 3 Cal. Rptr. 459 (Cal. Ct. App. 1960) (relying on
codified completeness rule in rejecting proponent's objection to remainder on grounds of
bot.h exceeding scope of cross and viob.ting hearsay mle). In State v. l\1enilla, 158 N.W. 645,
653 (Iowa 1916), the court relied on the completeness rule in holding that refusal to allow
the exculpatory remainder of defendant's statement, as "not proper cross-examination," was
error made harmless by the fuct that defendant made no attempt to introduce the remainder
in subsequent direct examination of the witness, the court explaining that the remainder
would have been then admissible as "res gestae."
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2. The Trumping Function

So one must look further for the full practical import of the rebuttal
rule. It can be found by observing that, in some situations, an exclusionary
rule can potentially bar the opponent from presenting the completing
portion. The following pages will offer examples of how this can occur
without the original proffer being inadmissible under the same
exclusionary rule. What is important here is to obsetve that this occurrence
generates a predicament. On the one hand, the evidence in its incomplete
form is, by hypothesis, misleading. In some such cases, the court could
exclude it on that basis, but then probative evidence might well be lost, a
loss that is especially problematic if the completing portion is available for
presentation. 42 On the other hand, admitting the original proffer as well
as the completing evidence requires one to face the seeming conflict
between the principle of completeness and whatever principle or policy
underlies the exclusionary rule in question. Here, at last, could be real
doctrinal meat in the completeness principle: Resolution of such- conflicts
would be the main point of the common-law completeness rulings.
In :fuct, courts have routinely used the rebuttal rule to override at least
some admissibility rules. 4 ~ The exclus_ionary rule most frequently
encountered in this way is the hearsay prohibition. 44 An illustrative,

42. See generally McCormick, supra note 5, § 185, at 544-48 (discussing discretionary
exclusion of evidence the probative value of which is outweighed by probative dangers). If the
incomplete evidence has been presented to the trier of fact before thus being ruled
inadmissible, one also has the fumiliar problem of trying to "unring the bell" of evidence
already heard. This problem implicates the doctrine of curative admissibility. See infra Part

III. B.
43. See McCormick, supra note 5, § 56, at 146. We will take up the matter of which rules
are su~ect to this override and why in Part III.C infra.
44. The following cases provide a good historical and jurisdictional sampling covering the
last century: Grattan v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 92 N.Y. 274, 284-86 (1883) (applying
common-law rebuttal rule to letter written by insured to defendant insurance company);
Morey v. State, 72 So. 490, 492-93 (Fla. 1916) (applying common-law rebuttal rule to criminal
defendant's out-of-court declarations); Hendrickson v. International Harvester Co., 135 A
702, 704-05 (Vt. 1927) (applying common-law rebuttal rule to letter written by defendant's
agent to plaintiff); Commonwealth v. Britland, 15 N.E.2d 657, 658-59 (Mass. 1938} (applying
common-law rebuttal rule to criminal defendant's out-of-court statement); Trammell v. State,
167 S.W.2d 171, 174-76 (Tex. Crirn. App. 1943) (applying codified rebuttal rule to criminal
defendant's out-of-court statements); Pierce v. Heusinkveld, 14 N.W.2d 275, 280-81 (Iowa
1944} (applying codified rebuttal rule to civil defendant's out-of-court statement); West v.
State, 37 S.E.2d 799, 800-01 (Ga. 1946) (applying codified rebuttal rule to criminal
defendant's out-of-court oral statements); Spani v. Whitney, 110 N.W.2d 103, 105-07 (Neb.
1961) (applying codified rebuttal rule to civil plaintiffs out-of-court written statements);
People v. Williams, 531 P.2d 778, 781-83 (Cal. 1975) (applying codified rebuttal rule to
criminal defendant's out-of-court statements); Albuquerque Nat. Bank v. Clifford Indus., Inc.,
571 P.2d 1181 (N.M. 1977) (applying rebuttal rule to answers to interrogatories); Rokus v.
Bridgeport, 463 A2d 252, 256 (Conn. 1983) (applying common-law rebuttal rule to civil
defendant's out-of-court oral statements); McElroy v. State, 553 N.E.2d 835, 839-40 (Ind.
1990} (applying common-law rebuttal rule to criminal defendant's out-of-court oral
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modem decision from a common-law jurisdiction is Rokus v. The City of
5
Bridgeport."l In that personal i~lliy case, the plaintiff offered and the trial
court adrr.tltted part of the defendant's out-of-court statement to the witness
concerning the cause of the accident. This, of course, was allowable
pursuant to the hearsay exception for a.."l opponent's admissions. However,
when the defendant proposed to cross-examine the witness concerning the
remainder of the statement, the trial court excluded such testimony as
46
hearsay. The Supreme Court of Connecticut held this exclusion to be
error under Lhe doctrine of completeness. In so ruling, the high court
agreed with the trial court that the remainder of the defendant's statement
was hearsay when offered by the defendant, but nevertheless held that
When a portion of a party's out-of-court admission is placed in
evidence by an opponent, the party has a right to introduce other
relevant portions of the conversation from which it was excerpted,
irrespective of whether it is self-serving or hearsay. 47
Indeed, the court emphasized that "[t]he principle announced :in [prior
Connecticut decisions] ... is an independent exception to the rule against
hearsay.~ Thus, the completeness principle has what may be called a
"trumping'' function, in that il. trumps the operation of a_n otherwise
applicable exclusionary rule. 49
To be sure, in sorne corllexts the opponent may use fue completing
matter for a purpose that does not :full within the hearsay prohibition at
all. \!\Then, for example, a party's out-of-court statement is admitted,
statements made by others in the same conversation or correspondence
may be introduced by either side as necessary to understand the
significance of the admitted statement, without running afoul of the
48

statement). A similar rule obtained in the federal courts before the adoption of the Federal
Rules of Evidence. See, e.g., United States v. McCorkle, 511 F.2d 477, 478-79 (7th Cir. 1974),
,-<U'd on ;-elwaring, 511 F.2d 482, 4S5-B7 (en ba.nc), ce-ri. de-nied, 423 U.S. 826 (1975) (opining
that prosecutor cannot introduce portions of defendant's statement and then object on
hearsay grounds to defendant's presenting completing portions; remainder properly excluded,
however, for failure to meet relevance tests for completeness).
45. 463 A2d 252 (Conn. 1983).
46. ld. at 255-56. The statements were made to, and reported in court by, a police officer
who investigated the accident Id.
47. ld. at 256.
48. ld. Accord, California Law Revision Commission Tentative Recommendation and Study
Relating to Uniform Rules of Evidence, Article VIII, Hearsay Evidence 599 (Aug. 1962) ("To
the extent that this section [upon which California's codified rebuttal rule was based] malces
hearsay admissible, we may regard the section as a special exception to the hearsay rule.").
49. The appellate court, however, went on to hold that the trial court's error in denying
the cross-examination at issue was rendered harmless by the fact that the defendant
subsequently testified not only to the material facts but also that he gave the same account
thereof in the out-of-court statement from which plaintiff selectively quoted. Rohus, 440 N.E.2d
at 256. Cf Commonwealth v. Britland, 15 N.E.2d 657, 659 (Mass. 1938) (rejecting harmless
error argument when defendant's completeness questions had been ruled out on crossexamination, even though defendant subsequently had testified to remainder of statement to
police).
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50

hearsay rule. Similarly, if the proponent uses the opponent's out-of-court
statement for some purpose other than proving its truth, then a suitably
limited admission of the remainder equally circumvents any hearsay
51
objection. In particular, when the original incomplete evidence is
offered to impeach a witness with a prior inconsistent statement and the
completeness counter attempts to rehabilitate the witness by showing that
the prior statement, taken in context, is not inconsistent with the witness's
original testimony, both parts of the prior statement may be used to assess
the credibility of the witness, without direct regard to their truth or
falsity. 52 In such cases, the completeness argument serves simply to
demonstrate relevance to the rehabilitation pmpose.55

50. See, e.g., United States v. Morello, 250 F.2d 631, 634 (2d Cir. 1957) (holding that
letter asserting unlawful acts is admissible under completeness to show meaning of a reply
letter written by defendants' unindicted coconspirator); State v. Hilleshiem, 305 N.W.2d 710,
712-13 (Iowa 1981) (relying on completeness principle in holding that statements of other
party to conversation "may be admitted without regard to their truth or fulsity in order to
show the context in which" the admission was made); Unity Tel. Co. v. Design Serv. Co., Inc.,
179 A2d 804, 807-08 (Me. 1962) (using completness doctrine to affirm admission of
correspondence); Friedman v. United Rys. Co., 238 S.W. 1074 (Mo. 1922) (holding that
proponent was properly allowed to introduce whole conversation in order to understand
plaintiffs admission).
51. See, e.g., People v. 'Neaver, 441.1 N.E.2d 112, 257, 259 (lli. 1982) (holding that, since
defendant's out-of-court statements, elicited by prosecution, were inconsistent as to content
with prosecution's theory of the case, but in their brevity might suggest inference consistent
with prosecution's theory, exclusion of remainder as hearsay, which might create misleading
impression that nothing further was said, was error under completeness idea). But the
completeness principle may also be used in cases in which the proponent's use of the out-ofcourt statement is arguably a hearsay use; invocation of completeness mutes the hearsay
question as applied to the remainder. See, e.g., Frank v. State, 27 Ala. 37 (1855) (holding that,
when part of defendant's out-of-court statement was admitted to show intent to conceal facts
by stating falsehoods, exclusion of the remainder was reversible error).
52. At common law, neither prior inconsistent statements nor prior consistent statements
can, without coming within some exception to the hearsay rule, be used as substantive
evidence of the matters asserted thereby, but only as evidence of the witness's credibility. See
McCormick, supra note 5, § 251, at 744. It follows that, "When a writing or recording is
admissible for impeachment purposes only, completing matter is admissible only to
rehabilitate the witness and not as substantive evidence, unless the completing matter is
admissible for substantive purposes independent of its admissibility under this [completeness
rule]." N.Y. Code Evid. § 106 (Proposed Draft 1991).
53. See, e.g., Hargress v. City of Montgomery, 479 So. 2d 1137, 1138-39 (Ala. 1985); Lowe
v. State, 25 S.E. 656, 657 (Ga. 1896); People v. Hicks, 192 N.E.2d 891 (III. 1963); Price v.
Commonwealth, 172 S.W.2d 576 (Ky. 1943); State v. Robertson, 328 S.W.2d 576, 581-82 (Mo.
1959); People v. Barker, 244 N.E.2d 323, 239-40 (N.Y. 1968). For pre-Rules federal decisions,
see Coltrane v. United States, 418 F.2d 1131, 1140 (D.C. Cir. 1969); United States v. Lev, 276
F.2d 605, 608-13 (2d Cir.), ccrt. denied, 363 U.S. 812 (1960); Cefasso v. Penn. RR Co., 169
F.2d 451, 453 (3d Cir. 1948); United States v. Smith, 328 F.2d 848, 850 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 936 (1964); Affronti v. United States, 145 F.2d 3, 7-8 (8th Cir. 1944). In this context,
a quasi-doctrinal function may remain, for the admissibility of the portion of the prior
statement consistent with the declarant's testimony is sometimes described as an exception to
the general rule that prior consistent statements are not admissible to rehabilitate the witness.
See also 7 Wigmore, supra note 10, § 2114(4), at 661 (noting that in such cases "putting in of
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This sort of analysis, if applicable in an completeness cases, would
substa..ntially reduce t..h.e need for a trumping function. Indeed, in many
cases, even when the original incomplete evidence is offered as
(admissible) hea.-say, a completing portion uttered by the same person on
the same occasion need not be used by t.h.e opponent for a hea.-say
purpose, since it can be used to attack the credibility of the declarant
without endorsi..1g !he truth of the completing part .A_n exa..lflple is
provided by ou:r hypothetical Case 3: Evidence that defendant said, "I
killed him, as I would kill any invader from Mars." In such a case, the
italicized :remainder impeaches the testimony lby undermining the
declarant's credibility. Alternatively, the .remainder evidence may impeach
the credibility of the witness by casting doubt on the accuracy of the .report
of the hearsay declaration. Thus, the omission of !he words "may have"
from hypothetical Case 2 ("I may have lulled hixn."), casts doubt on the
·witness's report without necessa..rily crediting the omitted qualification.
However, in the usual case, the .fuct of omission does not seriously impeach
the testimony un.less the .remainder is taken as a credible qualification, in
which case the hearsay status of the :remainder is manifest. Otherwise, its
omission is actually a service to the tribunal, eliminating superfluous
language, and does not adversely affect the credibility of the witness o.r the
5·1
proponent.
In a..ny event, as fue Rokus case illustrates, ilie completing evidence
o:rdlnariJy is not lLvnited in such cases to credibility inferences~ The
completeness response accepts arguendo the accruacy of the witness's
report, as .fur as it goes, as in om hypothetical Case 4 and Case 5. The
opponent invokes completeness lby way of saying, "If you are going to use
what you claim to be my out-of-court statement, fo.r whatever purpose, then
you must at least use the entire statement .relevant thereto." One might
argue that this conditional hearsay use does not come within the hearsay
prohibition, that the remainder is used me:rely l:o malte the original part
55
"understood."
This appears to have been Wigmore's view, for
56
example.
Most subsequent commentary, however, has found this

the exculpatory parts is justifiable equally on two principles," apparently meal""Jing verbal
completeness and relevance to rehabilitation).
54. Part III.CJ, infra, illustrates how Lhe Lrumping function is not limited to the hearsay
rule. In most other contexts, there is not even an analogue of the nonhearsay use argument
for admitting the remainder.
55. A standard definition of hearsay is "an assertion by an out-of-court declarant, offered
to prove the truth of the assertion." Carlson eta!., supra note 36, at 568. Cf Fed. R Evid.
80l(c). One might try to say, for example, that such a definition does not include statements,
or p;J.rts of st:ltements, that a party is forced by a.< opponent lo include. But there is no
warrant in the usual language for such a construction. More importantly, all the hearsay
dangers, concerning the memory, narrative ability, sincerity, and perception of the declarant,
are as applicable to the remainder as to the incomplete portion originally offered, perhaps
more so since the remainder will generally be self-serving. See grneraUy Edmund M. Morgan,
Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62 Hmv. L. Rev. 177 ( 1948).
56. 7 Wigmore, supra note 10, § 2113, at 659-60. Curiously, the exa;nple used by
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argument unconvincing, and even Wigmore expressed doubts about it. 57
The present elaboration supports the latter View. To be sure, there is
nothing improper or inconsist~nt in the opponent exercising the
completeness option while yet arguing that the completed hearsay
statement is inaccurate because, for example, it was given under duress or
in ignorance of other fucts or even because the statement was wrongly
attributed to the opponent. This would not mean that the remainder is
used for some purpose other than establishing the truth thereof, but only
that it is used for such a purpose argued in the alternative: "Don't believe
the offered statement; but if you do, believe only the complete version of
it." 58
This analysis yields an important conclusion with respect to the
relevance test Observe that the proponent's use of a party opponent's
prior statements can be either substantive, insofar as the making of the

Wigmore to support this view is a case in which the out-of-court statement was offered as a
"verbal act," a statement that has direct legal significance without its being considered
evidence of its own truth. See id. at 527 (discussing the Algernon Sidney seditious libel case
and the use of incomplete statements allegedly constituting the offense). Such statements,
offered by either side, are not within the hearsay prohibition at all. See, e.g., Aaberg v.
Minnesota Commercial Men's Ass'n, 173 N:W. 708 (Minn. 1919) (rebuttal presentation of
further terms of insurance contract; hearsay not discussed). Wigmore was certainly aware of
this distinction; elsewhere he noted the admissibility of verbal acts beyond the range of the
completeness doctrine. See 7 Wigmore, supra note 10, § 2114(1).
57. See Michael H. Graham, Handbook of Federal Evidence § 106.1, at 55 n.12 (2d ed.
1986); McCormick, supra note 5, at 146 n.S. Wigmore's doubts are expressed in John H.
Wigmore, A Student's Textbook of the Law of Evidence 322 (1935) (acknowledging that the
nonhearsay theory rests on a distinction that is "an artificial doctrine tending to a quibble").
58. Florida's version of Federal Rule 106 emphasized this point by adding a caveat about
the significance of the remainder:
When a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is introduced by a party, an
adverse party may require him at that time to introduce any other part or any other
writing or recorded statement which ought in :fuirness to be considered contemporaneously. An adverse party is not bound by evidence introduced under this section.
Fla. Evid. Code § 90.108 (emphasis supplied). Professor Graham argues that this caveat is
misworded, that it should state, "The party required to introduce the evidence is not bound
by its introduction." Michael H. Graham, Handbook of Florida Evidence§ 108.1, at 47 n.6
(1987). And some cryptic legislative history supports that view. See Fla. Evid. Code § 90.108,
Law Revision Council Note (Commentary on 1978 Amendment). Of course, Graham's caveat
is correct as well, since neither party is "bound" by an admission of evidence that does not
qualify as a 'Judicial" admission. See McCormick, supra note 5, § 262, at 776 (distinguishing
evidential admissions from judicial admissions contained in pleadings or stipulations). Yet the
caveat is more likely to be necessary to protect the opponent, since opinions differ on the
question of whether a party's testimonial statements are binding on that party as judicial
admissions, and this possibility could be extended to at least some out-of-court admissions. Id.
§ 266 (describing three main approaches to the question and endorsing the view that no
judicial admission should arise from a party's testimony). The caveat serves to emphasize that
the remainder, though offered by the opponent, is not to be considered her judicial
admission. In contrast, the proponent is already well protected by the nearly unanimous
rejection of the old notion that a party is bound by the testimony of his witness. See Lilly,
supra note 35, § 8.2, at 339 n.3; 3AJohn H. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law§
897 (Chadbourn rev. 1970).
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statement tends w prove its !Lruili (oilier than for a credibility purpose), or
nonsubstantive, insofar as it impeaches the opponent's testi.rnony at trial, if
a..ny. It can also be a hearsay or nonhearsay use, which is not the same
59
distinction. The possibility of multiple pennissible inferences from the
proponent's evidence :raises the question of whether the use of Lhe
completing evidence should ibe limited to deflecting the inference
explicitly argued by the proponent. In fact, an occasional judicial opinion
seems to suggest that the use of the remainder is limited and admissible via
completeness only if it qualifies or explains an inference argued by the
proponent. For example, :if the incomplete portion :is used merely to
impeach the opponent's testimony, then the proffered remainder is
admissible, under this view, only if it connters the impeachment effect; it is
not enough that the putative remainder qualifies a legitimate substantive
inference that the uier of fact might permissibly draw from the original
part6o
However, Lhe better reasoned cases reject this limitation, since
evidence admissible on either of tvm theories may be used by the t.-ier of
61
fact for either or bo!Lh. Correction of the misleading impression may lbe

59. The point, although often missed, is easily illustrated. Opponent's out-of-court
adiP..issions c.1.n be used to prove tl::e tnJ.U~ tb.ereof (thus hearaay), which in turn is used to
attack his credibility (thus, in one sense, nonsubstantive): For example, the opponent may
have made an out-of-court admission of lying under oath. Conversely, the opponent's out-ofcourt statement can be used t.o establish that the statement was made, irrespective of its truth
(thus nonhearsay), which may itself be part of what the proponent must prove or probative
thereof, such as a libel or contractual agreement (thus substantive). Thus, the substantive/nonsubstantive distinction, as so understood, is not congruent to the hearsay/nonhearsay
distinction.
60. In People v. Ramos, 500 N.Y.S.2d 667 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986), by a 3-2 decision, the
appellate court affirmed the defendant's conviction over a challenge to the trial court's
refusal to admit the putative remainder of the defendant's statement The majority
emphasized that the original portion was used solely for impeachment and the offered
remainder did not show that the prior statement was consistent with Lhe defenda.11t's
testimony, even though the remainder did tend to counteract a distinct substantive inference
against defendant Id. at 66twi9. Significantly, the majority indicated its concern to preserve
the jury's verdict by noting that the most likely substantive inference from the statement
involved uncontested matters, id. at 669, and by adding that any error in rejecting the
completeness motion would have been hai"Tnless. Id. at 670. The dissent thought the eJ>dusion
was reversible error. I d. at 670-71. The decision was affirmed in a short memorandum opinion
that unfortunately suggests the kind of narrow limitation on completeness criticized in the
text. People v. Ramos, 512 N.E.2d 304 (N.Y. 1987) (holding completeness motion properly
n:jected in absence of showing of relevance to rehabilitation by affecting understanding of
prior inconsistent statement).
61. See, e.g., Spani v. "Whitney, I 10 N.W.2d 103, 105-07 (Neb. 1961) (applying common-law
rebuttal rule to civil plaintiffs out-of-court written statements, specifically rejecting the
defendant-proponent's argument that the use of the plaintiff's prior statement was solely for
impeachment purposes); People v. Gallo, 186 N.E.2d 399, 400-01 (N.Y. 1962) (holding it error
for trial court to deny admission of remainder of defendant's out-of-court statement, noting
substantive admissibility of the statement despite prosecution's apparent impeachment use of
the originally admitted part). The matter is different, of course, if the entire statement is
substantively i7'.edmissibl-e en behalf of tlu: proponent SU? e.g., State v. Srnilh, 81 So. 320 (La.
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necessary even if the proponent does not specifically argue the theory as to
which fairness demands the remainder. Understandably, research has
uncovered no case in which the propone:nt requested a limitation on the use
of his evidence to only one of several legitimate purposes. 52 Only if such a
restriction is requested by the proponent, allowed by the court, and made
dear to the jury, should the completeness response be similarly limited. 6g
Thus, when the original incomplete statement may be used by the trier of
fact for a hearsay purpose, completing statements made by the same
person and satisfYing the relevance standard may, but need not, be used
qua hearsay as well. The completeness doctrine assures the admissibility of
the remainder for this purpose.
But how it does so remains somewhat puzzling. One way to view the
situation is that the proponent is thereby compelled to indude the entirety
of the verbal event as the admission. The statement, as qualified by the
remainder, is then available as substantive or nonsubstantive evidence,
depending on how the original proffer may be used. 64 If the original
hearsay is admissible by virtue of the party opponent admissions exception,
then ipso facto any such use of the remainder should also qualifY for the
admissions exception since it is being offered by the proponent, in
principle if not in practice. However, this conception is understandably
difficult to accept, given the identity of the party demanding admission of
the re-m:rindeL How can the opponent be seen to make use of the
admissions exception to the hearsay rule in presenting her own out-of-

1919) (holding it error to deny defendant's rehabilitative completeness motion even though
the whole of the statement was substantively inadmissible for the prosecution because of a
failure to comply with statutory restrictions on confessions).
62. Limitations as among multiple purposes are commonly imposed at the request of the
party opponent when one of the purposes is impermissible. See McCormick, supra note 5, § 59.
63. A further subtlety should be noted for jury cases: If the original part is inadmissible
for one purpose but rightly admitted for another, without an appropriate limiting instruction,
the remainder ought to be admissible to qualify the former use, since the jury will not know of
the limitation. In other words, in a jury trial the remainder should be admissible to qualify
any relevant use of the original part, unless the jury has been instructed that some particular
use is prohibited. Unlike judges, one cannot rely on the premise that the jury will use
evidence only for the purposes as to which it is technically admissible. Cf. id. § 60 (articulating
appellate rule that the trial court in a bench trial is presumed to have relied only on
admissible evidence in reaching its decision).
64. A distinct question arises concerning which party may use the various parts of the
completed statement as evidence of the truth of the matter asserted. Since a party's
admissions are not admissible for this purpose on behalf of that party, arguably they are not
affirmative evidence for that party even when properly introduced by an adverse party. In the
context of party admissions, however, it has long been settled that the self-serving parts of the
complete statement, once admitted, can be used substantively to support the declarant party's
case. See, e.g., Brown v. Brown, 4 F. Cas. 356 (C.C.D.RI. 1846) (No. 1,994); Bristol v. Warner,
19 Conn. 7, 18-19 (1848}; Perkins v. Lane, 82 Va. 59, 60-62 (1886). See generally I Greenleaf,
supra note 16, § 201 (concerning admissions},§ 218 (concerning confessions). For a modern
case reaffirming the trier's freedom to accept substantively the exculpatory portions of the
admission, see People v. Dlugash, 363 N.E.2d 1155, 1162 (N.Y. 1977) (holding that jury may
reject exculpatory portion ifit·is contradicted or rendered improbable by other evidence).
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court statementst Thus, the completeness doctrine sets to rest doubts
about admissibility that arise from this special form of evidence
presentation. In this sense, the comment made in the Rokus case and
elsewhere, that the remainder comes in by way of "an independent
exception to the rule against hearsay," 66 is somewhat misleading.
Although the completeness doctrine provides independent authority for
the substantive admission of hearsay, it's authority is inherently tied to, and
derivative of, the existing hearsay exception. 67
Alternatively, if we do not viewthe completeness idea as, in principle,
forcing the proponent to present the whole of a statement, then we must
instead view the responsive presentation of the remainder in the usual
adversarial way, and the trumping effect must be more explicit The
doctrinal force of completeness is then not simply a matter of removing
doubts engendered by the more unusual procedural conception explained
above. It must be premised ultimately on the claim that under certain
circumstances the usual goals of the hearsay prohibition are muted or
outweighed by the need for the responsive presentation of the remainder.
Indeed, the risks of misleading inaccuracies usually associated with a
party's presentation of her own out-of-court statements for the truth
thereof, even when that party does not testifY, are overwhelmed by the
likelihood of distortion accompanying the proponent's selective
presentation of portions of the opponent's statement Moreover, that the
proponent has already chosen to inject the statement into the trial of the
issue assures the tribunal that the proponent has the wherewithal to
challenge the opponent's version of the complete statement, an important
check upon total fabrication of self-serving hearsay. 68 One may reasonably

65. Occasionally, this confusion causes misleading statements in judicial opinions. See, e.g.,
Black v. Nelson, 424 P.2d 251, 253-54 (Or. 1967) (rejecting a completeness argument for
failure to meet the relevance te5t, but adding, "It is, moreover, as we have characterized it, a
mere opinion, and, while an admission against interest in the form of an opinion is
competent evidence against the declarant, [citations omitted], this is not true of a self-serving
declaration, such as the statement in question"). It is unclear whether the quoted argument is
intended as saying that the evidence is not admissible if the standards for completeness are
not met, or as an independent reason to reject the remainder even though fulling within the
reach of the completeness rule. One might try to avoid the confusion by thinking of the
remainder as introduced by the court, albeit at the opponent's suggestion. See McCormick,
supra note 5, § 8 (discussing court's authority to introduce evidence). However, it is doubtful
that the remainder would thereby qualify for the party-opponent hearsay exception. See, e.g.,
id. § 262 (defining admissions as "words or acts of a party-opponent ... offered as evidence
against him").
66. See supra note 48 and accompanying text
67. Later we will generalize this observation by illustrating how the completeness doctrine
is applicable in connection with inclusionary authority other than the hearsay exception for
admissions of a party opponent See infra Part ill. C.
68. See Roger Park, The Rationale of Personal Admissions, 21 Ind. L. Rev. 509, 514
(1988). One might argue that trumping the hearsay rule is unnecessary in view of the
opponent's opportunity to testify directly to the issues, one of the fuctors that seems to
warrant the asymmetry in the admissions exception in the first place. See id. at 516-17. This
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conclude, therefore, that in most cases the ultimate purposes of the
hearsay prohibition are not served by the exclusion of the remainder.
However the trumping function is conceived, it forms a crucial part of
the common-law rebuttal rule. The test used to determine wholeness is
critical, for the broader the standard, the more otheiWise inadmissible
evidence is rendered admissible. Relatively expansive versions or
applications of the standard may result from intuitions that the system
would otheiWise- be too restrictive in its admission of hearsay, especially
hearsay from a party declarant. This and other implications of trumping
may depend on how the rebuttal rule is conceived, as between the two
alternatives described above. Further attention will be given to this issue
after we fill out the common-law pattern by examining the second
common-law completeness rule.

C. The Interruption Rule
In some circumstances the opponent of the original proffer may insist
that the completing portion of the utterance be presented together with
the original proffer without waiting for the opponent's turn to present the
69
remainder on cross-examination or even later. I will call the rule
permitting this contemporaneous completion the interruption rule. An
examination of this second part of the completeness doctrine entails a
reconsideration of the timing and trumping functions already identified. It
also involves the identification of a third function, that of achieving
discovery of evidence, especially tangible evidence, in the hands of the
proponent. This identification yields insights into the historical
relationship of this aspect of the doctrine to the rebuttal rule discussed
above.
1. Timing and Trumping Functions Revisited

The interruption rule not only allows overriding some admissibility
rules which would otheiWise hinder the opponent's response, but also
allows the opponent to modifY the normal sequence of presenting
evidence by interrupting the proponent's chosen proffer. 70 This is done
in the interest of presenting the trier of fact the more complete evidentiary
package in a more understandable way. Contemporaneous completion

opportunity, however, will often be inadequate, since a trier of fact ignorant of the true tenor
of the hearsay is likely to discount the in-court, self-serving testimony in fuvor of the out-ofcourt, adverse admission. See supra note 49.
69. 7 Wigmore, supra note 10, §§ 2097-11.
70. See, e.g., Cody v. Louisville & Nashville Ry. Co., 535 So. 2d 82, 85-86 (Ala. 1988)
(applying common-law completeness rule to answers to interrogatories); State v. Mallar, 508
A2d 1070, 1071-72 (N.H. 1986) (applying common-law completeness rule to out-of-court
statement of nontestifying witness); People v. Gallo, 186 N.E.2d 399, 400-01 (N.Y. 1962)
(applying common-law completeness rule to criminal defendant's out-of-court statement to
allow apparently contemporaneous completion).
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avoids an inconvenient and potentiallly pe:tnicious gap in time between the
presentation of the incomplete part and the presentation of the
remainder. Thus, Lhe interruption rule operates essentially as an
accelerated rebuttal.
As described, the intenuption rule requires that the remainder "be
presented" contempora.neously. This phrasing is deliberately ambiguous
regarding which party is to do the presenting. The answer to this question is
important, both in theory and in practice, though the variety of trial
situations requires the flexibility to use both procedures.
AB for practice, the opponent surely knows better w:h.irh additional
portions she thinks need to be introduced, but if the opponent presents
the remainder then a significant disruption of the proponent's control
ove.r ilie presentation of his case will .result. This consequence argues for
allowing the proponent to do Lhe contemporaneous presenting designau.ed
by the opponent and required by the court. Indeed, the common-law
h1terruption rule typically takes the form of requiring the proponent to
present the remainder, at least if the opponent validly insists on
71
completeness.
As fo.r theory, requiring the proponent to present th.e remainder has
the advantage of obviating the trumping function, since the hearsay rule
would not bar the proponent's presentation of the complete version of the
opponent's admission. F.~plidtly forcing the proponent to introduce L.lJ.e
remainder, on pain of losing the admission entirely, thus confrrms a
conception of the trumping function that allows the opponent to piggybade. on the indusi.onary authority utilized by the proponent i.n the first
instance. What is essentially inclusionary in function takes on a conditional
c
7"
.
excluswnary
~arm. -

71. 7 Wigmore, supra note 10, § 2095. Since, as already noted, Wigmore distinguished
the completeness doctrine from timing issues, he ignored the possibility of contemporaneous
completion by the opponent's presentation of the remainder. He would view this as merely a
sequencing issue under the rules governing such, provided the opponent has the right to
present the l-emainder at a later time under what we have called the rebuttal rule. Wigmore
did not specifically address LlJis issue, however, and appears to have assumed that any
presentation by the opponent will be done on cross or later. Thus, for Wigmore the
interruption rule is coextensive with the requirement that the proponent introduce the whole
of the verbal event, whereas the rebuttal rule is coextensive with the option of the opponent
to introduce the remainder, regardless of when that occurs. !d. My distinction between the
rebuttal rule and Lhe interruption rule does not, Lherefore, correspond precisely to Wigmore's
distinction between "optional" and "mandatory" completeness. My reformulation both allows
for the expanded range of options empirically encountered and facilitates comparison of the
common law with the fede.-al rule.
72. Wigmore obsen~ed that the exclusionary rule is conditional. 7 Wigmore, supra note
10, § 2095(1), at 607 (referring to the proponent being "met by the objection that he can
offer no part unless he offers the whole"). It is unclear, however, whether exclusion is
necessarily the remedy in case the proponent refuses to introduce the whole. Not surprisingly,
no case has been discovered in which the proponent, after introducing the incomplete
statement and being met by a completeness objection, has tried to withdraw Lhe original
proffer, so it is difficult to say whether trial courts have been thought to have the authority to
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Clearly, the interruption rule has practical significance quite apart
from overriding otherwise applicable exclusionary rules. Being able to
interrupt the proponent's presentation and insist on contemporaneous
completion is itself significant. Indeed, cases arise in which the completing
evidence is otherwise admissible on behalf of the opponent, the
completeness rule being invoked in aid of the opponent's demand that the
completing portion come in simultaneously with the original proffer.7s
While the trial judge's discretionary control over timing of evidence
presentation should be adequate to achieve this result without the need of
a distinct completeness doctrine in cases where the opponent will present
the remainder, it would be a hard stretch to say that such authority could
require contemporaneous presentation by the proponent. Even an opponent's
contemporaneous presentation is a sufficiently dramatic alteration of the
ordinary process of proof, entailing a serious curtailment of the
proponent's ordinary control of his case, that it is not surprising for the
effect in question to be sanctioned by a distinct doctrine.74 Practically
speaking, one cannot say that the interruption rule is unnecessary as a
distinct rule without the potential to override otherwise applicable
exclusionary rules. Nevertheless, the functions of timing and trumping are
sometimes conjoined in common-law cases, as well as cases arising under
75
codifications pre-dating the Federal Rules of Evidence.
The important limitation on the common-law interruption rule arises
because of the difficulty of forcing a possibly hostile witness to recount
portions of an event or transaction without the benefit of extensive crossexamination. There is also the possibility that a complete oral rendition of
an out-of-court document or conversation might require several witnesses.
These possibilities threaten to undermine the ability of the proponent to
put on an organized, coherent case and present strategic opportunities for
the opponent to exercise contemporaneous completion to precisely that
end. Consequently, it is understandable that the interruption rule is less
liberally invoked by common-law courts than the rebuttal rule. In
particular, the former is generally applied only to incomplete proffers of
writings or other tangible verbal records, the context of which keeps the
76
interruption to manageable proportions.

order the presentation of the whole or pursue some other nonexclusionary response to the
situation.
73. Typical cases involve jural act documents such as deeds, wills, and contracts, offered
either as dispositive of the legal issue or as evidence relating to disputed factual issues. See,
e.g., In re Brown's Estate, 15 P.2d 605, 610 (Idaho 1932) (holding that trial court properly
required all of will to be admitted); In re Mann's Estate, 189 N.W. 991, 996 (Mich. 1922)
(same).
74. See generally 6 John H. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 1882
(Chadbourn rev. 1976) (describing general practice that rejects the idea of an opponent
interrupting the proponent's direct examination of a witness).
75. See cases cited supra note 70.
76. See, e.g., the cases cited supra notes 70 and 73. See generally 7 Wigmore, supra note 10,
§§ 2099-2100 (reporting that the interruption rule is not generally applied to incomplete
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This correlation of the interruption rule wifu .,,vritings must be
distinguished from the usual limitation of the :rebuttal rule to verbal
events, events which may be either oral or written. ln the context of the
rebuttal rule, the limitation concerns the nature of the event being
evidenced, not the fonn of the evidence employed. The additional
liwitation on i.nterruption, on the other ha.."1d, concerns the form of the
evidence offered in court. Presentations that mix documents with
testimony present the hard cases. For example, an incomplete testimonial
account of the contents of a document not presented in court will
ordinarily permit invocation of the rebuttal rule, not the interruption rule,
even though the constriction of scope inherent in the :reference to a
document serves to limit the extent of the interruption more so than if the
underlying verbal event we:re conversational. 77 Certainly, in such cases the
proponent should not be subject to a conditional exclusion that forces him
to examine the witness so as to introduce the remainder. The opponent
may introduce the completing portion on cross-examination. or later, and
in some cases contemporaneously, a presentation nnencumbe.red by many
exdusiona..--y rules that might otherwise apply. 78
OLher factors ente:r into the decision whethe.r to m:mdate the

testimonial proffers); §§ 2102-04 (reporting that interruption rule is often applied to
documentary evidence). See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(4) ("If only part of a deposition is
offered in evidence by a party, an adverse party may require him to introduce any other part
which ought in fairness to be considered with the part introduced, and any party may
introduce any other parts."); Fed. R. Crim. P. 15(e) ("If only part of a deposition is offered in
evidence by a party, and adverse party may require him to offer all of it which is relevant to
the part offered and any party may offer other parts."). Of the many versions of the Federal
Rules adopted by the states, this pattern is most clearly codified under Texas law. See Tex. R.
Grim. Evid. 106 (codifying interruption rule for writings or recorded statements as evidence);
Tex. R. Grim. Evid. 107 (codifying rebuttal rule for both written and oral evidence of
statements); Tex. R Civ. Evid. 106 (codifying interruption rule for writings and recorded
statements as evidence); Tex. R. Civ. Evid. 106 advisory committee's note (indicating retention
of rebuttal rule for both written and oral evidence of statements).
77. Understandably, Wigmore notes some significant judicial divergence from the
conclusion stated above in the context of verbal act documents, such as contracts, wills, and
deeds. See 7 Wigmore, supra note 10, §§ 2105-07. The divergence may be explained in part by
the tendency in such rulings to conflate admissibility questions with sufficiency questions.
78. Although the so-called "best evidence" rule generally requires the use of the
document to prove its contents, the posited example could arise in situations where the use of
the document is excused. See McCormick, supra note 5, §§ 237-40. How a completeness rule
could be needed to authorize rebuttal in such cases is explained infra, in Part Ill. C. Moreover,
documents are often introduced only by being read by an authenticating witness, and even
here the oral nature of the use may be considered adequate reason to deny interruption,
leaving the opponent to subsequent rebuttal. In most cases, however, the better rule would be
to allow interruption, provided the remainder passes the relevance test Compare People v.
Gallo, 186 N.E.2d 399, 400-01 (N.Y. 1962) (holding that trial court improperly denied defense
counsel's request to read rem<llnder contemporaneously, after stenographer read into record
selected parts of defendant's pre-trial statement), with People v. Perry, 499 P.2d 129, 148-49
(Cal. 1972) (affirming a ruling limiting rebuttal under relevance standard, after trial court
had denied interruption in favor of opportunity for rebuttal on cross-e.xa.lTiination afte;r part of
a written statement had been used to impeach a witness).
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proponent's presentation of the whole or to allow only responsive
introduction by the opponent If a document or other recording is cut into
fragments and presented in such a redacted form, the opponent's
presentation of the remainder in complementary redacted form would be
very inconvenient for the trier of fact, who would have to try to piece the
record back together. The opponent's responsive presentation of an
integrated document, which would certainly be allowed if the completing
portions satisfY the relevance standard for the rebuttal rule, would warrant
exclusion of the proponent's redacted version simply on grounds of being
confusing and unduly cumulative. To avoid the confusion and waste of
time inherent in first admitting and then excluding the redacted version,
admission of the proponent's offer of the redacted version may, in
anticipation of the completing response, be conditioned on the
simultaneous "introduction of the remainder. And absent a dispute about
the authenticity of the remainder, the court may insist on simultaneous
79
introduction in an integrated fonn.
A fairly dear picture emerges from these observations. In most
contexts, the interruption rule is rightly seen as subsidiary to the rebuttal
rule. The significance of the completeness doctrine rests primarily on the
trumping function. The interruption rule comes into play only in the
relatively unusual cases when delayed completion is considered inadequate
and simultaneous completion is considered practicable, primarily cases
-involving tangible records of statements. In such cases, the trumping
function carries over to contemporaneous completion.80 Of course, the

79. In a case of serious dispute over the authenticity of the putative remainder, the court
obviously should not compel an integrated presentation by the proponent; to do so would risk
confusion by suggesting to the trier of fact that the proponent does not challenge the
remainder's authenticity. In such cases, the better practice is to relinquish the opponent to
the usual responsive presentation, possibly assisted by the trumping function of the rebuttal
rule. Only rarely do the reported cases shed any light on this issue, since the overwhelming
majority of such cases involve remainders that are undeniably as genuine as the part
introduced by the proponent. Cf. McBrayer v. Walker, 50 S.E. 95 (Ga. 1905) (holding that
opponent can, without further authentication, introduce and rely on entries made on the
back of a deed introduced by proponent, when the entries on the back purport to reveal that
the deed on the front was given as security for a usurious loan).
80. Wigmore's presentation is organized temporally: He addresses interruption first
because that is the first issue that will come up in the litigation process. Only if the proponent
chooses, or cannot avoid, presenting evidence in a misleadingly incomplete form, and the
opponent is unable or unwilling to invoke the interruption rule, does the question of delayed
rebuttal arise as a strategic option. That Wigmore's sequencing of the discussion does not
reflect any sense of the relative importance of the two rules in the modem common-law is
confirmed by his report that the rebuttal rule is more clearly and predictably established. 7
Wigmore, supra note 10, § 2095, at 607 (noting that interruption rule is "the stricter effect of
the principle, and indeed is not enforced invariably or for all classes of utterances").
Wigmore's view of the relationship between the two branches of the doctrine is summarized
as follows:
It has been seen, in the foregoing sections, that there is much opportunity for
difference of opinion whether the proponent in the first instance must put in the
whole. But there is and could be no difference of opinion as the opponent's righ~ if a
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trial court's choice about whether to mandate contemporaneous
completion, even in the case of tangible proffers, will rarely be reversible
since the opponent retains the option to make a completing presentation
81
under the rebuttal rule.

2. The Discovery ~<i'unction Disinterred
The foregoing analysis of the modem completeness doctrine does not
fully reflect its historical development. In order to see why, one must
consider the profound changes in procedural rules that have occurred
since the doctrine first emerged.
In early English crim1nal trials there were severe limitations on the
82
defense's ability to present evidence at all. In such a context, it is not
surprising that the completeness principle would be invoked in tenns of
controlling or modifYing the evidence presented by the prosecution, rather
83
than in terms of the defense presenting completing evidence. Even in
Llle seventeenth century, as defend~nts began to can their own witnesses
and cross-examine prosecution witnesses, there still was no glimmer of
discovery :rights. 8·1 This remained true thwugh the development of truly
85
adve:rsarial procedures i.Il lhe eighteenth century. Sh-ni1arly, although

part oniy has been put in, himself to put in the remainder. Indeed it is the very fact of
this later opportunity and right which (as already seen) has frequent bearing upon
the question whether it is worth while to require it from the proponent in the first
instance.
I d. § 21 13, at 653.
81. The discretion of the trial court in this regard is routinely emphasized. See, e.g.,
Sovereign Camp, W. 0. W. v. Adams, 86 So. 737, 742-43 (Ala. 1920) (affirming trial court's
rejection of interruption in favor of rebuttal presentation of completing portions of insurance
contract). See generally 7 Wigmore, supra note 10, § 2099, at 618 (concerning discretion in
regard to testimonial evidence), a..11d § 2102, at 630 (concerning discretion in regard to
documentary evidence). More specifically, a trial court's judgment about conditional
exclusion will be virtually immune from challenge on appeal. lf the court denies the
opponent's motion for conditional exclusion, the opponent will still have a completing
response and it will be very hard to show that any error was prejudicial. Conversely, if the
court grants such a motion, the proponent will likely introduce the whole, in which case the
proponent will have a hard time showing prejudice in view of the fact that the opponent would
have had an opportunity to present the whole on rebuttal anyway. (Of course, the matter is
entirely different if the proponent's claim is that the remainder does not satisfy the relevance
standard applicable to both rebuttal and interruption.)
82. In the sixteenth century, "The defendant was not allowed to call witnesses, conduct
any real cross-examination, or develop an affirmative case." Stephan Landsman, Readings on
Adversarial ] ustice: The Arneri can Approach to Adjudication 13 ( 1988).
83. See, e.g., Algernon Sidney's Trial, 9 How. St. Tr. 818 (KB. 1683), in which the
defendant complained of selective reading from documents seized by the prosecution and
claimed to be treasonous. Id. at 853-54. The Sidney case also illustrates an argument in the
alternative, since Sidney argued that the documents were not authored by him and, in any
event, were not treasonous if taicen in their entirety. Id. at 878, 905.
S".L See generalry John H. Lat"Jgbein, The Criminai Triai Before the Lawyers, 45 U. C.'li. L.
Rev. 263 (1978).
85. See generally Stephan Landsman, The Rise of the Contentious Spirit: Adversary
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there had long been greater opportunities for each side in a civil case to
present evidence, there was no broadly effective system of discovery by
which the opponent could obtain evidence in the proponent's possession
86
to use in subsequent rebuttal. Again, in such procedural contexts, the
conditional exclusionary form of the interruption rule would obviously
retain considerable importance; especially as to incomplete documentary
evidence, which cannot be cross-examined by the opponent to elicit the
completing portions. 87
Thus, until at least the mid-nineteenth century, when civil discovery of
documents began to expand considerably, and even later in criminal
cases, 88 an important function of the completeness rule was to effectuate
discovery and presentation of documents introduced only in part by one's
adversary. Once again, it was a conditional form of discovery, since the
proponent could avoid it by not introducing even part of the document.
The rule nonetheless served as an important check on the defects of a
system lacking discovery and presentation rights as we know them. 89 On
the other hand, the development of the exclusionary rules, along with the
emergence of adversarial procedures in the eighteenth century,
increasingly presented occasions for cross-examination of witnesses and
admission of completing parts of documents that would run afoul of such
rules were it not for trumping. 90 Hence, during this period, the trumping
function emerged alongside the discovery function as of central

Procedure in Eighteenth Century England, 75 Cornell L. Rev. 497, 506 (1990); John H.
Langbein, Shaping the Eighteenth-Century Criminal Trial: A View from the Ryder Sources, 50
U. Chi. L Rev. 1 (1983).
86. See, e.g., Hill v. Aland, 91 Eng. Rep. 192 (K.B. 1707) (stating that when the writing in
one party's possession is evidence only, and not the basis of the action, the other party cannot
demand a copy); Attorney-General v. Coventry, Bunb. 290, 145 Eng. Rep. 677 (Ex. Cb. 1730)
(same). See generally Fleming James, Jr..et al., Civil Procedure §§ 5.1, 5.2 (4th ed. 1992).
87. See, e.g., Read v. Hide, Coke's Third Institute 173-74 (1613):
It was resolved that no exemplification ought to be of any part of a Letters Patents,
or of any other Record, or of the inrolment thereof, but the whole Record or the
inrolment thereof ought to be exemplified, so that the whole truth may appeare,
and not of such part, as makes for the one party, and nothing that make against
him, or that manifesteth the truth.
88. See generaUy 6 Wigmore, supra note 74, §§ 1859-60 (discussing development of duty to
produce documents before trial).
89. With regard to testimonial evidence, the absence of the right to depose witnesses
could inhibit the opponent's ability to know of a completing portion of the utterance in
question. However, this would be of relatively little moment in the most common
completeness context, that of proponent's incomplete presentation of the opponent's own
admissions. A more significant problem arose from the fact that as late as the end of the
eighteenth century a criminal defendant's witneSses could not testify under oath. See
Landsman, supra note 85, at 498-99, 506. Consequently, testimony as to the remainder of a
defendant's out-of-court statement could be much more valuable coming from the
prosecution's witness than from a witness offered by the accused.
90. See Landsman, supra note 85, at 564-72 (discussing emergence of hearsay rule during
eighteenth century). See also 5 John H. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 1364
(Chadbourn rev. 1974).
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importa..D.ce in the completeness doctrine. 91
Of course, the situation is radically different today. AH parties have
Lhe right to present evidence not excluded by some particular rule. 92
Discovery, especially discovery of tangible evidence m:.e documeni:s, is the
norm in boLh civil and criminal cases. 93 To be sure, even under modern
discovery regimes, occasions will arise in which the opponent has no access
to i:he full text of a document and will, therefore, be unable to utilize
delayed rebuttal of a misleadingly incomplete proffer. 94 One still
encounters an occasional case in which the completeness doctrine is
invoiced in aid of a requirement that the proponent not use part of a
document when the whole is neither admitted nor made available to the
opponent for possible rebuttal. 95 Nevertheless, it is dear that the rationale
behind the completeness nues has shifted substantially away from the
discovery function toward a mix of the timing and trumping functions. As
it did, invocation of i.he completeness doctrine shifted its emphasis from

91. The need for trumping was especially pronounced in regard to reports of out-of-court
statements of a party opponent, for until the mid-nineteenth century parties were
incompetent to testify under oath, thus dramatically limiting their ability to provide even the
substance of the remainder by their own in-court assertions, mucb less by testifying to the
remainder of the out-of-court statement See also 2 John H. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at
Common Law § 577 (discussing the abolition of disqualification of civil parties), § 579
(discussing the abolition of disqualification of accused .in crimina! cases) (Chadbourn rev.
1979). See generally Joel N. Bodansky, The Abolition of the Party-Witness Disqualification: An
Historical Survey, 70 Ky. LJ. 91 (1981-82).
92. Indeedl the right has constitutional dimensions in criminal cases, and perl--~ps in civil
cases as well. See generally Edward ]. Imwinkelried, The Case for Recognizing a New
Constitutional Entitlement: The Right to Present Favorable Evidence in Civil Cases, 1990 Utah
L. Rev. 1 (contrasting constitutional right in criminal and civil cases).
93. See, e.g., Fed. R Civ. P. 34; Fed. R Crim. P. 16. Failure of the prosecution to divulge
the remainder of a document, proffered in part at trial by the prosecution, should violate the
prosecution's constitutional duty to disclose exculpatory evidence. See generaUy Charles H.
Whitebread & Christopher Slobogin, Criminal Procedure §§ 24.02-.06 (2d ed. 1986).
Conversely, discovery of documents in the possession of a defendant does not violate the
defendant's constitutionai privilege against self-incrimination unless the document records tbe
defendant's own statements. See, e.g., United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975). Although
discovery only means being able to inspect and malce a copy of the document in question, the
subsequent admission of a part of tbe document by its possessor is subject to responsive
introduction of tbe copy of tbe remainder since the opponent's compliance with the original
document rule is excused, provided the opponent gives notice to Lhe proponent to produce
the whole of the original at trial. See McCormick, supra note 5, § 239.
94. Cj Edward W. Cleary Be John W. Strong, The Best Evidence Rule: An Evaluation in
Context, 51 Iowa L. Rev. 825, 837-45 (1966) (discussing limitations on discovery mechanisms
that may warrant an original document rule).
95. See, e.g., Arthur v. Commonwealth, 307 S.W.2d 182, 185 (Ky. 1957) (holding it error
for prosecutor to malce reference to written confession that prosecutor refuses to malce
available to defense); Elyv. State, 141 S.W.2d 626,628-29 (Tex. Crim. App. 1940) (suggesting
error for a party to make use of an alleged admission for impeachment purposes without
making the whole of the statement available to the opponent for a possible completeness
motion). Of course, restrictions long imposed on the use of prior statements of a witness for
impeachment purposes entail malcing available to tbe opposing side tbe substance of the prior
statement See generaUy McCormiclc, supra note 5, § 37.
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the interruption rule to the rebuttal rule. 96

D. "Wholeness" Contextualized
The foregoing elucidation .of the common-law completeness doctrine
emphasizes the relative doctrinal importance of the rebuttal and
interruption rules. But it also shows that the subject can be analyzed from
an orthogonal direction. Instead of focusing on the two branches of the
doctrine, as did Wigmore, one can organize one's thought according to
the three doctrinally distinct functions involved. In order of importance,
they are: first, the overriding of otherwise applicable exclusionary rules
(the trumping function); second, the overriding of otherwise· applicable
rules on the order of presentation of the completing evidence (the timing
function); and third, the overriding of otherwise applicable limitations on
a party's power to obtain evidence from an adversary (the discovery
function). Each of the first two functions is present to some extent in each
branch of the common-law rule, but neither is involved in every application
of the completeness doctrine. The third function inheres almost entirely in
the exclusionary form of the interruption rule, and its significance has
been eclipsed by the expansion of discovery rights.
One consequence of this isolation of function is the opportunity to
examine the question of whether the concept of "wholeness" is functiondependent. In: other words, the meaning of wholeness and the boundaries
of ihe verbal utterance in question may depend upon which function is in
play. These ramifications cannot be exhaustively explored here, but a few
important examples should be noted.
First, observe that as between the two most important modem
functions, trumping and timing, there is reason to expect a divergence in
their respective tests for wholeness. When trumping is at stake, the courts
should determine the whole with reference to the legitimate goals of the
exclusionary rules. When only timing is implicated, the courts should shift
the focus to the goals served by regulating the sequence of evidentiary
presentations. As has already been shown, the added significance of the
timing function constricts the range of the completeness doctrine under the
interruption rule. By limiting interruption to tangible proffers, the
determination of wholeness is rendered less problematic in a context
where that kind of simplicity is important In a different way, the
interruption rule may employ a more expanded concept of wholeness when
the trumping function is not in issue than when it is. If the efficacy of
otherwise applicable exclusionary rules is not at stake, the concept of
wholeness can be extended to embrace related tangible things with little
adverse effect. Application of the interruption rule may then involve a

96. Interestingly, Wigmore made no reference to the discovery function or its
attenuation. However, he does rightly suggest that a consideration in deciding whether to
invoke the exclusionary form of the completeness rule is the relative availability of the
document to the parties. See 7 Wigmore, supra note 10, § 2095(3).
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concept of wholeness more inclusive than even the pre-analytic concept of
97
a single verbal utterance.
But when trumping is in issue, the cow-ts have gravitated toward some
version of the relatively narrow, post-analytic relevance test discussed
earlier. 96 Such a limitation must be imposed, lest the admission of a single
out-of-court statement by a declarant render admissible all out-of-court
statements by that person about the subject matter of the suit or about
some aspect of it, a result that would substantially modify the hearsay rule.
If a declarant has made several distinct statements, prevailing practice
allows the pwponenll: to pid( among those which are subsi:antively
admissible, even if the opponent cannot use the others, as in the case of
the opponent's out-of-court assertions. The completeness doctrine modifies
this practice only to Lhe e..xtent of insisting that those statements selected
by the proponent are more accurately portrayed.
1. The Embedded Utterance Problem

These themes are nicely illustrated by the decision in Gencarella v.
Fyfe. 99 In this automobile accident case, the plaintiff examined a police
officer with respect to his ·written investigation report, as a prelude to
offering the report i.J.to evidence. The plaintiff attempted to isolate those
parts of the report that were based on the officer's personal observations
from those parts reporting the statements of witnesses. The defendant
objected, asserting on the basis of the completeness principle that tl1e
entire report should come in if any part of it did, and the trial court
agreed. 100 The report was apparently introduced, and the defendant
subsequently examined the officer, as wen as the defendant himself, with
regard to witness statements contained therein. The defendant thus
successfully invoked at trial what has here been called the intenuption
rule, and ultimately recovered a favorable judgment
On appeal, however, the First Circuit reversed the judgment,
conducting that the completeness doct..-ine had been improperly applied.
The fat--niliar limitation on hearsay exceptions for police reports, which
admits records of the officer's personal observations but not of witness
statements recorded in the report, meant that the plaintiff was pursuing a
legitimate it-.quiry as foundation to admitting parts of the report The
doctrine of completeness did not ovenide the othenvise applicable
limitation because the reported statements were "severable" from the
record of the officer's personal observations and had "no bearing to

97. A common example is the application of the interruption rule to reply letters in a
correspondence, when the proponent offers one letter thereof without offering the letter to
which it replies. See 7 Wigmore, supra note 10, § 2104, at 634-35.
98. See supra notes 15-26 and accompanying text.
99. 171 F.2d 419 (1st Cir. 1948).
100. Id. at 421-22.
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explain or qualify'' the latter.
This result is interesting in that the putative remainder very likely did
qualify inferences to be drawn from the admissible parts. 102 But unless we
are to have a rule that police reports are either admissible in their entirety
or not at all, it must sometimes -be possible to separate admissible portions
from inadmissible portions and admit only the former. The sensible
solution the court reached was to rule the two aspects of the report
"severable," which is to say that the wholeness test is not satisfied as to the
otherwise iruidmissible statements recorded in the report. Thus emerges a
subsidiary wholeness principle to the effect that no "imbedded utterance"
is embraced within the whole if no part of that embedded utterance (and,
presumably, no misleading reference to it) is admitted by the proponent in
105
the first instance. Yet, were the trumping function not at issue here,
there would be no need to invoke this limiting- principle, and the entire
report-including reported witness statements-could properly be
considered the relevant whole and required to be presented under the
interruption rule, at least if that would not seriously interrupt the
.
proponent' s sequenang
of eVI"dence. 104

2. The Source Limitation Issue
An even more important example of divergence in wholeness
concepts concerns the issue of whether wholeness is measured not only
with reference to the utterance in question, but also in reference to the
source through which it is evidenced. The paradigm of trumping that
appears repeatedly in the common-law cases is the offer of a remainder
through the same witness or document utilized by the proponent in the first
instance. Conversely, the paradigm in which trumping is not allowed is the
attempt of the opponent to introduce a contradictory version of the
105
utterance from a different evidentiary source.
But what if the

101. Id. at 422-23.
102. At least portions of the remainder consisted of reports of the defendant's statement
to the investigating officer, statements that would have been admissible for the plaintiff had
the plaintiff chosen to offer them. Significantly, this is the very part of the remainder that the
defendant most wanted to introduce, and did. See id. at 422.
I 03. Compare this result with the Rdms case, by which the trumping function was first
illustrated, supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text. There, the proponent introduced part
of the opponent's out-of.court statement by the testimony of the investigating officer; the
same trumping would have occurred had the vehicle for presenting part of the statement
been a written accident report that would be admissible, at the first level of hearsay as a
business record or prior recollection recorded, and at the second level as an admission of a
party opponent. See McCormick, supra note 5, § 324.3.
104. Imagine, for example, that the only witness statement contained in the report was
admissible at the second level of hearsay under some exception available to both parties, such
as the excited utterance or dying declaration exception. See McCormick, supra note 5, §§ 297,
283.
105. However, the conventional understanding in such a case is that the opponent can still
introduce the contradictory account through the second source for the limited purposes of
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opponent's distinct source provides a further portion of the utterance, thus
reporting a version that is consistent with, but more inclusive than, the
proponent's account? This looks like "completeness" in terms of the words
of the utterance itself, but it involves a different evidentiary source. How
then should the issue of trumping be decided?
A possible clue to the resolution of this issue comes from the
wholeness concept applicable under the discovery function, out of which
the modem completeness doctrine has evolved. For in terms of discovery,
the completeness rule covered only the proponent's particular evidentiary
source, or rather the particular version of the utterance derived from that
source. The completeness doctrine in effect protected the right to crossexamine the proponent's c_hosen witness with regard to the remainder of
the utterance; and it mandated that the whole of the proponent's chosen
documentary evidence be revealed to the, opponent and the court If this
inherent source restriction is applicable to the trumping function, that
constitutes a significant limitation on the reach of trumping. On the other
hand, it has just been demonstrated that the wholeness concept applicable
106
to one function may not necessarily be right for another.
The case law on this facet of the trumping function is surprisingly
meager. The vast majority of trumping cases involve remainders elicited
from the proponent's source, by cross-examining the proponent's witness
or by introducing, or demanding the introduction of, the remainder of the
document upon which the proponent has relied. This suggests at least a
tacit convention that the trumping function is subject to a same-source
limitation. On the other hand, no decision has been found explicitly
imposing such a restriction on trumping. And in at least one reported
appeal where the question of trumping from a distinct evidential source is
seriously implicated, the decision confirms the applicability of the
completeness doctrine.
07
In People v. Williams/ the defendant made video-taped statements
to police officers in investigative interviews. The officers testified at trial
about the defendant's admissions and were subject to cross-examination
using transcripts of the taped statements. The defendant subsequently
attempted to introduce the tapes to be played for the jury, but they were

impeaching the proponent's account See, e.g., United States v. Bourne, 743 F.2d 1026, 1032
(4th Cir. 1984) (rejecting a "best evidence" argument for excluding an oral report of
defendant's confession in fuvor of a tape recording, but indicating that the tape could be
used by the defense to impeach the prosecution's witness if the two accounts were at
variance); State v. Worthy, 123 S.E.2d 835, 841-42 (S.C. 1962) (articulating same distinction).
106. In particular, it is clear that a same-!lource limitation is not applicable to determinations solely concerned with the timing function. Frequently, these determinations concern
whether one letter in a correspondence should be coupled with another going in the opposite
direction and, therefore, certainly constituting a different evidentiary source. Admission of
one is sometimes conditioned .on admission of the other pursuant to the interruption rule. See
7 Wigmore, supra note 10, § 2104, at 634-35.
107. 487 N.E.2d 613 (Ill. 1985).
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excluded by the trial court primarily on the grounds that playing the tapes
would be cumulative and possibly confusing to the jurors, in view of an
extensive direct and cross-examination of the officers. 108 The defendant
appealed his conviction, and -the Supreme Court of Illinois reversed. The
high court identified two sources of incompleteness: (1) possibly s!gnificant
verbal · parts of the out-of-court statements omitted in the officers'
testimony, 109 and (2) inflections and other speech characteristics lost by
testimonial recounting of the confession.no Exclusion of the tapes was
held error under the rule of completeness, with the following clarifications
on the source issue:
To comply with this "rule of completeness," the trial court should
have allowed all that the defendant said, which pertained to the
events at issue, to be placed before the jury through crossexamination of the officers or through defendant's own witnesses. ...
In the instant case, defense counsel was not restricted in his crossexamination of Officers Moss and Strohm. In fact, utilizing a
transcript of the tapes, he extensively cross-examined both
officers. However, we do not believe that a defendant is limited in his
right to oral cross-examination regarding a conversation. When one
party offers oral testimony regarding a conversation, a tape
recording of that conversation may have independent relevance.
Demonstrative evidence may be dearer and more persuasive that
oral testimony covering exactly the same points, . . . Since the
veracity of the statements was dearly in issue, the defendant's
demeanor and voice inflections, as recorded on the tapes, was
[sic] relevant wholly independent of the actual words spoken.m
To be sure, this is only one decision, and there are several avenues by
which one might attempt to explain it away. 112 Moreover, the choice to

I 08. Id. at 6I6. The hearsay rule was apparently not considered by the trial court,
presumably because it was thought that some portions of the tapes could be used to impeach
the officer's testimony without violating the hearsay rule, just as the transcripts had been used.
I 09. The court noted that on several occasions the officer "could not remember or was
unsure of statements made by the defendant." Id. at 617.
IIO. The reasonable extension of the rule of completeness to nonverbal aspects of verbal
events explains why the hearsay rule would constitute no bar to the substantive use of the
tapes apparently contemplated by the court's opinion. At least some of the nonverbal aspects
of the statements would otherwise be precluded by the application of the hearsay rule to
assertive conduct. See McCormick, supra note 5, § 250, at 736-37.
111. Id. at 616-17 (emphasis supplied). The court's reference to demonstrative evidence
was no doubt an analogy; the tapes were not offered as demonstrative evidence in this case.
112. One might try to construe the decision as simply using the notion of completeness to
support the high court's reversal of the trial court's "cumulative and confusing" judgment. To .
that extent, the extension of the trumping function would not really be at issue. Cj supra
notes 32-33 and accompanying text. However, in view of the rule that a trial court's exclusion
of evidence should be sustained on appeal on any proper ground that might have been used
by the trial court, see McCormick, supra note 5, § 52, at 131, the appellate court should be
seen as speaking to the potential hearsay objection as well. Similarly, one might try to
characterize the tapes as concerned solely with inferences as to the credibility of the witnesses
at trial, including the defendant; there certainly are references in the opinion to issues of
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extend trumping to distinct evidential sources for the remainder is not
without costs. H means that, once a party offers evidence of an out-of-court
verbal utterance, the exdusiona..-y rules may be severely undermined in
their application to other versions of the utterance, versions that would not
be admissible by the opponent if the proponent had not broached the
subject 113 This is an important issue to which we must return after
delving deeper into the rationale of the completeness doctrine and its
distinct functions. The next Part will examine both the range of
exclusionary rules affected by the trumping function and the limits that
should properly be placed upon it.

III. COMPLETENESS AND THE BEST EVIDENCE

PRINCIPLE

This Part looks at the natt.ue of completeness as a constituent
principle in the body of evidence jurisprudence. It shows that completeness derives from the more fundamental principle that parties should
present the epistemically best evidence available to them on litigated issues.
The three procedural functions identified above are analyzed with
reference to this "best evidence" principle. The investigation clarifies the
problems that necessitate a completeness doctrine and yields valuable
insights on Lhe othe!Wi..se mysterious question of which exclusionary rules
are appropriately subject to being trumped by the completeness
principle. 11 ·l

A. Completeness as a Component of the Best Evidence Principle
In a previous article, I argued that within the law of evidence is a
principle that serves to explain, and to some extent to justifY, many of the
existing rules. With deference to eighteenth and early nineteenth century
judges and evidence scholars, I called this the "best evidence principle"
and articulated it as the principle that a party should present the best
evidence reasonably available on any given litigated issue. "Best evidence"

credibility of the witnesses, including the defendant. See 487 N.E.2d at 61 '7-18. But the high
court's references to the credibility of the defendant's taped statements as such serve to
emphasize the substantive hearsay use of the tapes being suggested by the defendant and
condoned by the court. Seeid. at 616-18.
113. A same-source limitation would also reduce the frequency with which the court must
resolve the often difficult question of whether the opponent's evidence "completes" or simply
"contradicts" that of the proponent. Coming from the same source, the remainder is unlikely
to deny the part originally introduced by the proponent, though it may well qualify its
significance, even to the point of reversing it. On the other hand, such a limitation would
complicate matters by necessitating determinations of whether a particular piece of evidence
is in fact from the "same" source, as when the putative remainder is written on the back of
the proponent's documentary evidence.
114. A word about authorities: Until now, in order not to confuse the common law with
practice under the Federal Rules of Evidence, little reference has been made to the latter. In
this Part, more frequent citation to practice under the Federal Rules will serve to illustrate
how the problems giving rise to the completeness doctrine exist under those rules and their
state counterparts as well.
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was defined in terms of epistemic value, that is, in terms of what a

reasonable trier of fact, whether lay or expert, would find most helpful in
the rational determination of the issue in question. 115 I further argued
that this principle is not absolute; it is subject to at least one pervasively
important qualification based on the existence of an adversarial system of
adjudication. This qualification is not easy to state with precision, but in
rough terms it may be expressed as follows: A litigant is privileged not to
present the best available evidence if the opponent will have a reasonable
opportunity to present that evidence. 116 Thus, a judicial application of the
best evidence principle is identifiable as:
[A]ny judicial use of a rule, decision, or argument that proceeds
by identifying some set of potential evidentiary items, call it P,
which is rationally of greater probative worth than that set which
is or might be offered, call it S, and that either (i) enforces a
preference for P because of its superior probativity, or (ii)
recognizes such a preference but Rermits the use of S because of
some countervailing tonsideration. 117
The most significant countervailing considerations internal to the theory
are: (1) the practical infeasibility of the proponent presenting P without
placing incommensurate burdens on the resources of the parties and the
tribunal, and (2) the practical capacity of an opponent to present P in a
not substantially less understandable or more costly way. 118
In demonstrating the significance of this principle, I analyzed a wide
variety of evidentiary doctrines, ranging from discovery rules to witness
sequestration rules, from "substantive" legal rules like statutes of frauds and
statutes of limitation to what we think of more traditionally as the heart of
evidence law, the rules of admissibility. 119 In particular, I argued that
commitment to the best evidence principle provides a better interpretive
account of most admissibility rules than the usual alternative theory based
on distrust of lay jurors. Among the rules briefly mentioned in that analysis

115. See Nance, Best Evidence, supra note 3, at 230-34, 240-42.
116. Id. at 234-39, 242-43, 263-70. In the indicated passages, I gave an even narrower
articulation of the adversarial privilege, one that requires presentation of the episternically
best, reasonably available evidence unless the party reasonably believes that another party will
present the better evidence omitted by the former. In a later article, I worked with the
broader privilege described in the present text See Dale A Nance, Missing Evidence
[hereinafter Missing Evidence], 13 Cardozo L Rev. 831, 859-60 (1991). Although I have stated
the more conservative version here, nothing significant for present purposes turns upon the
difference.
117. Nance, Best Evidence, supra note 3, at 245-46.
118. The indicated considerations are "internal" to the theory in that both are based, at
least to some extent, on the goal of obtaining the best reasonably available evidence for use
by the trier of fact ''External" countervailing considerations include limitations arising from
extrinsic social policies like the preserving of confidential relationships under privilege rules.
To the extent that adherence to an adversarial system is premised on litigant autonomy,
rather than accuracy of adjudication, it constitutes an "external" countervailing consideration.
Cf. id. at 241-42.
119. Id. at 270-94.
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is the common-law completeness rule. 120 This section elaborates on ithe
daim lhat lhe completeness rule is a manifestation of tlb.e best evidence
principle.
On its face, the preference for the whole of a verbal event or
utterance is easily seen as gene:rated by the best evidence principle. The
whole of the event, insofu as necessary to understand the significance of
some relevant part, is better evidence than the part alone. Tnis is true
regardless of the nature of the trier of fact, whether lay or professional,
expert or otherwise, so the rule is not attributable to special concerns
about misleading a lay jury. Nor is there any other obvious explanato:r1
candidate available with respect to this preference. One might be tempted
to say that simple fairness motivates the completeness idea, rather than the
concern for accuracy that motivates the best evidence principle. But
fai_mess is one of those conduso.ry terms that calls out for explanation. The
unfairness involved in the selected presentation of only parts of an
utterance is that it poses a threat to accuracy of the judgment This
concern with accuracy arises not only because accuracy is an end in itself,
but also because accuracy is important in doing substantive justice. It is
that aspect of justice that warrants taldng and evaluating evidence at alt
Remove the risk of inaccuracy, and there would be no plausible daim of
unfairness in this context.
Thus, in understanding completeness as a consequence of the best
evidence principle, fue only difficulties that require attention he in the
countervailing considerations. In fact, the qualifications of the best
evidence principle explain the more precise contours of fue completeness
rule. Out of deference to history, we start by examining the discovery
function.
1. The Discovery Function
As already discussed, the conditional exclusionary form of the
interruption rule offsets limitations on fue opponent's ability to discover a
document in the proponent's possession. The adversa:r1 privilege fails to
out:.veigh the best e·vidence principle LV} this context for the simple :reason
that the opponent does not, without the assistance of the rule, have the
opportlLnity to present the remainder, at least not through the same
evidential source. On the other hand., if the proponent also does not have
access to the remainder, conditional exclusion would simply result in the
loss of valuable evidence. Thus, one would expect the completeness .rule,
like other best evidence rules, to display an excusable preference structure
in which the proponent can excuse the presentation of the part on the
ground that the whole is not available to the proponent or that the
remainder is available to the opponent
The cases are.often difficult to penetrate in this regard because most

120.

Id. at 284-85.
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opinions provide little information about the relevant context of the trial
court's decision. Nonetheless, some evidence suggests that, unless the
proponent's proffer is so incomplete as to be obviously unhelpful in the
case, such an excusing structure exists. Perhaps the most important piece
of evidence is the tendency not to invoke exclusion in response to
unavoidably incomplete testimonial accounts of verbal events. Consider, for
example, the appeal in the case of People v. Adamson. 121 Defendant alleged
error in the admission of testimony recounting only part of a conversation
in which he participated. The Supreme Court of California affirmed the
conviction, noting the well settled rule "that a witness may testify to a part
of a conversation if that is all that he heard and it appears intelligible." 122
What is significant about this result is that the witness who was the source
of the account was subject to cross-examination concerning the statement.
Had the witness heard the remainder and yet refused to reveal it on crossexamination, the court should, and under conventional doctrine would,
have stricken the direct testimony on motion. 125 Thus, the unavailability
of the missing information from this witness insulated the testimony from
exclusion. 124 Moreover, the common-law pattern generally encountered in
the testimonial proof of extrajudicial statements of a party does not even
require the witness, on pain of exclusion, to state in the first instance all

121. 165 P.2d 3 (Cal. 1946) (prosecution for murder and burglary).
122. Id. at f>.7. The court rejected the defendant's argument that the incompleteness was
such as to render the evidence irrelevant Id. To the same effect, see also Lynn v. State, 79
S.E. 29, 33 (Ga. 1913); Mays v. Deaver, I Iowa 216, 222-23 (1855). Confessions are sometimes
suJ:9ect to statutes requiring the whole thereof. Cases interpreting such statutes typically allow
the use of unavoidably incomplete reports of the confession, although they may also require
the witness to be able to state the "substance" of the whole confession. See, e.g., State v. Jugger,
47 So. 2d 46, 54 (La. 1950) (allowing witness to testify to substance of defendant's admissions
even though he could not remember all that was said). An exception should also be noted in
the understandable reluctance of some courts to allow unavoidably incomplete testimonial
accounts of lost or destroyed documents having in themselves legal effect, such as deeds,
contracts, and wills. See 7 Wigmore, supra note 10, §§ 2105, 2106.
123. See McConnick, supra note 5, § 19. See also Nance, Best Evidence, supra note 3, at
282-84 (analyzing the requirement that a witness submit to cross-examination, and the
exclusionary rule that is activated by a refusal to so submit, as a best evidence rule).
124. Of course, there is the remaining potential for collusion between the proponent or
some other person and the witness to manufacture or feign a loss of hearing or memory as to
the remainder, but the Adamson court was obviously not impressed by this possibility in the
context of the case. One line of authority excludes confessions when the defendant's
statement was interrupted after the admission of the act but before an explanation could be
given. Compare William v. State, 39 Ala. 532 (1865) (holding defendant slave's partial
· confession to master improperly admitted when master prevented defendant from completing
the confession), with United States v. Wenzel, 311 F.2d 164, 168 (4th Cir. 1962) (affirming
admission of defendant's confession to officer even though it was interrupted by arrival at jail,
where defendant showed no inclination to qualifY statements already made). In such cases,
exclusion may be based upon the presumptive unreliability of the statement, but may also
represent a confusion between admissibility and sufficiency. In the former cited case, for
example, the court in reversing the conviction makes reference to the presumption of
innocence and the possibility that the defendant might have gone on to provide a justification
for the killing, such as self.Uefense. William, 39 Ala. at 535.
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tl'lat was perceived; because of the availability of this i.nfonnation to the
opponent by way of cross-examination, elicitation of !:he re:m..alnder is
generally left to the opponent. 125
In the context of incomplete tangible proffers, the a priori
improbability of the proponent having access to only part of an important
document, coupled with the difficulty of detecting false dai.ms of
unavailability, should lead the courts to adopt a rather skeptical attitude
toward the proponent's daim that the remainder is unavailable. Still, in
some contexts the unavailability of the remainder is uncontroversial, and
the appropriateness of the exclusionary response then turns on whether
the incomplete proffer is so incomplete as to be simply a distracting waste
of time, or perhaps on the likelihood of tampering. 126 As for the
argument that the tangible remainder is available to the opponent, the
cases do not invariably accept this excuse either. But at least the reason for
this tendency is not difficult to discern within the framework provided
here. Certainly, both case law and commentary confirm the proposition
that availability of the remainder to the opponent is a relevant factor in
deciding whether to invoke the exdusiona.~;/' response. 1 ~ 7 Yet even when

125. See 7 Vflgn1ore, supra note 10, § 2099, at 620-21, a.nd § 2100, at 622-23 (noting some
judicial ambivalence in cases of criminal confessions). Stricter applications in tt'-le context of
confessions given under custodial interrogation are understandable as prophylactic measures,
since the government generally has adequate control to assure the availability of an admissible
account of the whole of the confession.
126. See, e.g., Harrison v. Henderson, 12 Ga. 19, 22 (1852) (affirming admission of a letter
written by a defendant and acknowledging debt, despite Lhe mutilation of a postscript). One
can observe this pattern particularly well in the context of the recurrent modem problem of
partially inaudible tape recordings. Compare Monroe v. United States, 234 F.2d 49, 54-55 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 873 (1956), wherein the court stated:
Partial inaudibility is no more valid reason for excluding conversations than the
failure of a personal witness to overhear all of a conversation should exclude his
testimony as to the portions he did hear. Unless the unintelligible portions are so
subs~'1tial as to render t..l-te recording as a whole unt.n1stwoJu'ly the recording is
admissible ....
with Hunter v. Hunter, 83 A2d 401 (Pa. Super. Ci.. 1951) (holdiBg it error to admit, in
divorce proceeding, incomplete tape recordings of conversations between husband and wife
surreptitiously made by son at husband's request; admission also held to violate privilege for
confidential communications). Numerous federal cases are cited in 1 Jack B. Weinstein &
Margaret A Berger, Weinstein's Evidence 'i[ 106[01], at 11-12 (1991) (concluding that
"federal courts have generally admitted inaudible or incomplete tape recordings if it seemed
clear that inaudibility was not created deliberately by the proponent"). Cj State v. Dills, 416
P.2d 651, 655-56 (Or. 1966) (affirming admission of partly inaudible tape in conjunction with
testimonial account of remainder of defendant's statement, the court noting that no
tampering claim had been made).
127. See, e.g., Cannister Co. v. United States, 70 F. Supp. 904, 909 (CL Cl.), cert. denied, 332
u.s. 830 (1947):
Whether or not a part only may be introduced depends to some extent on the facts.
It is improper, we think, to receive in evidence only a part of a document unless the
remainder of it is available or is m~de available to the other party.... The original
of the bill of sale, a copy of which was introduced, was in plaintiffs possession. If
plaintiff thought the omitted portion material to the issue, it was available to it and
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the opponent's possession of the remainder is readily verifiable, the timing
function may provide an independent reason to reject the proponent's
excuse for partial presentation.
2. The Trumping Function

An examination of the trumping function is even more revealing.
Assume, for simplicity, that the discovery function is not also at issue; that
is, assume that both parties have reasonable access to the evidence of the
128
remainder.
Here the adversarial privilege fuils, not because the
remainder is unavailable to the opponent, but because an exclusionary rule
bars the opponent from presenting the remainder evidence to the trier of
fact As illustrated in the previous Part, the most common problem of this
sort occurs when the proponent has used substantively damaging parts of
the opponent's out-of-court admission; without the aid of the completeness
doctrine, the opponent cannot fully utilize the completing out-of-court
statements in response without running afoul of the hearsay rule. The law
has responded by honoring the opponent's demand that if the statement is
to be used for the hearsay purpose, it must be used as a whole. This
illustrates the affinity of the completeness rule to the very rule it is
trumping, since the general point of both rules is to prescribe that if a
declarant's knowledge is to be brought to bear on the case, it should
ordinarily be done in the more reliable form. In the hearsay context, this
means in the form of in-court testimony; in the completeness context, it
means in the form of a complete utterance. 129
It is important to recognize that the failure of the adversarial privilege
in such a context renders the proponent's duty to present the whole
absolute, provided of course the parties have reasonable access to the
remainder and no countervailing considerations of extrinsic social policy

could have been introduced by it.
See also 7 Wigmore, supra note 10, § 2095(3) (noting the mandatory requirement of entirety

of parts may be dispensed with when whole of document is produced in court for possible use
by t..h.e opponent).
128. Once again, if neither party has such access, we have only a problem of the
excusability of the preference for the whole in the face of an inability to obtain the whole. By
hypothesis, trumping is not at issue.
129. Several scholars have explored the connection between the hearsay rule and the best
evidence principle, and all have concluded that substantial reform of the rule is necessary to
bring it into complete harmony with that principle. See George F. James, The Role of Hearsay
in ·a Rational Scheme of Evidence, 34 Ill. L. Rev. 788 (1940); Nance, Best. Evidence, supra
note 3, at 281-83; Dale A Nance, Understanding Responses to Hearsay: An Extension of the
Comparative Analysis, 76 Minn. L. Rev. 459 (1992) [hereinafter Understanding Responses to
Hearsay); Michael L. Seigel, Rationalizing Hearsay: A Proposal for a Best Evidence Hearsay
Rule, 72 B.U. L. Rev. 893 (1992). Other recent proposals for reform bear some affinity to a
best evidence approach. See Richard D. Friedman, Toward a Partial Economic, GameTheoretic Analysis of Hearsay, 76 Minn. L. Rev. 723 (1992); Roger Park, A Subject Matter
Approach to Hearsay Reform, 86 Mich. L. Rev. 51 (1987); Eleanor Swift, A Foundation Fact
Approach to Hearsay, 75 Cal. L. Rev 1339 (1987).
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preempt such a result 130 Thus, the best evidence principle leads to the
conclusion that :invocation of the trumping function should be viewed as a
forced presentation by the proponent, thereby resolvi..ng the ambiguity we
encountered in the common-law doctrine. 131 Under this interpretation,
the completeness doctrine allows the opponent to piggy-back on the
indusionary authority used by the proponent. That does not mean,
however, that the actual physical introduction of the remainder must be
performed by the proponent. Reasons of convenience and clarity dictate
that it is often better to allow the opponent to introduce those portions
needed for the sake of completeness, whether contemporaneously or later,
especially in cases where the proponent does not concede that the
:remainder was uttered as the opponent claims. Indeed, a negotiated and
mediated adversary process may properly determine the whole of the
132
verbal event and precisely how it is to be presented to the trier of fact.
One may even say, with a civiJity that is not entirely counterfactual, that the
133
opponent assists the proponent to perform his duty to the tribunal. So
the trumping function, seen as a consequence of the best evidence
principle, is entirely compatible with both mandated presentation under
the interruption rule and optional presentation of the remainder by the
opponent under either the interruption or rebuttal rule.
To be sure, one might object that an exclusionmy response, the
traditional form. of ihe conunon-Iaw interruption mle, is an odd -vvay to
ensure that the whole of the utterance comes in. There is truth in this
134
complaint
It reflects a paradox that is ubiquitous in the law of

130. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
131. See supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
132. See, e.g., United States v. Castro, 813 F.2d 571, 574-77 (2d Cir.), cerl. denied, 484 U.S.
844 (1987) (affirming trial court's compromise acceptance of defendant's completeness
motion so as to allow substance of remainder of defendant's statement into evidence without
jeopardizing confrontation rights of co-defendant).
133. One commentator, drawing on language found in many case reports, accurately
stated t...l)e functional relationship in t..l)e cqntext of confessions, where the law is pa.rtJcular!y
well developed:
When a confession is admissible, t.l)e whole of what t..he accused said upon the
subject at the time of making confession is admissible and should be taken together,
and if t.he prosecution Sits to prove the whole statement, the accused is entitled to
put in evidence all that was said to and by him at the time which bears upon the
subject of controversy, including any exculpatory or self-serving declarations
contained therewith.
29 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence § 535, at 586 (1967), formerly 20 Am Jur. Evidence § 488, at 425,
quoted in United States v. Wenzel, 311 F.2d 164, 168 (4th Cir. 1962). This language has been
cited as an example of the ambiguity of the rules in confession cases in that it does not
"distinguish between the prosecutor's having to introduce the whole confession and the
accused right to call for the rest." 1 Weinstein 8c Berger, supra note 126, 'i! 106[01], at 8-9.
The discussion in the text shows why this ambiguity actually selVes to relate the two kinds of
rules.
134. One might respond that the simple explanation of the common-law division between
rebuttal and interruption lies in the answer to the question of whether the incomplete proffer
is so misleading as to be excludable without regard to a completing response. This, however,
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evidence. Evidence law is thick with exclusionary rules more intended to
encourage presentation of additional evidence than to eliminate from
consideration the evidence excluded. Exclusionary rules may thus have
what I have elsewhere described as an "expansionary'' purpose. 155 On the
other hand, some exclusionary rules serve not only to encourage the
presentation of other evidence, but also to eliminate the evidence excluded
for that purpose. The most conspicuous rule of this sort is the hearsay rule;
presentation of the declarant for testimony in court does not ordinarily
render her out-of-court statements substantively admissible. 156 Such rules
are "substitutionary'' in that their object is to replace the offered evidence
with the preferred evidence. 15~
The completeness doctrine, in both itS inclusionary and exclusionary
forms, is of the expansionary kind. That is just what is meant by the
conditional nature of the exclusion enforced under the common-law
interruption rule. For if the remainder is introduced, the original is no
longer subject to exclusion for its incompleteness. Generally speaking,
exclusion is no worse an option in this context than it is elsewhere in the
law of evidence. 158 In any event, the sense of paradox does not arise in

suffers from two serious problems: (1) It does not explain the tendency not to employ
exclusion in the context of testimonial incompleteness, even though such incompleteness can
be as extreme as any tangible incompleteness; and (2) It does not explain the tendency to
employ exclusion in the context of tangible incompleteness even though the incompleteness
does not create a seriously misleading impression. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying
text. Tliat is, this explanation of the exclusionary response is both overinclusive and
underinclusive relative to the empirical patterns.
135. See Nance, Best Evidenne, supra note 3, at 281-85 (discussing, inter alia, the exclusion
of testimony when the witness refuses to submit to cross-examination; the exclusion of
incomplete verbal utterances under the completeness rule; and the exclusion of proffered
evidence in the absence of other evidence with respect to which the former is inaccurately
said to be "conditionally relevant").
136. ·The Federal Rules make some noteworthy exceptions, representing a laudable shift
toward a more expansionary version of the hearsay rule. See Fed. R. Evid. 801 (d)(1).
137. The original document rule-the paradigmatic "best evidence" rule-may be thought
to be the clearest example of this phenomenom. See, e.g., Model Code of Evidence Rule 602
(1943) ("As tending to prove the content of a writing, no evidence other than the writing
itself is admissible unless" failure to introduce original is excused.). There is authority,
however, for the proposition that this rule excludes secondary evidence of contents only by
way of encouraging the use of the original; if the original is used, the rule is satisfied, whether
or not secondary evidence is also used. See 4John H. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common
Law § 1190 (Chadbourn rev. 1972) (opining that a copy may be used in addition to an
original, although it may be excluded as superfluous). The Federal Rule is surprisingly precise
on this point, as it does not explicitly exclude secondary evidence, but rather mandates the
use of the original-a mandate implicitly backed by an exclusionary rule. Compare Fed. R.
Evid. 1002 (requiring original) with Fed. R. Evid. 1004 (allowing use of other evidence of
contents under fairly broadly stated conditions of unavailability of original). See Nance, Best
Evidence, supra note 3, at 273-74.
138. To be sure, there are reasons not to employ exclusion of relevant evidence as the
means of encouraging the presentation of other evidence. This is a difficult matter taken up
more generally elsewhere. See Nance, Missing Evidence; supra note 116, at 835-38, 845-46, 866,
872-81. Suffice it to say that the principal factor counting against exclusion is the availability of
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connection with optional completion by t.he opponent or with completion
chosen by t.he proponent in contemplation of the opponent's otherwise
- inevitable and embaJ.TTaSsi.l'!g rebuttall. 139
3. The Timing Function

Finally, consider briefly the timing function. Assume that both sides
have reasonable access to the .remainder and that no otherwi...se applicable
exclusionary rule bars the opponent from a response in rebuttaL In such
cases, there remains the problem of timing. Though this problem is a
relatively minor one when compared to problems of access to and
admissibility of the remainder, it is nonetheless worth addressing. When
introduction of the remainder is moved to a point earlier in the trial than
would otherwi...se occur, the subsequent presentation is rendered
redundant Thus, invoking tl1e timing function effects the substitution of
one fonn of presentation-one more nearly contemporaneous-for
another. The purpose, one. entirely compatible with the best evidence
principle, is to provide the i..~fonnation in a manner most readily usable Toy
the trier of fuct. Not only do we worry that the misimpression cannot be
corrected by delayed response, but also we see no good reason to impose
the additional TDurden on the trier of fuct necessary to malce the
140
connection.
Once again, the limitations on contemporaneous

the remainder for presentation by the opponent, against which must be balanced the need
for contemporaneous completion and the failure-where it occurs-to recognize the
trumping function when that is necessa.y to allow the opponent's response.
139. Nevertheless, as with all remedial invocations of the best evidence principle, one
should give careful attention to the range of possible responses. For example, when the
opponent cannot offer completing evidence without regard to the completeness doctrine, one
might argue that a missing evidence instruction, such as the following, is appropriate:
If a party fails to produce evidence which is under his control and reasonably
available to him and not reasonably available to the adverse party, then you may
infer that Lhe evidence is unfavorable to the party who could have produced it and
did not.
3 Edward]. Devitt el al., Federal jury Practice anti Instructions§ 72.16 (4th ed. 198'7). This,
however, would be an unusual application of U~e quoted instnJction, vv1hich is n-1ore typically
employed when the missing evidence would be admissible on behalf of Lhe adverse party, if
only it were available to that party. If one interprets the language "not reasonably available to
the adverse party" as covering situations where the evidence is inadmissible by the adverse
party, that would be setting up inferences outside the completeness context favoring a party
in precisely those situations where the law has chosen not to allow that party to present
certain evidence. It would be a bizarre and intolerable situation, forcing each party to present
any admissible evidence that is not admissible by an adverse party, just to avoid the adverse
inference. One could limit the use of an adverse inference to the subset of these cases that
involves incomplete proffers by the proponent, but even then the vagaries of an adverse
inference from unlmown information are much worse than the uncertainties associated with
the evaluation of actual evidence of the remainder. Thus, the adverse inference is a plausible
response to incompleteness only in cases where the content of a remainder known once to
have been available has been lost by the proponent's negligent or intentional spoliation.
l '!0. There is also an occasional resource savings should the earlier presentation of the
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completion arise from concerns that this form of response may actually
confuse matters by making the proponent's presentation di~ointed. 141
In sum, an examination of the three functions of the common-law
completeness doctrine reveals straightfonvard connections to the best
evidence principle. In a moment, we will see what can be inferred from
this in terms of the reach of the important trumping function. Before doing
so, however, we pause to consider the relationship between the trumping
function and the doctrine of curative admissibility. This examination will
deepen our understanding of the role of the best evidence principle in this
context.

B. Completeness and Curative Admissibility
It has been argued that the trumping effect is, or can be, simply a
consequence of the application of the notion of "curative admissibility."142 Curative admissibility refers to the idea that one party's
presentation of inadmissible evidence, which for some reason is admitted,
may be met by the introduction of other inadmissible evidence insofar as
143
necessary to remove any induced prejudice. As applied in the present
context, the argument is that admission of incomplete portions of a verbal
event gives license for the opponent's introduction of the otherwise
inadmissible remainder.
The difficulty with this assimilation of the two doctrines is that the
premise of each is, or is usually thought to be, different. Curative
admissibility applies only when the original evidence is properly inadmissible
upon objection, whereas the original proffer to which a completeness
response is made is typically considered admissible, even though
144
incomplete.
To bridge the gap, the suggested explanation of the

remainder so undermine the strength of the proponent's case as to make it appropriate to
direct a verdict without the necessity of responsive evidence.
141. One might argue that the reluctance to intrude upon the proponent's presentation is
a consequence of the concern for litigant autonomy, independent .of any concern about
accuracy of the judgment. Although superficially attractive, this expla.."1ation is implausible
except in the rule-consequentialist sense of wanting to maintain litigant autonomy even at the
cost of accuracy in a particular case for t.ile sake of maintaining accuracy in the long nm of
cases. In any event, here the point matters not, since the best evidence principle obviously
does not assume that all legitimate competing demands must somehow be traceable to the
best evidence principle itself.
142. The commentator who has pressed this connection most consistently is Professor
Michael Graham. See, e.g., Michael H. Graham, Evidence: Text, Rules, Illustrations and
Problems 595 (2d eel. 1988); Cleary & Graham's Handbook of Illinois Evidence, § 106.2, at 38
(4th eel. 1984). The fourth edition of McCormick's hornbook, the editors of which now
include Professor Graham, has picked up on this idea. See Charles T. McCormick, McCormick
on Evidence § 56 (4th ed. 1992). To be precise, Professor Graham does not deny the
trumping function of the completeness doctrine; rather, he asserts, without elaboration, that
even if such a function is not part of the completeness doctrine, as some federal courts have
opined, essentially the same effect can be achieved by invoking curative admissibility.
143. See McCormick, supra note 142, §57.
144. See 1 David W. Louisell & Christopher B. Mueller, Federal Evidence § 50, at 369
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tnunping effect presupposes that the original proffer must be so
misleading on account of its incompleteness as to be excludable were the
145
opponent to object. Although there will be cases where the original
incomplete proffer would be properly excludable upon objection, there
will also be cases where the trial court reasonably concludes that admitting
the incomplete proffer, without regard to a possible completeness motion
by the opponent, would be less detrimental to accurate fact finding than
excluding the incomplete proffer. Most conspicuously, the significance of
the remainder, or even the fact of its utterance, may be seriously disputed,
and the trial court may entertain sufficient doubts on that score as to
preclude a finding that the proponent's proffer is too misleading to be
146
admitted.
Even if the court is confident of both the occurrence and the
significance of the remainder, it might not conclude that the original part
is inadmissibly incomplete. Ordinarily, judges and commentators tend to
think about exclusions of evidence as misleading without regard to the
availability of other evidence. If, however, one extends the rubric of
"misleading'' to include situations in which other important, contextproviding evidence is known or even believed likely to be available, then
such an incomplete proffer should be held excessively misleading relative to
the complete version, even though the same evidence would not be so
misleading as to be excludable if the remainder were unavailable. 147

(1977).
145. There is considerable disagreement in judicial opinions and academic commentary
over the question of whether the opponent must object, or must not object, to the
proponent's proffer in order to be able to take advantage of the opportunity to present
curative evidence. See generally 1 John H. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law§ 15, at
731 (Tillers rev. 1983). In sharp contrast, completeness cases do not even address the issue of
an objection to the admissibility of the original part as a precondition of the response, which
suggests that typically no one has thought the original pwffer inad.uissible, except in t.'le
special, conditional way associated with the interruption rule. See, e.g., People v. Gambos, 84
Cal. Rptr. 908, 909-12 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970) (rejecting curative admission, emphasizing
opponent's waiver by failure to object to proponent's evidence; separately rejecting
opponent's completeness argument because of failure to show relevance to understanding
proponent's proffer).
146. For example, Fed. R Evid. 403 provides in pertinent part: "Although relevant,
evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of ...
misleading the jury .... " (emphasis supplied). Under such a rule an incomplete proffer may
have relevance that is not "substantially outweighed" by its misleading character. See, e.g.,
United States v. Soulard, 730 F.2d 1292, 1301 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that the admission of
certain evidence was within court's discretion ·under Fed. R Evid. 403, and rejecting
defendant's argument that the evidence should have been excluded under Rule 106, stating,
"First, the record shows that Soulard failed to object timely to the evidence as being
'incomplete.' Second, even if Soulard had objected timely, rule 106 would not have required
exclusion of the exhibits-it would merely have allowed Soulard to compel the Government
to introduce evidence as to the other subfranchises on a showing that the new evidence
"ought in fairness ... be considered contemporaneously .... ").
147. The drafters of Rule 403 stated, "The availability of other means of proof may also be
an appropriate fuctor" to consider in determining whether to exclude evidence under that
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Though probably still perceived as unconventional, this is not an
unreasonable extension. Indeed, that is the upshot of a best evidence
analysis of many long-established exclusionary rules. 1 -~a
However, there is yet another difficulty for the assimilation of the
trumping function under curative admissibility: It presupposes that the
jurisdiction in question recognizes the latter doctrine. In reality, some
jurisdictions are reluctant to employ curative admission, while no such
reluctance is evidenced with regard to completeness. 149 As a practical
matter, therefore, if courts reject the trumping function as an inherent
part of the completeness rule, curative admissibility might fail as a
substitute. On the other hand, situations in which the completeness
principle applies may be among those in which a general reluctance to
allow curative admissibility would be overcome. When the proponent has
incompletely evidenced a verbal event, granting a motion to strike may
leave significant pnjudice to the opponent, and the curative admission of
the remainder will remain subject to relevance restrictions that serve to
keep the curative admission :from getting out of hand. The remainder thus
tends to satisfY the generally prevailing restrictions on curative admis•

S10n.

!50

Whether one views the trumping function as an integral part of the
completeness rule, or as a special application of curative admissibility, one
must recognize its distinctive character. Ordinarily, in cases where curative
admissibility is explicitly applied, the preferred situation would have been
that neither party's evidence be presented. 151 The responsive evidence

rule. See Fed. R Evid. 403 advisory committee's note. See, e.g., United States v. Crosby, 7I3
F.2d I066, 1071-72 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. I001 (1983) (excluding prior consistent
statements of defendant under Rule 403 partly on grounds of incompleteness thereof). It is
hard to see how a jury could be affected in its inferences from the evidence by the availability
or unavailability of evidence that is not presented, unless the jury is aware of the relevant
circumstances. The point, of course, is that though their evaluation of the two situations
might and should be the same if they are not so informed, all things considered it ought not
to be the same. The traditional response to problems of available evidence not presented,
when they are not covered by some best-evidence exclusionary rule, is to allow the opponent
to request a "missing evidence" jury instruction, which entails bringing the availability of the
missing evidence to the jury's attention. See Nance, Missing Evidence, supra note 116, at 85657, 866. For reasons already noted, this makes no sense in cases where the reason for
unavailability to the opponent is an exclusionary rule. See supra note 139.
148. See supra note 134 and accompanying text
149. Compare, e.g., Cal. Evid. Code§ 356 (West I967) (codifying completeness rule; quoted
supra note 30) with 3 B.E. Witkin, supra note 34, § I 993 (summarizing general reluctance of
Califomia courts to employ curative admissibility).
150. See I Wigmore, supra note 145, § 15, at 740 (describing the so-called "Massachusetts
rule" that curative admissibility is allowed only to the extent necessary to cure prejudice).
Note that the usual though not invariable context of an incomplete proffer, especially an
incomplete testimonial proffer, makes it unlikely that the opponent will have a meaningful
opportunity to object prior to its introduction. This tends to undermine the usual argument
against curative admissibility, namely that the opponent is adequately protected by the right to
object and should therefore be viewed as waiving the objection if it is not made. ld. at 746
(articulating this explanation of cases rejecting curative admissibility entirely).
151. Rare exceptions may occur when the parties have stipulated to the admission of the
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"cures" the situation only in that it balances or negates the prejudice
otherwise resulting from that to which it responds, or at least so it is
hoped. Curative admission does not remove the feature that made the
original evidence inadmissible.152 Thus, curative admissibility reflects the
law's judgment that the preferred rank ordering of evidentiary
presentations, from best to worst, is: (1) that neither proponent's nor
opponent's evidence be presented, (2) that both be presented, or (3) that
only proponent's be presented. The law settles on the "second-best''
solution because the theoretically optimal solution has become impossible
to achieve, practically speaking. 155 Thus, for example, the introduction of
the responsive evidence under curative admissibility does not ordinarily
waive the opponent's right to challenge the original admission on
appeal.l54
In contrast, no case has been found in which the opponent
successfully challenged on appeal, as prejudicially misleading, the
admission of only a part of a verbal event when the opponent was able to
155
put in the remainder. And this is as it should be, since the introduc-

two parts as a package. In that event, the parties' choice to override otherwise applicable
exclusionary rules should ordinarily be respected according to their agreement. See, e.g.,
Crawford v. United States, 212 U.S. 183, 197-205 (1909) (holding that trial court erred in
excluding defendant's inadmissible reply to prosecution's inadmissible accusatory letter to the
defendant, where parties apparently had agreed before trial that the prosecution would
present both).
152. Typical cases involve: otherwise irrelevant evidence used to rebut irrelevant evidence,
e.g., St. Clair County v. Bukacek, 131 So. 2d 683, 689-90 (Ala. 1961); inadmissible hearsay used
to rebut a distinct inadmissible hearsay, e.g., Inspiration Consol. Copper Co. v. Bryan, 252 P.
1012, 1015 (Ariz. 1927); or, otherwise inadmissible cl!acacter evidence used to counter
inadmissible cl!aracter evidence, e.g., United States v. Whiting, 308 F.2d 537, 542 (2d Cic.
1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 909 (1963). The same waiver idea may be employed when the
rebutting evidence would otherwise be inadmissible for constitutional reasons, such as
violation of searcl! and seizure llinitations. See, e:g., Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65
(1954) (affirming admission of extrinsic evidence of drug possession after defendant
volunteered that he had never possessed drugs).
153. The ineffectiveness of an objection to, or motion to st.-ike, the original inadmissible
evidence appears often as one of the crucial fuctors to be considered in making a ruling on
curative admissibility. See, e.g., McCormick, supra note 5, §57, at 147-48.
154. See 1 Wigmore, supra note 145, § 15, at 748 (noting, however, that the curative
admission may make the original admission harmless error).
155. In the oft encountered problem of redacted confessions, for example, the
incompleteness of the prosecution's proffer is not considered subject to cl!allenge on appeal
as long as the defendant had the opportunity to invoke a suitable completeness response,
whether exercised or not. A series of Texas cases has made this point well. See, e.g.,
Harrington v. State, 547 S.W.2d 616, 621 (Tex. Crim App. 1977) (rejecting appeal where
rebuttal right exercised); Pineda v. State, 252 S.W.2d 177, 178 (Tex. Crim. App. I 952)
(rejecting appeal where rebuttal right not exercised). The same result obtains even when the
prosecution's omissions are so serious that, were the remainder not available for introduction
on a defense motion, the original proffer would surely be inadmissible, assuming the fact of
incompleteness could be shown. See, e.g., Reece v. State, 772 S.W.2d 198, 202-04 (Tex. App.
1989) (rejecting appeal even though prosecution redacted confession by omitting the word
"not" from defendant's statement, "I did not kill Mr. Smith ... "; case arising under Texas's
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tion of the completing portion eliminates, by hypothesis, the misleading
character of the original proffer, although some residual confusion may
remain due to the timing of the completeness response. Given the assumed
(not insubstantial) relevance of the complete utterance, the admission of
both parts is to be preferred to the admission of neither. 156 Here, the
law's general preference order is: (1) that both be presented, (2) that only
proponent's be presented, or (3) that neither be presented. To be sure,
the second- and third-ranked solutions may be reversed in priority if the
incomplete proffer is especially misleading, as the assimilation argument
supposes, but each remains subordinate to the first 157
This means that the status of the two parts in a curative situation is
different from that of the two parts in a completing situation. The former
may not have the status of substantive evidence, in the sense of supporting
a request for particular jury instructions, opposing a motion for directed
verdict, or supporting a verdict in a post-trial motion. 158 This is obvious in
a case where admitted irrelevant evidence is met by curative irrelevant
evidence: By definition, neither can support a verdict on the appropriate
merits or a jury instruction relevant thereto, except possibly a jury
instruction· admonishing the jury to ignore irrelevancies or limiting the
jury's use of the curative evidence to negating the significance of the
proponent's original irrelevancy. Arguably, prejudicial or incompetent
evidence used to counter prejudicial or incompetent evidence should be
limited in the same way. 159 Indeed, some commentators have argued that

version of the Federal Rules).
.
156. It may, ofcourse, tum out that the completed utterance is of de minimis probative
value, the remainder offsetting whatever significance the original part appeared to have. But
that can be known only after the remainder is considered, at which point exclusion of the
whole will usually not save court time or otherwise serve any useful purpose, unless the
evidence contains otherwise prejudicial elements.
157. In the interruption rule context the law may settle on exclusion of the original proffer,
which seems to adopt solution (3), but that will be more as an incentive to move the
proponent from (2) to (I) than as an expression of a preference for (3) over (2). See supra

PartiDA
158. It is important to distinguish between two fundan!entally different aspects of the
curative admissibility doctrine that are often conflated. On the one band, there is a doctrine
which the opponent invokes at trial claiming that the proponent's introduction of what the
trial court recognizes as inadmissible evidence warrants the opponent's introduction of
responsive inadmissible evidence. This branch of the doctrine, which is the one most seriously
questioned, is raised on appeal by the proponent if the responsive introduction is allowed, or
by the opponent if it is disallowed. On the other hand, there is a purely appellate doctrine
that arises from the appellate court's recognition that the trial court failed ·to exclude the
proponent's evidence when it should have done so. Here the argument is that, given the
opponent's responsive introduction, the error in admitting the proponent's evidence is
harmless. In the former category of cases, the opponent usually has not made an appropriate
objection; in the latter, an appropriate objection has been overruled. In the former, the trial
court should not consider the evidence substantive in the sense described; in the latter, the
trial court's erroneous application of the exclusionary rules usually means that the evidence
was considered substantive by that court.
159. In many ways this is analogous to the limited admissibility of prior inconsistent
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curative evidence should be allowed only for the purpose of deflecting
immaterial inferences. 160
Completion evidence is different Since it eliminates the defect of the
incomplete proffer, both parts can and should be considered substantive in
the sense described here. When taken together as the principle demands,
both are relevant evidence not subject to exdusion. 161 While the
remainder becomes admissible only by virtue of the proponent's
presentation of the incomplete part, the net effect of the whole ought not
to be limited in a way that it would not have been if offered by the
proponent in the first instance. Thus, the use of the remainder is not
rightly limited to nullifying the effect of the incomplete part. The net
probative effect of the whole utterance may favor the opponent. 162
Of course, a single proffer may contain both kinds of defects,
incompleteness as well as some {other) reason for ina<L-nissibility.
Numerous cases of this type can be found in which the tompleteness

statements of a witness: At common law, they can only have the effect of negating the
witness's testimony. See supra note 52. By noting the analogy, I do not mean to endorse the
concept of limited admissibility in either context My tentative view is that, all balancing for
prejudice having been done, evidence admissible for any legitimate purpose ought to be
admitted for all purposes as to which it is relevant, although cautionary instructions may be
appropriate in some contexts. See Nance, Best Evidence, supra note 3, at 292-93. However,
defending this position is not necessary to the present topic. It is certainly not the
conventional view. See McCormick, supra note 142, §59.
160. See 1 Wigmore, supra note 145, § 15, at 750.
161. The New York Court of Appeals expressed the point, not without ambiguity, in a
classic completeness opinion approving the fully substantive use of the remainder:
The rule appears to be firmly settled, both as to a conversation or writing, that the
introduction of a part renders admissible so much of the remainder as tends to
explain or qualify what has been received, and that is to be deemed a qualification
which rebuts and destroys the inference to be derived from or the use to be made of
the portion put in evidence.... [H]ere the declarations of the letter were not
admissible in behalf of the plaintiff at all, because she was the personal representative of the deceased [declarant]. The defendant could waive that difficulty by putting
such declarations, or a part of them, in evidence, on its behalf, but when it did so,
must also make equally evidence that which tended to explain or qualify the portion
which was used.
Grattan v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 92 N.Y. 274, 282-86 (1883) (holding that self-serving
parts of a letter written by an insured could be used by the jury to infer that the insured had
not lied in his application for insurance, even though other undisputed facts strongly implied
that he had).
162. Wigmore's claim, discussed supra note 56 and accompanying text, that the
completing evidence is limited in use, may have been intended to mean more than that it
avoids the hearsay rule; he may have meant that the completing evidence is not substantive in
the sense discussed here, even if it does trump the hearsay rule. This is not, however, the way
his argument reads, and the cases he cites are better explained in other ways detailed above.
There are occasional statements by other commentators to a similar effect See, e.g., Graham,
supra note 142, at 596 (completing statements "may be admitted substantively only if
otherwise admissible"). Note, however, that Professor Graham makes this statement in the
context of his explanation that the trumping effect can be achieved by the use of curative
admissibility, which theory may well be subject to the nonsubstantive use limitation.
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rationale is used to support the responsive introduction of evidence. 165 In
such cases, however, though the completing evidence cures the first
defect-the incompleteness-it does not cure the second defect-the
inadmissibility, although it may negate the prejudice that arises from the
latter. Consequently, admission of the remainder must be limited in
character-not supporting a verdict or jury instructions-in the same way
as other curative admissions. 164 In other cases, it is diffirult to know
whether the principle of curative admissil:iility is at work and whether,
therefore, a limitation on the use of the remainder is in order, yet the
doctrine of completeness is clearly employed. 165
Curative admissibility, then, is not an adequate explanation of the
trumping function at work in the common law of completeness, nor is it a
fully adequate substitute for that function. The two doctrines are related,
in that each may be seen as an example of a "constructive waiver" of the
proponent's otherwise valid objection. The waiver is "constructive" because,
although it is not intended by the proponent, the circumstances entitle the
court to treat the situation as if it were. But they are not co-extensive, since
the nature of the proponent's action and its consequences for the scope of
the waiver are different in the two contexts. Nevertheless, in those
jurisdictions, if any, where the courts wrongly insist that trumping is not
part of the completeness rule, curative admission may be the best available

163. See, e.g., R.C. Bottling Co. v. Sorrells, 275 So. 2d 131, 133-34 (Ala. 1973) (applying
completeness to otherwise inadmissible hearsay statement offered by proponent); State v.
Lovely, 517 P.2d 81, 81-82 (Ariz. 1973) (en bane) (applying completeness to otherwise
inadmissible portions of complaining witness's hearsay statement); State v. Hinkle, 229 N.W.2d
744, 749 (Iowa 1975) (using completen·ess and curative admissibility as alternative reasons to
affirm the introduction of the remainder); Stewart v. Sioux City & New Orleans Barge Lines,
Inc., 431 S.W.2d 205, 211-12 (Mo. 1968) (applying completeness to hospital records
containing otherwise inadmissible hearsay offered by proponent). In other cases, the court
uses the completeness idea, but not by name. See, e.g., Seaboard Coast Line R.R. v. Magnuson,
288 So. 2d 302 (Fla. Dist Ct. App. 1974) (allowing opponent to clarify contents of
inadmissible hearsay through other testimony of same witness).
164. Compare Grattan v. Metropolitan Ufe Ins. Co., 92 N.Y. 274, 282-86 (1883), discussed
supra note 161 and accompanying text, with People v. Schlessel, 90 N.E. 44 (N.Y. 1909)
(endorsing, in dicta, limited admissibility for curative and completing evidence, but clea'rly
rejecting both theories as to the responsive evidence in question).
165. See, e.g., Grobelnyv. W.T. Gowan, Inc., 151 F.2d 810, 812-13 (2d Cir. 1945), in which
the trial court allowed the plaintiff to introduce the remainder of a medical report part of
which was introduced by the defendant on cross-examination of the plaintiffs expert Since
the whole of the report would have been inadmissible hearsay if offered by the plaintiff for
the truth of statements contained therein (which included statements made by plaintiff not for
pulposes of treatment), its partial presentation was presumably allowed in the first instance by
way of indicating the basis and limits of the expert's opinion. If so, then the remainder is
similarly limited in ·use. See supra notes 56-52 and accompanying text On the other hand, no
limitation seems to have been placed on the introduction of the part Thus, it is possible that
the part was available as evidence of the truth of the statements contained therein. If so, the
remainder may also have been used substantively in this sense. In the latter case, whether the
remainder was used curatively depends on whether an objection was made, and required to
be made, in response to the plaintiff's original unlimited proffer. See supra note 145.
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protection against truth-defeating unfairness :in the presentation of
166
misleadingly incomplete evidence.
This approach does not reproduce
the "forced presentation" interpretation of completeness adumbrated
above, and this could make a difference in some situations. Still, there may
be no substantial loss in approaching the trumping function in this
manner, pr(Jl)ided the distinctive cha..racter of completeness as a curative
doctrine is kept firmly in view.

C. Exclusionary Rules and the Reach of the Trumping Function
We come now to the most important implications of the analysis. In
this section, we take up the difficult question of the reach of the trumping
function, that is, the delineation of those situations in which trumping is
proper. We proceed by generalizing from the examples of trumping that
have been used in the foregoing analysis, thereby obtaining a first-order
approximation of the class of cases in which trumping is appropriate.
Then, we refine the analysis by considering objections to the
overinclusiveness and underinclusiveness of the proposed class.
1. Asymmetry and the Trumping Function

Up to this point in the Article, abuse of the party-admission exception
to the hearsay rule has been the sole example of the problem that gives
rise to the trumping function. It is certainly the most commonly
encountered example, but it is not the only one. For example, if the
statement of a criminal defendant, part of which is used by the
prosecution, is contained in the testimony of the defendant at a prior trial
for the same offense, the problem becomes more complex. The
prosecution can use the defendant's prior testimony either under the
party-opponent admission exception or, if the defendant elects not to
testify at the later trial, under the prior testimony exception. But the
defend:mt can use neither exception. The prior testimony exception does
not allow the defendant to present the remainder, for that exception
depends upon· the declas.d..LJ.t being unavailable to the proponent of the
hearsay. 167 And while the defendant is unavailable to the prosecution, he
168
will not be considered unavailable to the defense.
Therefore, if the

166. In jurisdictions not governed by Fed. R Evid. 106, or state rules patterned on that
rule, it is very hard to find decisions that clearly reject the trumping function. And the rare
indications against trumping have been short-lived. For example, in Indiana, despite a longestablished trumping function, see Metzer v. State, 39 Ind. 590, 590-91 (1872), the law was
confused in the 1980s by a decision in which a split court affirmed the tria! court's authority
to exclude remainders because they were otherwise inadmissible under the hearsay rule. See
Duff v. State, 508 N.E.2d 17, 19, 21-22 (Ind. 1987). However, this rule was soon reversed, and
the traditional trumping function was restored, in McElroy v. State, 553 N.E.2d 835, 839 (Ind.
1990) (holding that trial court erred in denying admission of remainder of defendant's
statement).
167. See, e.g., Fed. R Evid. 804(b) (1); see also McCormick, supra note 142, § 302, at 308.
168. See, e.g., Fed. R Evid. 804(a)(l) (defining unavailability to include situations in which
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doctrine of completeness modified only the party-opponent admissions
exception, distortion of a defendant's statements could perhaps be effected
by the prosecution's offering the partial statement only under the prior
testimony exception. More generally, the prior testimony of a party or
nonparty witness can be admissible on behalf of a proponent but not on
behalf of his opponent, owing to differential application of the
"unavailability" requirement 169
Moreover, completeness can be important in this way well beyond the
confines of the hearsay rule. Several such problems can arise in the
context of the original document rule, which requires, unless excused, the
use of the original to prove the terms of a document 170 Suppose, for
example, that the original of a document is in the possession of a third
person. Our proponent calls the adverse party as a witness and secures an
admission from the opponent of only the portions of the writing's contents
favorable to the proponent. In such a case, use of the original by the
proponent is excused since its contents are acknowledged by the adverse
party. 171 But if, on cross-examination, the opponent is asked what further
terms the writing contains, terms favorable to the opponent, the exception
does not apply. Without the completeness doctrine, the opponent's further
testimony would be admissible only if by chance some other exception to
the original document rule applies or the opponent manages to subpoena
the original mid-trial. 172 If the proponent is willing to rely on the

the declarant "is exempted by ruling of the court on ground of privilege from testifYing
conceming the subject matter of the declarant's statement"); see also McCormick, supra note
I42, § 353, at 132.
169. For example, the federal rule specifYing hearsay exceptions conditioned on the
unavailability of the declarant, after listing the various ways in which the declarant can be
considered unavailable, qualifies the list as follows: "A declarant is not available as a witness if
exemption, refusal, claim of lack of memory, inability, or absence is due to the procurement
or wrongdoing of the proponent of a statement for the purpose of preventing the witness
from attending or testifying." Fed. R Evid. 804(a). Such qualifications obviously can, indeed
almost inevitably will, apply differentially to opposing parties. At common law, the
completeness doctrine has been employed to trump the otherwise applicable hearsay
exclusion when a proponent seeks to use such qualifications to block the opponent's
introduction of the remainder of the declarant's utterance. See, e.g., King v. State, 287 S.W.2d
642 (Tex. Grim. App. I956) (involving prior testimony exception as applied to testimony of
defendant at previous trial).
I70. See, e.g., Fed. R Evid. I 002 (requiring original when writing, recording, or
photograph used to prove contents thereof). See generally McCormick, supra note 142, § 230.
In at least one context, the drafters of the Federal Rules specifically anticipated a completeness issue in the administration of the original document rule. If there is no genuine issue of
authenticity of the original from which a duplicate is made, the duplicate is to be treated as
equivalent to the original unless "in the circumstances it would be unfu.ir to admit the
duplicate in lieu of the original." Fed. R Evid. I 003. One circumstance identified as involving
such unfairness is "when only a part of the original is reproduced and the remainder is
needed for cross-examination or may disclose matters qualifying the part offered or otherwise
useful to the opposing party." Fed. R Evid. I003 advisory committee's note (citing United
States v. Alexander, 326 F.2d 736 (4th Cir. I964)).
171. See, e.g., Fed. R Evid. 1007; see also McCormick, supra note I42, § 242.
I72. For example, Fed. R Evid. I 004 (2) provides that secondary evidence, like the
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opponent's characterization of the documentary contents, he should at
least be required to introduce the opponent's complete statement on the
matter.
Again, suppose the proponent offers the testimony of a nonparty
witness to prove the contents of the document This time, the proponent
invokes an exception to the original document rule that applies when the
original is in the possession of an opponent who has been given reasonable
notice to produce the original at trial. 175 The opponent denies possession
of the original, but the trial court fmds by a preponderance of the
evidence that the opponent has the original. 174 Thus, the proponent is
allowed to introduce secondary evidence, such as testimony of the
document's contents. •However, the opponent claims that the secondary
evidence is incomplete in omitting crucial passages of the document and
proposes to add the remainder through further testimony. The proponent,
however, now objects on the ground that the circumstances do not entitle
the opponent to use the exception to the original document rule upon
which the proponent relied, or any other exception recognized as part of
the jurisprudence of the original document rule. The trial judge may have
to agree, completeness aside, for by hypothesis the original is in the
.
possession
of th e opponent. 175
Alternatively, suppose the proponent's clainl, accepted by the trial
176
court, is that the opponent destroyed the original in bad faith. The
opponent admits the destruction but vehemently denies bad faith, saying
the destruction was done pursuant to a regular business practice

remainder of the proponent's secondary evidence, is admissible if "[n]o original can be
obtained by any available judicial process or procedure." This exception could be invoked if
the opponent obtains a stay in order to subpoena the original and demonstrates that the
efforts to obtain the original, though reasonable, were ineffective. The exception might even
be stretched to say that, because of time limitations at trial, the subpoena process is not
reasonably available to the opponent.
173. See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 1004(3) (stating that original is not required if, "At the time
when an original was under the control of the party against whom offered, that party was put
on notice, by the pleadings or othecwise, that the contents would be a subject of pmof at the
hearing, and that party does not produce the original at the hearing"); see also McCormick,
suprn note 142, § 239.
174. See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 104(a), 1008; see also McCormick, suprn note 142, § 53.
175. One might respond by noting that the opponent can always introduce the odginal.
This is true, pwvided the trial court was conect in its judgment that the opponent has
possession of the original. Given the standard of pmof on the issue, that judgment could be
wwng in a significant number of cases. It is one thing to use the prepondecance of evidence
standard to determine whether to excuse a pacty fmm presenting the original; it is another to
use that same standard and determination as controlling the opponent's ability to present the
remainder of secondary evidence introduced only in part by the proponent. There is also the
possibility that the odginal was in possession of the opponent at a time when the pmponent
secved notice of an intention to use secondary evidence but, with or without the fault of the
opponent, it is not in opponent's possession at the time of trial. See suprn note 173.
176. See Fed. R. Evid. 1004(1) (prescribing admission of other evidence of contents if "all
originals ace lost or have been destroyed, unless the proponent lost or destroyed them in bad
faith"); see also McComrlck, suprn note 142, § 237.
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necessitated by the economics of information storage. In such a case, the
opponent almost surely has no access to the original with which to counter
the proponent's incomplete secondary evidence. One may say that such is
the price the opponent must pay for her bad faith. But even putting aside
residual doubts about the purpose of the admitted destruction, doubts
which may be substantial, it is a dubious response to a litigant's bad faith
to give a deliberately incomplete account of the document to the trier of
fact, whose duty is to reach its best judgment of the truth on the merits. Is
it not better to punish a procedurally miscreant party in some way other
than skewing the evidence available to the trier of fact and thereby ·
knowingly interfering with the trier's effortS to perform its task? 177
The problem can be even more subtle than the previous examples
would suggest. Consider, for example, the hearsay exception for statements
178
against interest. Assuming the declarant is unavailable to both parties,
this exception appears to be equally available to each side. However, there
is a body of case law addressing when a statement not itself against interest
is admissible in connection with a statement that is, usually because the
former is closely connected with the latter. 179 Now, what if the related
statement not against the declarant's interest is against the interest of the
proponent? One can expect the proponent not to raise the question of the
bootstrap. Yet the incomplete statement thereby introduced may well call
for a completing response by the opponent. Without the trumping
function, this response is arguably precluded by the fact that the
remainder is neither against the declarant's interest nor presented by the
opponent together with against interest dedarations. 180
These examples show that the need for a trumping function is not
tied exclusively to the admissions exception to the hearsay rule, nor indeed
to the whole set of hearsay exceptions. Rather, the trumping function is
important in any context where the exclusionary rules are asymmetric, that

177. See generally Nance, Missing Evidence, supra note 116, at 872-81 (arguing for caution
in the use of punitive evidentiary sanctions).
178. See Fed. R Evid. 804(b) (3) (prescribing admissibility of some such statements if
declarant unavailable); see also McCormick, supra note 142, § 316.
179. See, e.g., United States v. Garris, 616 F.2d 626, 629-31 (2d Cir.), cerl. denied, 447 U.S.
926 (1980). See generally 5 John H. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 1465
(Chadbourn rev. I 974). See also Model Code of Evidence Rule 509(2) (1942), which states:
Subject to Rule 505 [governing criminal confessions], evidence of so much of a
hearsay declaration is admissible as consists of a declaration against interest and such
additional parts thereof, including matter incorporated by reference, as the judge
finds to be so closely connected with the declaration against interest as to be equally
trustworthy.

A recent decision by the Supreme Court may have eliminated this possibility, at least in the
federal courts. See Williamson v. United States, 114 S.Ct. 2431 (1994).
180. Case law confirms trumping here as well. See, e.g., State v. Mallar, 508 A2d 1070,
1071-72 (N.H. 1986) (affirming conditional exclusion of defendant's proffer of selfinculpatory statements of a declarant unless completing statements inculpating defendant also
admitted).
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is, where the rules make certain evidence admissible if offered by one
party, but inadmissible if offered by an opponent 181 The completeness
doctrine is a "meta-rule" about admissibility, a rule about the use of other
admissibility rules. More precisely, it is a rule to prevent the abuse of
asymmetric exclusionary rules and asymmetric exceptions to exclusionary
rules. This insight suggests a test for determining when trumping is
appropriate, assuming the remainder satisfies the applicable relevance test:
PRELIMINARY TEsT: Under the principle of completeness, evidence
of the remainder should be admissible on demand of the
opponent over an otherwise valid objection by the proponent to
the same extent and for the same purposes as the combined
evidence of the whole of the verbal event (original part plus
remainder) would be admissible on behalf of the proponent
This counterfuctual criterion attempts to respond directly to the defect in
the adversarial presentation of evidence by correcting for the advantage
that a proponent could otherwise gain by a partial introduction of the
verbal event. As befits a meta-rule, it does not specify the purposes for
which the remainder is admissible, but leaves that to be determined
according to the counterfuctual consideration of the admissibility of the
remainder by the proponent. 182 The test responds to our sense of the
unfairness involved when a proponent introduces only a pari of an
utterance, when the opponent has no ability to respond with the
remainder. 183 The following subsection, however, will press this intuition.
As is true more generally, the sense of fuirness cloaks other values that
may, when made explicit, require us to qualify the Preliminary Test.

181. See Nance, Best Evidence, supra note 3, at 266-67. This kind of asymmetry is a species
of a broader genus that Professor Jonakait calls "biased" evidence rules. See Randolph N.
J onakait, Biased Evidence Rules: A Framework for Judicial Analysis and Reform, 1992 Utah L.
Rev. 67 (defining biased evidence rules as "those that permit one party to use a kind or class
of evidence while prohibiting the other from using it").
182. In some cases, rules provide for admissibility of evidence without indicating the
purpose for which admission is allowed. For example, if a witness uses a writing to refresh her
memory, the writing may be admissible by a cross-examining party. See, e.g., Fed. R Evid. fij 2.
Rule 612 sets up an asymmetry because it does not allow the calling party to introduce the
writing. See McCormick, supra note 142, § 9, at 33. Moreover, the rule does not specify for
what purpose the writing is admissible; it does not specify what otherwise applicable
exclusionary rules are being overridden. Under our Preliminary Test, an incomplete
introduction of the writing by the cross-examining party could be met with a completing
introduction of the remainder by the calling party. The purposes of both introductions must
be worked out as part of the jurisprudence of Rule 612. See 3 Weinstein & Berger, supra note
126, i 612[05], at 50-51 (opining that Rule 612 does not create exception to hearsay rule, use
of the document under that Rule being limited to testing the credibility of the witness).
183. This idea is briefly suggested in a recently published treatise:
[I]f the initial statement fits ~ exception and the related statement would fit if the
proponent offered it originally, the fact that the same exception would not be
available to adverse parties should matter much less (or not at all) since the original
proponent should not be able to misuse an exception in a misleading way.
Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Evidence § 1.17, at 69 (1995) (footnote
omitted).
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2. Beyond Formal Asymmetry
a. The overinclusiveness of asymmetry
The test developed in the previous subsection is called "preliminary"
because we must still consider whether it is overindusive or underindusive
in its extension of the trumping function and its consequent admission of
evidence. Consider first the question of overindusiveness: Should all
asymmetric exclusionary rules be subject to trumping? We have already
considered the hearsay rule and the original document rule in some of
their many variations. Must we consider every other variation and every
other rule separately, or can we make some useful generalizations?
·
i. Best evidence and other accuracy rules. - To begin with, trumping is
surely appropriate when the asymmetric rule to be trumped is designed to
facilitate accurate adjudication by assuring the presentation of the best
reasonably available evidence on an issue. These are just those asymmetric
rules based on the best evidence prin.ciple. 184 This fact allows one to
make sense of the otherwise cryptic remark made by Dean McCormick in
describing the trumping function under the common-law rebuttal rule:
This right is subject to the qualification that where the remainder
is incompetent, not merely as to form as in the case of secondary
evidence or hearsay, but because of its prejudicial character then
the trial judge should exclude it if he finds the danger of
prejudice outweighs the explanatory value. 185
In its ambiguous reference to "form," this passage suggests, but does not
dearly articulate, the connection between the hearsay and original
document rules. That connection is their mutual dependence on the best
evidence principle. 186 The trumping function is dearly appropriate in
contexts where that principle is not being well served by a rule based upon
it.
The relative infrequency with which the trumping function arises in
the original document rule context, in the modern· era of liberal discovery,
results from the fact that the rule and its exceptions generally allow the
opponent to present the remainder of the secondary evidence if either the
original is also presented or it is unavailable to the opponent. 1B'I As
illustrated by the unusual character of the examples presented in the
previous section, under such an excusing structure, trumping is rarely
required. Substantial liberalization of the admissibility of hearsay, bringing
that rule into greater harmony with the best evidence principle, would
generate a similar excusing structure. 188 Whether this would greatly

184. See supra notes 115-20 and accompanying text.
185. McCormick, supra note 5, § 56, at 146. This language appeared in all editions up to
the current, fourth edition, where it is unfortunately dropped by the reviser in favor of the
curative admissibility approach. See McCormick, supra note 142, § 56.
186. See Nance, Best Evidence, supra note 3, at 286.
187. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
188. See, e.g., Model Code of Evidence Rule 503 (1942) (prescribing admission of hearsay
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:reduce the h1cidence of circumstances calling for the exercise of a
!J--umping function depends on how the liberalization would affect the
189
asymmetry of the admissibility of pri.o:r statements of parties.
At present, of course, the contours of the hearsay rule do not
conform perfectly to the demands of the best evidence principle. Indeed,
since the nineteenLh century, many have believed that the hearsay rule is
motivated by a different truth-seeking rationale, that the probative value of
hearsay is likely to be excessively credited by the trier of fuct, especially a
lay jury. 190 Although this theory is probably insufficient to support a
general exclusionary rule for hea:rsay, 191 its acceptance nonetheless almost
certainly warrants trumping in contexts of asymmetry. Suspicions of jmor
credulity cannot rationally be strong enough to malce acceptable the
misleadingly incomplete admission of evidence under a hearsay exception
gener<~Jly thought to obviate those suspicions. In the ove:nvhelming
majority of cases, the omission will undermine the reliability thought to
justify the exception. The same point applies as to other exclusionary rules
similarly grounded, 192 thus indicating a somewhat broader conclusion:

if declarant testifies or is shown to be unavailable); Seigel, supra note 129, at 930-32
(recommending admission of hearsay "if it is the best evidence available to the offering party
from a particular declarant source, or if the best evidence has been or will be presented to
the trier of fact").
189. See Seigel, supra note 129, at 938 (justifying party-opponent admissions exception
under a best evidence approach to the hearsay rule). Although Professor Seigel does not
address the issue, a theory of hearsay exclusion that rests on enforcing a preference for live
testimony by the dec!ara.Tlt may render the exclusion of a nontestifying criminal defendant's
proffer of his own out-of-court declarations unconstitutional as a violation of the Fifth
Amendment privilege not to be compelled to testify, unless the declaration in question was
generated just to avoid having to testify. That result would end much, but not all, of the
asymmetry that necessitates the trumping function in criminal cases. Cf. Brown v. State, 450
S.E.2d 821, 823 (Ga. 1994) (recognizing that trial court's denial of defendant's motion to
admit remainder of defendant's pretrial statement, on the ground that defendant was
available to testify, could violate defendant's privilege); People v McLucas, 204 N.E.2d 846,
847-48 (N.Y. 1965) (holding that trial court's limitation on use of exculpatory remainder of
defendant's statement because it "does not take the place of sworn testimony from the witness
chair" violates defendant's privilege).
190. See Nance, Understanding Responses to Hearsay, supra note 129, at 460-64
(distinguishing "taint" theories from "inducement" theories, the former excluding hearsay
because of the truth-defeating effects of the hearsay itself, and the latter excluding hearsay as
a means of inducing its proponent to present the "better evidence" testimony of the
declarant). Not to be confused with such taint theories is one that prescribes the exclusion of
hearsay when necessary in order to conserve the cognitive resources of the trier of fact for the
evaluation of more important evidence. See Craig R Callen, Hearsay and Informal Reasoning,
47 Va..rJd. L. Rev. 43 (1994). The latter Lheory can be a_rticu!ated in a manner consistent with
the epistemic best evidence principle.
191. See Seigel, supra note 129, at 905-16 (rejecting what he calls the "misinformation"
theory of excluding hearsay).
192. An example would be the so-called Dead Man's Acts, which. commonly prohibit a
party adverse to the interests of an estate from testifying to statements made by the deceased.
See, e.g., Reeves v. Lyon, 277 N.W. 749, 754 (Iowa 1938) (invoking completeness doctrine to
hold that estate's use of part of conversation allows adverse party to use remainder).

VERBAL COMPLETENESS

883

Trumping should generally apply in cases of asymmetry in any exclusionary
rule that regulates the admission of evidence primarily in order to facilitate
195
.
accuracy of adJudication.
ii. Privilege rules. - Questions of privilege are only somewhat more
troublesome, provided the privilege is held by the proponent. Of course,
the concept of privilege competes with truth finding in its attempt to
protect confidentiality or secrecy at the cost of adjudicative accuracy. 194
And it might seem that this would be the strongest argument for
overriding the best evidence principle. However, in many cases, probably
most, the very presentation of the original part will effect a waiver of the
privilege under conventional privilege rules. 195 Indeed, it has been
argued that preventing a proponent from utilizing misleading incompleteness is precisely the proper focus of the waiver rules. 196 But if no waiver is
found, the court will need to make a further determination as to whether
the interests of justice require the negation of the privilege to the extent
necessary to correct the incompleteness of the proponent's proffer. A
possible, though unusual, example is when the original incomplete

193. Important asymmetric rules, to. which trumping readily applies, are those ordinarily
symmetrical objections that are held not to apply to a party opponent's admissions. For
example, the proponent offers part of a statement of an opponent that does not of itself
indicate "personal" or first-hand knowl~dge of the facts stated. The usual personal knowledge
requirement is dropped in such cases. See McCormick, supra note 142, § 255, at 144-47.
However, if the opponent offers a remainder similarly devoid of evidence of personal
knowledge, this exception would not apply without the help of the completeness doctrine.
194. See McCormick, supra note 142, § 72. To be sure, some privileges may actually
contribute to the flow of relevant information to tribunals. See Ronald J. Allen et al., A Positive
Theory of the Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work Product Doctrine, 19 J. Legal Stud. 359,
361-62 (1990):
In brief, our argument is that the attorney-client privilege and the work product
doctrine offer two perspectives on a larger goal, which is to increase the amount of
information about disputes available to courts and to work against the disincentives
to the production of that information which would otherwise exist.
195. See generally McCormick, supra note 142, § 83, at 305-06 (concerning marital
privilege), § 93, at 344 (concerning attorney-client privilege), § 103, at 386-87 (concerning
physician-patient privilege). A fair restatement of the Jaw is that
A person upon whom t.hese rules confer a privilege against disclosure waives the
privilege if he or his predecessor while holder of the privilege voluntarily discloses or
consents to disclosure of any significant part of the privileged matter. This rule does
not apply if the disclosure itself is privileged.
Unif. R Evid. 510. See also Proposed Fed. R Evid. 51 I. An occasional case makes the
connection between the doctrine of completeness and that of waiver of privilege. See, e.g.,
Struble v. Village of De Witt, 132 N.W. 124 (Neb. 1911) (invoking completeness doctrine in
considering waiver of confidential communications between patient and physician).
196. See Richard L. Marcus, The Perils of Privilege: Waiver and the Litigator, 84 Mich. L.
Rev. 1605, 1607 (1986) (arguing that in analyzing attorney-client privilege waiver issues, "the
focus should be on unfairness flowing from the act on which the waiver is premised. Thus
focused, the principal concern is selective use of privileged materials to garble the truth,
which mandates giving the opponent access to related privileged material to set the record
straight."). Some decisions have narrowed the scope of waivers to countering only such
misleadingly incomplete disclosures. See, e.g., In· revon Bulow, 828 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1987).
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statement does not itself contain any portion of a privileged communication, but the necessary remainder does. 197 If the privilege is neither
waived nor trumped, the court should malce a final determination as to
whether the original proffer should be admitted, or allowed to remain in
evidence. 198 Essentially the same analysis applies in the context of "quasiprivilege" doctrines that exclude evidence in order to promote or protect
199
certain kinds of conduct by actual or potentiallitigants.
iii. Prejudice rules. - Finally, objections to the remainder based on
prejudice to the proponent are the most problematic because there is as
yet no fully adequate theory of what prejudice is or why courts exclude
evidence on account of it 200 Putting aside the simple risk of inaccu_rate
evaluations of evidence discussed above, prejudice can be characterized as
a "tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though
not necessarily, an emotional one." 201 This, in tum, can be understood as

197. The question would be whether the proponent has "consented" to disclosure even
though he has not disclosed any part of the privileged matter. See Unif. R. Evid. 510 (quoted
supra note 194). This presupposes that the privilege can extend to a part of the whole
conversation in a way that the privileged part satisfies the relevance test for completeness with
respect to the unprivileged part. See John K Baldwin, Note, Does the Attorney-Client Privilege
Extend to a Confidential Part of a Non-Confidential Communication?, 32 S. Cal. L. Rev. 212,
216-17 (1959) (noting t.he connection between completeness and waiver but doubting Lhat the
privileged part will often satisfy the relevance test by qualifying the unprivileged part).
198. See e.g., United States v. LeFevour, 798 F.2d 977, 981 (7th Cir. 1986) (''Rule 106 was
not intended to override every privilege and other exclusionary rule of evidence in the legal
armamentarium, so there must be cases where if <h'1 excerpt is misleading the only cure is to
exclude it rat.her Lhan to put in other excerpts."). See also Graham, supra note 57, § 106.1, at
55 n.l3 ("If the otherwise inadmissible evidence necessary in fairness to explain, modify,
qualify, or otherwise shed light upon the evidence being offered is absolutely barred for
constitutional or as [sic] other reasons, it is open to the trial judge to exclude the originally
proffered evidence under Rule 403.").
199. See McCormick, supra note 142, § 72.1 (distinguishing true privileges from rules
excluding evidence of subsequent remedial repairs, offers of compromise, and so forth). For a
codification of the notions of waiver and trumping, see Fed. R. Evid. 410(i) (allowing
admission or remainder of statements made in plea bargaining). Cj Lindley v. Wabash Ry.
Co., 233 N.W. 450 (Neb. 1930) (admitting remainder of events even though it included
information about subsequent repairs).
200. As a preliminary matter, one might object that exclusions for prejudice are not
asymmetrical; any party may object to improper prejudice toward any party. But while the
rules excluding evidence for prejudice, e.g., Fed. R Evid. 403, do not explicitly limit sta._nding
to raise Lhe objection, a trial judge probably is obligated to accept a party's waiver of the risk
of prejudice to that party. Add to that the a priori unlikelihood that an objection will be
invoked by someone other than the adversely affected party, and one readily concludes that
prejudice rules are essentially asymmetrical.
201. Fed. R. Evid. 403 advisory committee's note. See Richard D. Friedman, The Elements
of Evidence 61-62 (1991):
We may break [the danger of unfair prejudice] into two types. First, some evidence
may bias the juror[s], effectively distorting the burden of persuasion that they apply;
for example, proof that an accused is a native of a nation with which we are on
unfriendly terms might encourage some jurors to convict him even though they are
not persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt about his guilt. Second, some evidence
might be overvalued by the jury; for example, in some cases jurors might be inclined
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the regrettable consequence of the admission of evidence before a trier of
fact, willing to render a decision contrary to its own rational judgment of the
facts under the applicable burden of persuasion. This sort of explanation
may depend on a concept of juror irrationality or obstinacy causing less
accurate results when certain evidence is presented than when it is not,
even if tha.t evidence is epistemically the best aVailable. 202 Alternatively,
prejudice can be seen as improper litigant conduct in appealing to the
baser side of the trier of fact, whether or not one predicts that the appeal
will be successful in the particular case. 203 In either event, a balancing of
competing considerations is dearly necessary in order to decide whether
the remainder should be admitted, although the nature of that balancing
will depend on the theory of prejudice adopted. Without attempting to
develop such a theory here, one can simply conclude that when
proponents raise the issue of prejudice associated with the remainder,
essentially the same procedure must be employed as in the case of
privilege claims in which no waiver is found; trumping is not automatic.204

b. The underinclusiveness of asymmetry
Consider now the issue of underindusiveness. Does the asymmetry test
admit too little? In other words, does the Preliminary Test exclude from
trumping cases that ought to included? Here the issue focuses on those
situations in which the remainder, hypothetically considered, would be
inadmissible if offered by the proponent. Obviously, such cases present an

to give some evidence with an appearance of scientific complexity far more weight
than it merits.
202. See, e.g., Andrew K Dolan, Rule 403: The Prejudice Rule in Evidence, 49 S. Cal. L.
Rev. 220, 22fi..28, 235-37, 240-42 (1976); Victor J. Gold, Federal Rule of EVidence 403:
Observations on the Nature of Unfairly Prejudicial Evidence, 58 Wash. L Rev. 497, 503-06
(1983); Richard 0. Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 75 Mich. L. Rev. 1021, 1036 (1977).
203. See Nance, Best Evidence, supra note 3, at 291-92. The viability of controlling
potential prejudice by the use of limiting or cautionary instructions may also depend on which
theory of prejudice one endorses, being easier to justify under the latter theory. See id. at 29293.
204. Compare In re Mann's Estate, 189 N.W. 991, 996 (Mich. 1922) (affirming trial court's
requirement that all of will be introduced, notwithstanding the potential prejudice arising
from the jury's exposure to the relative wealth of the contestants), with Derrick v. Rock, 236
S.W.2d 726, 728-29 (Ark. 1951) (holding that putative remainder was erroneously admitted
because it was irrelevant to the part introduced and contained prejudicial information about
insurance), andJeddeloh v. Hockenhull, 18 N.W.2d 582, 585-89 (Minn. 1945) (same).
Unlike privilege claims, however, if the remainder is admitted over a claim of prejudice,
and the prejudicial aspect of the remainder is distinguishable from its completing uses,
limiting or cautionary instructions are appropriate. CJ United States v. Apuzzo, 245 F.2d 416,
420 n.4, 421-22 (2d ar. 1957) (holding no error in trial court's admission of remainder
containing potentially prejudicial reference to defendant's prior arrest for similar offense,
when trial judge instructed jury not to infer defendant's guilt from the fact of a prior arrest;
affirmance based on waiver by invited response as well as verbal completeness).

886

80

IOWA LAW REVIEW

[1995]

obstacle to trumping under a theory that rests on the idea of m_andatory
presentation by the proponent How GL1l the proponent be compelled to
introduce that which he has no right to introduce?~ Two genera]
contexts should be distinguished. In each, the question is whether to allow
trumping or to leave the opponent to other remedies that may be
available. As discussed in the previous section, these remedies include: ( 1)
disallowing the proponent's evidence on the ground that it is substantially
misleading relative to its probative value and (2) involuiJ.g cu1-ative
admissibility to introduce the remainder for the limited purpose of
negating the proponent's evidence. This leads us into especially difficult
problems of choosing the optimal institutional response, but we may
console ourselves in the resulting ambivalence with the recognition that
these situations are very unusual as compared to the completeness
problems already discussed. 206
i. Complenu;ntary asymmetric rules. - First, in addition to ru"l asyrnumeu-ic
rule blocking the opponent's response, the proponent's introduction of
the remainder could be subject to an objection asymmetrically available
only Ito the opponent, for example a privilege or quasi-privilege held by the
opponent Of course, the opponent can waive the latter in choosing to
introduce the remainder, thus leaving in place only the asymmetric
objection favoring the proponent Indeed, the opponent is not :raising the
secondary objection tworing her as to the remainder, so fue proponent :in
fact could have introduced the remainder, and a functional asymmeuy is
207
presented.
Moreover, the opponent ought not to be in a worse
position, a.>d Lhe proponent ought not to be in a better position, than if
05

205. Recall the reluctance of common-law courts to accept completeness as a..r1 argument
to allow the proponent to admit additional portions of an utterance that are otherwise
inadmissible. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
206. Certain cases we may set aside. If the remainder is unavailable, then forced
presentation obviously would mal'e no sense. It might seem that forced presentation also
mal,es no sense when the remainder is available only to the opponent, but since the
proponent probably could have obtained the remainder by discovert a.""Jd L.'le opponcat
ultimately makes the remainder availa!)le to the tribunal, there is no reason to deny that it
can, in principle or in practice, be made available to the proponent for presentation.
207. One might suggest that such situations caii for exclusion of the proponent's
incomplete evidence, even though the discovery function is not in play, because of the
potential invasion of the opponent's privilege that admission represents. But there is generally
no reason to prohibit the introduction of evidence simply because it will put pressure on the
opponent to waive his right to keep out other evidence. See, e.g., Marcus v. United States, 86
F.2d 854, 858 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (holding defendant's confession, redacted to omit references
to other crimes, admissible for the prosecution despite the alleged incompleteness); United
States v. Grunewald, 164 F. Supp. 644 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (holding redacted testimony of
defendant from former trial admissible for prosecution, even though remainder would
include cross-examination concerning the defendant's exercise of Fifth Amendment rights
which had been held unconstitutional in previous appeal, so long as redaction would not
garble the sense of the former testimony). Of course, without recourse to the completeness
doctrine, the trial court certainly has the di~cretion to eJl:clude a proffer of minimal probative
value if the primary purpose of the proffer is to create a misleading impression that can only
be eliminated by the opponent's waiving the privilege in question. See Fed. R Evid. 403.
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no such additional objection, intended solely for the protection of the
opponent, were available. So these cases should qualifY for trumping, and
the Preliminary Test is underiilclusive.in this regard, unless it presupposes
the opponent's waiver of such additional .asymmetric objections. This
problem can be rectified by changing the counterfactual to allow trumping
if the evidence of the whole utterance would - be admissible by the
proponent over the same objection by the opponent
ii(a). Judicial economy rules.- Second, there could be an objection to
the remainder equally available to each of the opposing parties as against
the other. This problem might also be superimposed on a distinct
asymmetric rule favoring the proponent. The symmetric objection would
not be trumped even under the expanded test just articulated. But should
it be? In two subcategories the answer clearly is in the negative. The first is
the symmetrically available objection that the probative value of the
remainder, though extant, is so minimal in comparison to the time and
effort nececessary to introduce and evaluate it that it should be excluded
in the interests of judicial economy. 208 Such objections obviously should
not be subject to a completeness override. The contractionary dimension
of the best evidence principle they instantiate is not rendered inoperative
by the introduction of part of an utterance. On the other band, the
unusual probative value of a completing remainder may help to establish
that its consideration by the tribunal is not in fuct a waste of time under
the rule that the proponent has invoked. 209
ii(b). Third party privileges. - The second subcategory that should be
immunized from trumping involves a valid objection to the remainder that
renders it inadmissible on behalf of either party as a consequence of the
need to avoid prejudice to a third party or violation of a privilege held by a
third person. 210 Here the interests of third persons argue against
trumping; such persons are not responsible for the misleading proffer,
though they may seek to take advantage of the opponent's incapacity to
respond. 211 If the third person does not consent to the introduction of

208. See, e.g., Fed. R Evid. 403 (allowing exclusion of relevant evidence if probative value
substantially outweighed by Lhe danger of W"'..ste of time). The resulting exclusion of releva...>t
evidence is not necessarily in conflict with the goal of truth finding. In some cases, exclusion
may actually enhance the accuracy of adjudication by shepherding the unavoidably limited
resources of the trier of facL
209. See supra note 33 and accompanying texL As compared to a claim of prejudice to the
proponent, the courts have a distinct and more significant interest in monitoring the issue of
judicial economy, and- the objection cannot therefore be viewed as fully waivable by the
proponent or as essentially asymmetrical. CJ. supra note 200.
210. In addition to the usual rules of privilege, some rules protecting witnesses from the
admission of impeaching evidence may be put in this category. See r.g., Fed. R Evid. 412
(stating federal "rape shield" rule); State v. Miskell, 451 A2d 383 (N.H. 1982) (interpreting
rape shield statute as creating a privilege for complainant). This example also illustrates how
the proponent may have standing to raise the objection on behalf of the third person;
otherwise, there would be nothing to trump under the Preliminary Test as worded.
21]. Of course, if the remainder can be edited so as to achieve the explanatory function
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the remainder, the court faces the decision whether to admit the
incomplete utterance without the remainder, to admit the remainder for a
limited use as between the proponent and opponent, or to exclude the
whole of the utterance. 212 The second option, moreover, seems plausible
only in cases of potential prejudice to a third party, not those involving the
privilege of a third person, since limited use would still entail disclosure of
the privileged material. However, the completeness doctrine is implicated
if the proponent, though not technically the holder of the privilege, is
effectively in control of its exercise. In such a case, an effective asymmetry
may exist because in practice the proponent can choose whether to admit
the complete verbal event.m This contingency also requires recognition
in a revised test for trumping.
ii(c). Symmetric accuracy rules.- A third large subcategory of symmetric
exclusionary rules poses perhaps the most difficult trumping issues.
Suppose evidence of the remainder· is blocked by a symmetrical
exclusionary rule that is intended to improve accuracy by inducing the
presentation of better evidence than that offered, or by eliminating
214
evidence that might be accorded excessive weight, or both.
For

without jeopardizing the legitimate interests of the third person, then the potential conflict
between completeness and the protection of the third party's interest can be avoided. See, e.g.,
State v. Turecek, 456 N.W.2d 219, 225-26 (Iowa 1990) (affirming admission of taped statement
by defendant in child abuse case, when defendant was allowed to testify to related
conversation with victim in order to clarify meaning of defendant's apology to victim;
remainder of conversation relating to prior abuse of victim by another excluded in
accordance with Iowa's rape shield rule).
212. Under the Federal Rules, the decision is at the interface of Rule 403 (discretionary
exclusion) with Rule 105 (limited admissibility). See Fed. R. Evid. 105 advisory committee's
note (advising that limited admissibility may be rejected in cases of undue prejudice). See, e.g.,
United States v. Bigelow, 914 F.2d 966, 971-72 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1077 (1990)
(holding that trial court did not abuse discretion in refusing to admit marginally exculpatory
remainder of defendant's statement that would strongly inculpate co-defendant in violation of
latter's confrontation rights); United States v. Ford, 771 F.2d 60, 62-64 (2d Cir. 1985)
(holding that trial court did not abuse discretion in excluding defendant's proffer of both
complete and redacted version of co-conspirator's post-arrest statement offe1ed as a
declaration against penal interest; confrontation rights of co-defendant implicated). Also
available as a means to avoid prejudice to a co-defendant third party is the option to sever
trials. Compare People v. LaBelle, 22 N.E.2d 727 (N.Y. 1966) (holding that trial court erred in
not granting motion to sever trials of joint defendants and then allowing prosecution to use
redacted statement of one defendant that omitted exculpatory parts), with United States v.
Alvarado, 882 F.2d 645, 650-51, 655-56 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1071 (1989) (finding no
error in not granting motion to sever trials of joint defendants and then allowing prosecution
to use redacted statement of defendant that omitted parts implicating co-defendant but
included substance of defendant's exculpatory assertions).
213. If introduction of the original part violated the same third-party privilege, then a
mixed problem of curative admissibility and completeness results. The proponent cannot
choose to raise the privilege bar without requiring the exclusion of both parts; even if the
proponent cannot formally waive a third party's privilege, and even if the proponent is not in
effective control of the third party's decision about waiver, the introduction of part of the
privileged matter may be treated under an estoppel theory as a waiver of the proponent's right
to invoke the privilege. See supra notes 194-96 and accompanying text.
214. These are expansionary and substitutionary best evidence rules, such as the hearsay
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example, suppose again that a partial confession is introduced by the
testimony of a police officer who heard the defendant's oral statement
This time, the defendant offers as rebuttal the testimony of a witness who
says he was told by someone that the defendant also made an exculpatory
explanation on the same occasion. Without regard to trumping, this would
be excludable "double" hearsay when offered by either party, though the
reason for its exclusion when offered by the prosecution is only the second
level of hearsay that does not come within the exception for a party
admission. 215
It is hard to state a general conclusion about whether to allow
trumping in such situations. Once again, to reconcile trumping with a
forced presentation theory of completeness, one must rely on the not
wholly satisfYing fact that the opponent would not in fact exercise her right
to object to the remainder if it were offered by the proponent. One can
make the further, admittedly abstract argument to support trumping
generally. Any symmetric exclusionary rule can, in principle, be divided
into two asymmetric exclusionary rules, one favoring the proponent and
one favoring the opponent The former is exactly the kind of rule
paradigmatically subject to trumping, whereas the latter is waivable by the
opponent under the same reasoning applied above to cases involving the
existence of a secondary privilege rule favoring the opponent. Why then
should it matter that the exclusionary reasons applicable to both parties
arise under distinct rules rather than the same rule? Moreover, the
pmpose of symmetrical exclusionary rules is almost invariably. to facilitate
accuracy of judgment without unwarranted expense in time or other
resources,216 and once again, that is when trumping has its strongest
appeal.
· But not in every case. Consider the partial confession case
hypothesized above. Certainly, there are occasions in which the opponent's
responsive testimony is the best available evidence with respect to the
content of the remainder; in the stated hypothetical, for example, the
prosecution's witness may not have heard the entirety of the confession,
and the "someone" who told the defense witness about the remainder

rule, the original document rule, and the opinion rule, as well as other symmetric accuracy
rules. See generally Nance, Best Evidence, supra note 3, at 278-94.
215. See, e.g., Fed. R Evid. 805 (excluding hearsay within hearsay unless exceptions apply
at each level). (Technically, in the federal scheme admissions of a party opponent are
nonhearsay, so the prosecution faces only a single level hearsay problem; but the resulting
issue is the same as under the conventional, double hearsay sclJeme of the common law.)
Moreover, the analysis assumes that residual exceptions to the hearsay rule do not apply. See
Fed. R Evid 803(24), 804(b)(5). The requirement of advance notice of the use of evidence
under these rules would militate against their use for completeness purposes in situations
where the proponent's introduction of incomplete reports of utterances cannot be
anticipated.
216. The only discemable exceptions are rules protecting third persons, rules that apply to
both proponent and opponent but which cannot ordinarily be invoked by either of them. This
matter is addressed supra notes 210-12 q.nd accompanying text.
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might be a since-deceased officer who heard the remainder. This possibility
seems to demand an expa...J.Sion of the test to allow trumping of symmetric
rules. The risk of misleading incompleteness dwarlS any hearsay
concems. 217 On the od1er hand, a different case is presented if the
second officer is still available to testify. Then, either the second officer
would testifY favorably to defendant, in which case the defendant would
have called ilie officer, and iliere would be no double hearsay problem; or
the second officer would deny the qualifYing remainder or provide it in a
form less favorable to defendant than that offered by the defense witness
in the hypothetical, leading the defendant to offer the double hearsay. In
tlJ.e latter case, arguably the defendant's proffer should be rejected: The
second officer's testimony is presumptively better evidence of ilie
remainder, as the hearsay rule implies. To this extent, the hearsay rule can
be honored without precluding evideJq.ce of the remainder; indeed,
application of the rule stands to improve the reliability of the evidence of
t:he remainder. 218 But the opposite conclusion should obtain if the
second officer's declaration V.'<!S made under conditions reducing the
probative dangers of hearsay, especially if the testimoniall report of the
219
remainder is made by an apparently neutral or pro-prosecution witness.
One may conclude that the court should exclude the remainder
unde:n: a symmetric rule to the extent that the objection .raised by the
proponent is due to a defect in the opponent's evidence that -..ve can
reasonably expect lhe opponent to be able to cure a...1d the curing of which
will likely improve the quality of the evidence of the remainder of the
220
utterance. The limited case law available tends to confi.nn such a view.

217. Once again, the fact that the proponent can and has presented evidence of part of
the utterance inherently reduces the risk of total fabrication by the opponent, since
proponent's witness will very likely have knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the
alleged remainder. Cj supra note 68 and accompanying text. The importance of such
background information affecting the reliability of hearsay is emphasized by Professor Swift,
supr2 note 129.
218. Of course, one can argue that the assumption of the availabilit"f of the second officer
renders the prosecution's objection unnecessary, since ihe second officer may be called by the
prosecution if it considers tl1c hearsay account of his :report unacceptable. However, this
argument is one that applies quite generally to all hearsay from an available but nontestifying
declarant. The same reasons for excluding hearsay from such a declarant, whatever Lhey are
and however convincing they may be, apply here. (The best evidence principle is the most
coherent reason to exclude such hearsay, if exclusion is justifiable at all.) And in this context,
deference to those reasons does not present an inescapable conflict with the completeness
principle.
219. This ungainly qualification would be unnecessary if the hearsay rule were reformed in
the direction of greater conformity to the best evidence principle, as that would certainly
allow the opponent to present the hearsay of the second officer's statement as long as the
second officer also testifies, see supra note 188, and perhaps even if not, given Lhe officer's
identification with the prosecution. See Seigel, supra note ] 29, at 938 (best evidence hearsay
rule should admit hearsay statements of a person strongly identified with an opposing party).
220. See, e.g., State v. Ryder, 348 A2d 1, 3-5 (Me. 1975) (holding remainder evidence
rightly excluded as improper in form on account of witness's use of unnecessary opinion;
remainder could have been introduced by properly phrased questions). Note that in Ryder the
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In this respect, the brief formula suggested by Dean McCormick221 is just

backwards: Objections like hearsay .<Uld secondary evidence should be
applied to the remainder evidence precisely,when they are objections only
"to form," if by that one means curable 9bjections to the manner of
evidencing the remainder as opposed to objections that, if sustained, would
preclude the opponent's evidencing the remainder at all Conversely, an
incurable admissibility defect should not stand in the way of eliminating
the greater defect of incompleteness, unless of course the former is the
unlikely circumstance that introduction of the remainder evidence would
cause an inordinate consumption of time or money relative to the
significance of the issue in question.
To be sure, the problem with this scheme is that the substitution of
the curable defect standard for rules symmetrically excluding the
remainder amounts to a significant modification of the hearsay rule and
other symmetrical rules in accordance with the best evidence priiiciple.
Some may consider this too radical in liberalizing admissibility. But when
limited to evidencing a verbal event that has already been broached by the
proponent, it is hard to see how this is undesirable. 222

3. The Problem of a Source Limitation Revisited
Notice, however, that the confession hypothetical just discussed is
ambiguous as to the testimonial source of the remainder: The witness who
is to report the hearsay version of the remainder might or might not be
the witness through whom the prosecution offered the original part. As
discussed at the end of Part II, nearly all reported trumping cases involve a
remainder evidenced by the proponent's chosen source, whether a witness

defect of the opponent's response was avoidable by the opponent. Also, the .court endorsed
earlier decisions, from Maine and from other states, allowing trumping in the more typical
contexts. Id. at 4 (citing, inter alia, Storer v. GoTen, 18 Me. 174, 176-77 (1841) ).
221. See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
222. Among the most pervasive symmetric exclusionary rules are the authentication and
identification Tequirements for tangible evidence. See gen..i•mlly McCormick, supra note 142, §
212, at 7-9 (discussing identification of real evidence), § 218 (discussing authentication of
documents). Since authentication of a portion of a document will usually entail authentication of the whole of the same document, the opponent's completeness motion will rarely be
impeded by authentication concerns, and the same point applies to identification. Moreover,
to the extent that these requirements are interpreted flexibly, in accordance with the best
evidence principle, they should only rarely present an occasion for exclusion on account of an
.incurable defect in the foundation for the remainder. See Dale A Nance, Conditional
Relevance Reinterpreted, 70 B.U. L Rev. 447, 484-88, 492-97 (1990) (rejecting the
"conditional relevance" explanation of authentication and identification requirements and
arguing for an excusable preference structure). However, a less flexible interpretation has not
been uncommon, and the occasional case in which a problem arises does seem to allow for
trumping. See, e.g., McBrayer v. Walker, 50 S.E. 95 (Ga. 1905) (holding that opponent is not
required to offer evidence authenticating entries on back of deed introduced by proponent,
even though proponent relied only on information on the front).
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or document. If this pattern suggests a rule, then the opponent may
introduce a Temainder pursuant to the completeness :rule, over an
otherwise valid objection, only to the extent that the remainde>: can be
elicited from ilie proponent's witness, or from lhe complete version of lhe
document only part of which the proponent has introduced. On ilie other
hand, if there is no same-source limitation, as apparently was held in the
Williams case, then the opponent is free to use other sources to complete
224
the utterance and stiH take advantage of the trumping function. In the
earlier discussion, this issue was left unresolved. Can we now give a more
defmitive answer?
If the "forced presentation" theory of completeness :is taken as the
starting point, a same-source limitation might seem proper. One way to
express the adversarial privilege is that a litigant should generally be free
to choose evidential sources, though he need not and should not be free
to distort what a given source has to offer the tribunal.. Mter all, the
witness's oath, with which we started our discussion, requires only that
witnesses tell the whole truth as they know it. That requirement pennits a
witness to give an incomplete account, as long as the information needed
to make it complete is not lmown by the witness. As to other sources, it is
at least plausible that the usual. exclusionary rules should apply.
However, one must not confuse the 1-vitness's duty with the litigant's
duty. Even though a given witness cannot be expected or even encouraged
to tell more than he or she lmows, the proponent is in a di_fferent sirnation
when he has lmowledge that the witness's accormt is incomplete. Thus,
while it may be true that the proponent is free to choose his evidential.
sources, and it may also be true that he should not be free to distort what
a given source has to offer the tribunal, it may further be true that the
proponent should not be free to use a complete account of what one witness
knows (or is willing to reveal) in order to distort the evidence of a verbal
utterance by omitting information available from a different source that
cannot be introduced by his opponent So we must look further in order
to resolve this issue.
Consider what a sa..vne-source li..vnitation means for the typical case in
which the opponent's remainder is blocked by the asyr11metric partyopponent exception to the hearsay rule. Under such a regime, the
opponent can c.ross-e:xami.ne the proponent's mtness concerning the
remainder; if the wiLness admowledges the remainder it can be used
substantively just as i.f the proponent had presented the remainder on
direct If, however, the witness denies the utterance of a remainder, that
ends the completeness motion as such. Independent evidence of the
remainder can still be used, but only for impeachment purposes, or more
precisely, only if otherwise admissible. And if the mtness denies knowledge
of the remainder, but admowledges the possibility of its utterance (say

223.
224.

See supra notes 105-07 and accompanying text
See supra notes 107-12 and accompanying text
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because the witness did not hear all that the opponent may have said on
the occasion), then even impeachment of the witness is barred, at least in
theory, since evidence of the remainder is in no way inconsistent with the
witness's truthfulness. Nevertheless, the incompleteness of the witness's
knowledge will at least appear on cross-e:xamlnation and serve to alert the
trier of fact to the dangers of relying on the proponent's version of the
225
utterance.
Now this scheme presents some fairly serious difficulties, given what
has already been argued. For example, it would mean that a video-taped
remainder, like that involved in the Williams case, would ·not be
substantively admissible, even though the tape is undeniably superior
evidence of the defendant's confession than the officer's testimonial
226
account introduced by the prosecution. Yet paradoxically, if the videotape were no longer available to be introduced, and the proponent's
witness were aware of its contents, the opponent could admit substantively
the witness's account of the remainder derived entirely from the
unavailable tape. This follows from the claim of the previous section that
an incurable symmetric objection to the remainder is subject to trumping
combined with the fact that in this case the trumping would come from
the same source. But how can it be tbat an available video-tape is
substantively inadmissible, while secondary evidence of the contents of an
unavailable video-tape is substantively admissible? This kind of inconsistency can be avoided only by retreating to a scheme in which symmetric
exclusionary rules are not subject to trumping at all, even if the defect that
they address is incurable.
A more fundamental, if more abstract problem is that a same-source
limitation has the effect of turning completeness into a kind of "voucher"
rule, whereby the proponent vouches for the particular evidentiary source.
To be sure, this is not the same as the traditional notion that a proponent
is estopped from controverting the testimony of his own witness, a
restdction which has been 1ightly rejected in modern evidence iaw. 227

225. A similar regime would apply to documentary proof. ff the proponent introduces part
of a documentary record of the opponent's admission, the opponent can cross-examine the
sponsoring witness with regard to other parts, or otherwise introduce the remainder that will
have been subject to discovery. ff the document relied on by the proponent reveals a
qualifying part, it may be introduced and used substantively just as if the proponent had
presented the remainder together with the original proffer. ff, however, no qualifying
remainder appears from the document from which the proponent has drawn his proffer, then
the opponent will be unable to use the completeness motion to introduce independent
testimonial or documentary evidence of a claimed remainder. Such evidence will be limited to
impeachment uses.
226. One may be accustomed to this perversity in the form of the routine ruling that the
testimony is not excludable in favor of the tape by virtue of a "best evidence" objection. See
Nance, Best Evidence, supra note 3, at 227-29. However, the issue here is not whether to
exclude the testimony, but whether to admit the tape as well.
227. See generally 3A John H. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law §§ 896-99
(Chadbourn rev. 1970). The application of this rejection of voucher to evidence presented by
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Nonetheless, a same-source limitation seems to rely on the idea that the
proponent must at least vouch for the admissibility of the remainder,
precisely because he has introduced a part of what that source has to offer
the tribunal. This source-based voucher draws on the same discredited
moral intuition as the traditional voucher rule. Moreover, if the theoretical
account of completeness offered here is correct, it arises from the demand
· for the best available evidence, applied within an adversarial structure of
rules that incorporates that idea as a heavilly weighted, but not exclusive
principle. Neither a same~source restriction nor its implicit voucher
concept speaks to such a theory of completeness.
On the other hand, different problems must be addressed if trumping
is not confmed to what can be elicited from the proponent's source. The
most important issue arises from the fact that, when the remainder is
evidenced from an independent source, there is a much greater chance
that the proponent will plausibly dispute the utterance of the putative
remainder or claim that any such remainder was different from that
asserted by the opponent 228 Of course, the fact that one side disputes
events evidenced by the other is ordinarily no cause for alarm; but in the
context of a completeness motion, the question is whether forced
presentation is theoretically appropriate. It is hard to infer that the
proponent should have presented evidence of a remainder that the
proponent believes was not uttered.
This suggests that before allowing trumping, especially from a distinct
evidential source, the trial court should make a preliminary fmding that
the remainder was uttered as claimed. More precisely, upon the
proponent's challenge to either the occurrence or the content of the
remainder utterance, the court should make a conditional finding that if the

way of completeness is mentioned supra note 58.
228. When trumping involves a remainder elicited from the same source, the proponent is
hard pressed to maintain that the remainder was not uttered as the opponent claims. In the
case ~f testimonial evidence, the proponent must argue that his witness is telling the truth
about part of the utterance but a falsehood as to the remainder. The possibility is somewhat
more realistic in the case of documentary evidence, since the proponent can claim, for
example, that only part of a document is a forgery. Interestingly, in the only such cases
encountered in this research, trumping of the otherwise applicable authentication
requirement was endorsed. See McBrayer v. Walker, 50 S.E.2d 95 (Ga. 1905); see also Dagleish
v. Dodd, 172 Eng. Rep. 955 (KB. 1832) (admitting for defendant writing by plaintiff's
insolvent on back of defendant's letter already admitted for plaintiff). However, these cases
also rely, more or less explicitly, on a distinct and understandable exception to the
requirement of authentication, one that does not depend upon the completeness rule as
such, namely that "a person's possession of documents purporting to be made by himself and,
particularly, of documents used and acted on by him in the ordinary conduct of his business,
is sufficient evidence of their genuineness to justify their reception." 7 Wigmore, supra note
10, § 2160, at 777 (emphasis omitted). Even in the Williams case, where the court applied the
completeness rule to mandate the admission of evidence of the remainder from a distinct
source, that source was a video-taped version of the defendant's confession created and
possessed exclusively by the police and prosecution. Obviously, the proponent was in no
position to contest the utterance of the remainder.
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original part was uttered as the proponent claims, then the remainder was
uttered as the opponent claims.:129 If this conditional fact is established,
one may reasonably infer that the proponent should have revealed the
evidence of the remainder to the trier of fact. If not, the opponent is
subject to the same regime that would apply if ,there were a same-source
trumping limitation. This, moreover; is not simply a matter of conditional
relevance, but rather a matter of determining the applicability of the suprarelevance exclusionary rule, usually the hearsay rule, the trumping of
which is at issue. 2g° Consequently, under conventional practice, the
required preliminary fmding should be made by a preponderance of the
evidence, just as would a factual issue conditioning the application of an
.
exception
to su ch a rul e. 251
The difference between these two completeness regimes lies in the
degree to which they allow expression of the refo:n:llative power of the best
evidence principle in terms of liberalizing the admissibility of evidence.
This power is given greater sway if a same-source limitation is not imposed.
Granted that one should not find in the completeness doctrine authority

229. A conditional form reflects the filet that the opponent may well deny the asserted
occurrence of the utterance as a whole or the asserted identity of its speaker or author. See
supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text. While it might be theoretically more precise to
pose the question of whether the proponent was aware of the utterance of the remainder, that
awareness will depend on the evidence, and the evidence might only come to the proponent's
attention at trial. Thus, the preliminary question is more practically posed in terms of what
the evidence shows than in tenns of what the proponent knew or believed before trial.
230. Among other implications, this means that the trial court is not bound by
exclusionary rules, other than privileges, in making its preliminary determination. See Mueller
& Kirkpatrick, supra note 183, § 1.12, at 51-53. Note that to the extent an authentication or
identification requirement is the objection to the remainder at issue, the opponent can gain
admission by either (a) producing sufficient admissible evidence to support a finding that the
remainder is what the opponent claims it to be (i.e., the ordinary route in which trumping is
not employed, see id. § 9.2), or (b) producing sufficient evidence that the trial judge finds
conditionally that the remainder is what the opponent conditionally claims it to be (i.e., the
route in which trumping is employed).
231. See id. § 1.12, at 50-51. Of course, there are several other candidates for a
requirement, including: (I) a finding that the proponent concedes the utterance as claimed;
(2) a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the remainder was uttered as claimed; (3) a
finding that the evidence would support a finding that the remainder was uttered as claimed;
or ( 4) a finding that there is some significant evidence that the remainder was uttered as
claimed (i.e., that it is not beyond reasonable doubt that it was not uttered as claimed). In
each case, the finding would be conditional, in the sense described in text. Standard (I) is
obviously too demanding on the opponent, since it would allow the proponent to block any
truJ;Dping. Arguably, standard (4) is insufficiently demanding under a forced presentation
theory of completeness, since it would mean the proponent is obligated· to present any
significant evidence of a remainder utterance not otherwise admissible for the opponent,
which by definition will be true under a completeness motion that survives the relevance test
and raises the issue of trumping. Standard (3) is plausible, since the trier of filet is likely to
ignore a remainder that does not satisfy such a test, but it is nonetheless too weak a
requirement in that it places a theoretical moral burden on the proponent to present
evidence he disbelieves just because he might have believed it. And standard (2), also
plausible, makes the opposite mistake.
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to reform the whole of admissibility law, two fuctors favor the more
expansive view of trumping. First, the vast majority of the troublesome
cases, involving symmetric exclusionary rules premised on improving
accuracy, will concern the hearsay rule, and there is reason to believe that
hearsay is not as great a danger to accuracy as once thought. 252 Second, a
same-source limitation pushes one to limit trumping too narrowly to cases
of formal asymmetry, while the concerns that are introduced by the
trumping of symmetric rules ate dramatically reduced by requiring a
preliminary finding in any case where the utterance of the remainder is
255
disputed.
On balance, the Williams case is correct in its apparent
conclusion that the better choice is not to impose a same-source limitation
on trumping, at least when the utterance of the remainder as claimed by
the opponent is conditionally probable. 254
4. A Revised Test for Trumping

We thus obtain the following revised version of the test for
determining when trumping should occur, assuming once again that the
proffered remainder passes the relevance test for wholeness.
REviSED TEsT: Under the principle of completeness, evidence of
the remainder should be admissible on demand of the opponent,
for the same purposes as to which the original proffer is
admissible, over an otherwise valid objection by the·proponent if
the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the
remainder was uttered as the opponent claims, assuming for this
purpose that the original part was uttered as the proponent
claims, unless:
(a) the objection to the remainder is based on a defect that is
reasonably curable by the opponent, the curing of which will
232. See, e.g., Peter Meine et al., Juror Decision Making and the Evaluation of Hearsay
Evidence, 76 Minn. L. Rev. 683 (1992) (reporting results of empirical study to the effect that
jurors do not overvalue hearsay evidence). Note also that, according to the analysis of the
previous subsection, the problem will only arise when the hearsay objection represents an
incurable defect, since a curable defect objection can be asserted despite the completeness
argument. Theories of hearsay that emphasize the conservation of the trier's cognitive
resources do not lead to a different result, since remainder evidence that is extraordinarily
weak need not be admitted under the analysis of the previous subsections. See supra notes 20708 and accompanying text.
233. For example, in the double hearsay confession hypothetical of the previous
subsection, if the trial court's finding is not in favor of the opponent's (perhaps conditional)
claim that the remainder was uttered, then trumping is not allowed, but the evidence of the
remainder may nonetheless be admis5ible for nonhearsay purposes such as impeachment,
which do not require such a finding.
234. A complete analysis of this issue would require consideration of the problem of
"nonverbal completeness," that is, the possibility of a trumping function with a wholeness
criterion that is not even limited to verbal events, but rather demands complete evidence of
the often underlying nonverbal events. Unfortunately, that examination must be postponed
until another occasion, so the conclusions reached here with regard to a source limitation
must be considered subject to revision.
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improve the quality of the evidence of the remainder, or
(b) the public interest in acc:uracy served by admitting the whole
of the utterance in question is dearly outweighed either by the
proponent's interest in excluding the reinainder under a rule of
prejudice or an (unwaived) rule of privilege or quasi-privilege or
by the public's interest in reasonably efficient trials, or
(c) admission would violate a right held by a third person, not
lawfully waived by the proponent, under rules of privilege or
prejudice.
Of course, if the remainder falls into one of the three exceptional
categories of the Revised Test, it remains open to the trial court, in an
appropriate case, to exclude the original part as excessively misleading or
even to invoke the doctrine of curative admissibility to admit the
remainder for the limited purpose of offsetting the probative effect of the
original part. 235 The former response, excluding the incomplete proffer,
ought not be available with regard to remainders falling into the first
exception since by hypothesis the opponent has the ability to redress the
incompleteness.236 And the latter response, invoking curative admission,
will almost certainly be precluded when the reason for the inadmissibility
of the remainder is an unwaived privilege rule. However, if the privilege is
one protecting the proponent, the likelihood that the proponent's rights
under such a rule would not be waived is exceedingly small. 237
Note that we started with a Preliminary Test based on asymmetry, but
we have concluded with a Revised Test that is not explicitly dependent on
that concept This is a consequence of the shift from formal to functional
asymmetry and of the emphasis on accurate adjudication as the principal
goal underlying our sense of unfairness in the situations that call for
trumping. Nevertheless, the vast majority of trumping cases have occurred
in the context of formal asymmetry, where the demands of fairness and
accuracy are most clearly complementary.
N. CONCLUSION

The advers~-.ial common law has always contained -norms that serve to
assure the presentation of the best reasonably available evidence on a
litigated issue. That is not to say that the courts have invariably achieved
such a goal, but only that serious pressure is applied to move things in that
direction. One such norm has been the doctrine of completeness, a
general indusionary doctrine judicially crafted to forestall several
mechanisms of truth-defeating unfairness. In its early development, before
the advent of modern discovery rules, the most significant of these was the
differential availability of the evidence to the parties. Under modem
procedure, most significant is the existence of exclusionary rules that are

235.
236.
237.

See supra Part III.B.
See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 194-95 and accompanying text.
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fonnally or functionally asymmetric when applied to a given item of
evidence. Of secondary importance is the ability to control the timing of
the presentation of the remainder in order to facilitate its understanding
by the trier of fact.
Recent decades have seen an unfortunate tendency to deemphasize
this important common-law doctrine. The most conspicuous evidence of
this tendency is the seemingly narrow version of the doctrine that emerged
out of the federal codification, quoted in the Introduction to this Article:
When a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is
introduced by a party, an adverse party may require the
introduction at that time of any other part or any other writing or
recorded statement that ought in fairness to be considered
contemporaneously with it. 238
Aside from the lack of significant guidance inherent in the vague "fairness"
standard, this version suggests that the doctrine of completeness applies
only to "writings or recorded statements," thus apparently leaving
untouched the enormous category of incomplete testimonial recountings of
conversations, statements, or documentary contents. Stated in a form that
is easily recognized as the modem counterpart of what has here been
called the interruption rule, it also risks a narrow interpretation as
concerned only with the timing· function. Unfortunately, these narrowing
connotations are endorsed by a substantial body of poorly reasoned judicial
dicta as well as supporting academic commentary. 239 It is not surprising,

238. Fed. R Evid. 106. Earlier evidence is the fact that the common-law doctrine does not
appear at all in the American Law Institute's Model Code, except in connection with the
more narrowly applicable doctrine of waiver of privilege. See Model Code of Evidence Rule
231 (1942).
239. See, e.g., United States v. Harvey, 959 F.2d 1371 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that trial
court did not err in excluding certain exculpatory hearsay statements made by defendant,
where they were not within Rule 106 because they were neither relevant to qualify any
statements elicited on direct examination of t.i-}e witness nor part of a writing); United States
v. Terry, 702 F.2d 299, 314 (2d Cir.), ccrt. denied, 461 U.S. 931 (1983) (stating in dictum that
"Rule 106 does not render admissible evidence that is otherwise admissible," but holding
remainder of oral statements in question admissible under state of mind exception to hearsay
rule); United States v. Costner, 684 F.2d 370, 373 (6th Cir. 1982) (holding that trial court
erred in admitting portions of document containing hearsay upon prosecution's request after
defendant had introduced portions relevant to testimony of witness and upon which witness
relied to refresh memory, where portions offered by prosecution irrelevant to witness's
testimony; dictum that Rule 106 governs only order of proof); United States v. Burreson, 643
F.2d 1344 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 830 (1981) (holding that the trial court did not
abuse discretion in denying admission of irrelevant, hear5ay remainder). For similar academic
commentary, see Graham, supra note 57, § 106.1; Stephen A Saltzburg & Michael M. Ma.rtin,
Federal Rules of Evidence Manual 57 (5th ed. 1990); 1 Weinstein & Berger, supra note 126,
1106[01], at 13, and 1106[02] (noting common-law antecedents but then simply asserting
that Rule 106 "merely regulates a detail of the order of proof'). To be sure, there are
competing opinions more in line with the common-law understanding. See, e.g., United States
v. Sutton, 801 F.2d 1346 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (holding that completeness trumps hearsay
objection to evidence of remainder of defendant's out-of-court declaration); Louisell &
Mueller, supra note 144, § 49.
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therefore, that' the doctrine receives little or no attention in many modern
textbooks on evidence law, a fact which no doubt contributes to a lack of
understanding and appreaation of the doctrine in the practicing bar. 240
The present study ·has begun th~ process of redressing this
unfortunate state of affairs. In later work; I will address the question of
whether the Federal Rules of Evidence are compatible with the
understanding of the completeness doctrine developed here. I will also
consider what amendatory language would more readily achieve the
laudable functions that evolved at common law. If the indicated narrowing
constructions are in fact placed on the Rules, such amendment may be
necessary in order to avoid injustice.

240.. No significant discussion can be found in the following standard texts: Ronald J.
Allen & Richard B. Kuhns, An Analytical Approach to Evidence: Text. Problems, and Cases
(1989); Eric D. Green & Charles R Nesson, Problems, Cases, and Materials on Evidence
(1983); John Kaplan, Jon R Waltz, & Roger Park, Evidence: Cases and Materials (7th ed.
1992); Richard 0. Lempert & Stephen A Saltzburg, A Modem Approach to Evidence (2d ed.
1982); and Leon Letwin, Evidence Law: Commentary, Problems and Cases (1986). Only brief
discussions can be found in the following standard texts: Edward W. Cleary, John W. Strong,
Kenneth S. Broun, & Robert P. Mosteller, Evidence: Cases and Materials 407 (4th ed. 1988);
Paul R Rice, Evidence: Common Law and Federal Rules of Evidence 346, 781 (1986); and
Jack B. Weinstein, John H. Mansfield, Norman Abrams, & Margaret A Berger, Cases and
Materials on Evidence 172-75, 577-78 (8th ed. 1988). Texts devoting at least some significant
attention to the doctrine include: Ronald L. Carlson, Edward J. Imwinkelried, & Edward J.
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